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1970-72


THE KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI RESEARCH INSTITUTE
SILVER JUBILEE VOLUME

69056

Edited by
Dr. S. S. JANAKI



1970-71, 1971-72



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PREFACE

The Silver Jubilee of any institution is a memorable event. It was indeed so of the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, founded in 1944 and which has made consistent and valuable contribution to Oriental Studies and Indology in an unostentatious manner, during nearly three decades. The Institute bears the honourable name of Prof. Mm. Kuppuswami Sastriar, a scholar of colossal magnitude who shaped the destiny of Sanskrit Studies in Madras during his life-time (1880-1943). His standards were high, his ideals great. Fortunately for the Institute its founders and those who followed them set up the same ideals in store before them in building up the Institute slowly and steadily, as a temple of learning that would be worthy of the great name that it bears. Dr. V. Raghavan, a sincere student of Prof. Kuppuswami Sastri, the Founder-Secretary of the Institute, who was mainly responsible for the present status of the Institute and also for the successful conduct of the Silver Jubilee Celebrations in March 1971, is unfortunately not with us to see this Volume in print.

The publication of this Silver Jubilee Number has been delayed due to unforeseen circumstances, including the difficulty of presses in Madras for printing Sanskrit and Indological material in Devanāgarī and Roman Transliteration, steep hike in paper-price and the unexpected demise of Dr. V. Raghavan. I am happy that it has been possible for me to bring out this Volume during the Birth-Centenary Year (1980-81) of Mm. Kuppuswami Sastri. The Volume carries an account of the Celebrations, and the papers presented on the occasion, except the few which the authors got published elsewhere.

I am thankful to the Indian Council of Historical Research, New Delhi for their financial assistance, and to Dr. C. S. Sundaram, Reader in Sanskrit, University of Madras, for assistance in the proof-reading.


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
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Distinguished Scholars who participated in the Silver Jubilee Celebrations
with the members of the Governing Body



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SILVER JUBILEE OF THE KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI RESEARCH INSTITUTE

1971 was a noteworthy year in the annals of the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, which was started in 1945, and which, like the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona and Ganganatha Jha Oriental Research Institute (now the Kendriya Vidyapitha), Allahabad, has been doing yeomen service to Indology. The Silver Jubilee of the Institute was organised in March 27-28, 1971 and celebrated on a grand scale, like a mini-conference of Sanskrit and Indology with the participation of scholars and pandits from all parts of India. It was celebrated in a spacious pandal at the premises of the Institute and the Sanskrit College, with Prof. K. A. S. Iyer, Retd., Vice Chancellor of the Lucknow University, as the President, and Prof. Suniti Kumar Chatterji, Chairman of the Sahitya Akademi as the Chief guest.

On March 27 at 8-30 a.m. the function commenced with Vedic recitation and blessings received from H. H. Sankaracharya of Kanchi Kamakoti Pitha and from Acharya Visvesa Tirtha of Pejawar Math. Dr. V. Raghavan, Secretary, read messages received from scholars in India and abroad, for the success of the celebration. The Messages received on the occasion, included, among others, the following :—

The President of India, Hon. Sri V. V. Giri.

The Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi.

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, President of the Institute said: "I send my best wishes for the Silver Jubilee Celebrations of the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute. Mahamahopadhyaya Kuppuswami Sastri was in the long tradition of Indian wisdom and scholarship and the Institute that commemorates him has done distinguished work in the same line. I hope it will continue to do so."

The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, one of the pioneers in the field, sent a long message appreciating the activities of the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute and praying fervently that it will receive sufficient support from Scholars and the enlightened public and Government to carry out its projects and doing more and more useful work in future.

The following other Institutions in India have sent their greetings :—

The Asiatic Society, Calcutta, Vaidik Samshodan Mandal, Poona, The Sahitya Akademi, Adyar Library, Saraswati Mahal Library, Tanjore, University Mss. Library, Trivandrum, Ganganath Jha Research Institute, Allahabad, Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, Deccan College Research Institute, Poona, Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati, The Indian Institute of World Culture, Bangalore, and the French Institute of Indology, Pondichery.

Dr. R. K. Sharma of the Central Sanskrit Board, Dr. Lokesh Chandra, International Academy of Indian Culture, Delhi, Sri D. D. Malavya of the L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, Sri T. S. Swaminathan of the Ministry of Education, Dr. Awasthi of the Sangeet Natak Akademi, New Delhi, Dr. Sivaramamurthy of the National Museum, Sri M. D. Raghavan, Prof. Venkitakrishna, Pattambi, Dr. V. R. L. Sharma, Kumbhakonam and Mr. & Mrs. Indu Rao of Delhi have sent messages.

Messages have also been received from Dr. M. Varadarajan, Vice-Chancellor, Madurai University, Dr. Chandran D. S. Devanesan, Principal, Christian College, Tambaram, Sri M. R. L. Sastri, Principal Malleswaram College, Bangalore, Sophia Wadia, President, Indian P. E. N., Sri N. Ramaswami Iyer. Founder, Sitalakshmi Ramaswami College, Tiruchirapalli, Dr. B. N. K. Sharma, Bombay, Sri N. Venkatarama Ayyar, Sri P. S. Raghava Rama Sastri, Sri G. A. Dharmarajan, Madras University, Dr. Mrs. Sukumari Bhattacharji, Dr. Chhabra, Ootacamund.

The following Sanskrit and Indological scholars from Europe, America and Japan have sent their good wishes for the success of the Silver Jubilee Celebrations :—

Prof. J. Gonda, University of Utrecht, Holland, Dr Mayeda of the Suzuki Foundation and Dr. Hara, University of Tokyo, Dr. Yamaguchi of the Osaka University, Prof. Burrow, Boden Professor of Sanskrit, Oxford University, Dr. H. Bechert of University of Gottingen, Germany, Dr. Oscar Botto of University of Turin, Italy, Prof. G. Tucci of the Institute for Middle and Far East, Rome, Italy, Dr. Alex Wayman of the Columbia University, New York, Dr. Ludo Rocher, the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Dr. K. de Vreese of Amsterdam and Dr. A. L. Basham of the Department of Asian Civilizations, Australian National University.

Sri T. V. Viswanatha Aiyar, Chairman of the Reception Committee, welcoming the distinguished guests. observed—

“The Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute was founded immediately after the demise of the late Prof. Mr. S. Kuppuswami Sastrigal. Neither to an audience in this part of the city nor to the world of Sanskrit Scholars is there any necessity to speak about the great Professor in whose name this institute was started.

This Institute was started in the latter part of 1943. But it is a continuation of the work which he had initiated and was maintaining during his lifetime since 1927-28 through the *Journal of Oriental Research* and the related publications of the *Madras Oriental Series*. On his demise the idea of perpetuating his memory and work, through a research institute in his name, was considered to be the most appropriate memorial to him, by some of the most eminent persons of that time who were intimately connected with Professor Sastriar, like Rt. Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Sri T. R. Venkatarama Sastriar, Sri K. V. Krishnaswamy Iyer, Sri R. Narayanaswamy Iyer, (Proprietor of the Madras Law Journal Press) and Sri K. Balasubrahmanya Iyer (Managing Editor of the Journal of Oriental Research and Secretary of the Sanskrit College). Besides there were the assets of his own personal large library, 13 Volumes of the Journal of Oriental Research and copies of some of the books which he had brought out including the *Dhvanyāloka*, and last but not least the devotion and energy of Dr. V. Raghavan, one of the leading and most active of his students. The support of these distinguished persons and the generous manner in which Professor's son Sri G. K. Seshagiri, gave his father's library, and the active help, Sri R. Narayanaswamy Iyer and Sri K. Balasubrahmanya Iyer gave, the *Journal of Oriental Research* and the connected publications, helped to bring the institute into existence. After the Memorial meeting held in the Senate House of the Madras University under the Chairmanship of Dr. A. L. Mudaliar, the Vice-Chancellor and a meeting of students, friends and admirers of the Prof., at the residence of Rt. Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, the Institute was formally inaugurated on 22-4-1945 at the Sanskrit College grounds by Sri S. V. Ramamurthy, then adviser to Governor, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Dr. A. L. Mudaliar and Dr. K. M. Munshi participating in the inaugural function.

Thanks to the appeal that the first President of the institute, the Rt. Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar made to scholars, friends and patrons all over India, financial support for starting the activities of the Institute was secured. From the very beginning the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute has been a voluntary organisation without

any assistance from official sources and has been carrying on its work through the contributions of Life Members, Fellows and Patrons. The Journal was resumed and from volume 14 onwards and a total of 38 volumes have been issued. The formes of the *Dhvanyāloka* were bound and made ready. The Primer of Indian Logic was salvaged and republished twice and several other publications, nearly a score of them, have since been issued. It must be mentioned that among these, are included two of the unpublished lectures of Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar himself. Considering the very modest resources of the Institute and the absence of any financial assistance, it will be agreed that the institute had done remarkably well.

In the more recent years, after the Central Sanskrit Board came into being, some meagre assistance was being received annually. It has been possible to extend the premises in which the institute is located. With the kind accommodation provided by the authorities of the Madras Sanskrit College, the institute was housed in this very hall which had been sanctified by the stay here of His Holiness Chandrasekharendra Saraswati, Sri Sankaracharya of Kanchi Kamakoti Peetha who had performed Poojas and meditations herein. It has therefore been appropriately called after His Holiness's blessed name. The first extension of the building on the frontside was done with a handsome donation of B. G. Paul & Co. The addition of a wing on the west and then another on the east, was made possible by a contribution of the Central Sanskrit Board. We have appealed to the Board for further assistance for improvements to the building and providing more facilities, safety and accommodation and we hope the Board will come to our assistance.

As I have already stated, from the very beginning, the Institute could not have sufficient financial resources to have their own paid staff to carry on research and publication work. The work is being carried on by Honorary office-bearers and outside scholars. It is hoped that with the increased assistance from the Central Sanskrit Board it will be possible for the Institute to have some paid research scholars, fellows, librarians, etc. to carry on the work.

The Institute now has in its library, a collection of about 10,000 volumes which are particularly rich in Sanskrit texts, several of which have been handled by distinguished persons like Prof. Kuppuswami Sastrigal, Prof. M. Hirianna of Mysore, Prof. K. V. Rangaswami Iyengar and other savants in other fields of activity who had a strong Sanskrit grounding like the Rt. Hon. V. S. S. Sastriar, Sri T. R. Venkatarama Sastrigal and several others who gave us smaller collections as gifts. Special mention must be made of several works of high research value given by the wife of the late Sri M. S. Ramaswami

Iyer of the Madras Police Service who was well known for his researches in Biblical history. Recently the Central Sanskrit Board has been presenting us with a number of publications in Sanskrit and on Sanskrit subjects. One of the primary activities of the Institute is to arrange for lectures on Sanskrit and allied subjects of research in Indian history, archaeology, religion, philosophy, literature, art etc. by visiting scholars from other parts of India and from foreign countries. The Institute had also organised some noteworthy activities, two of which could be mentioned. One, an Exhibition of Gītā literature collected from all over the world through the co-operation of several libraries and a Bibliography of Gītā based on the survey made at that time by Dr. V. Raghavan is one of the projects which the Institute has in mind. The second is the conduct of a Sanskrit Class for some years with the help of Sri Chittoor Rajagopalachariar who gave a handsome donation in his old age, foregoing even his personal comforts. This was an experiment conducted by one who had mastered Sanskrit grammar, Sri Sankara Subramanya Iyer, who taught Pāṇini's Sūtras themselves according to a method evolved by him.

Among the projects which the Institute wants to undertake or pursue, is the edition of the *Dhvanyāloka* with the corrections and readings noted by Prof. Sastriar and with his own Sanskrit notes. The Institute has also on its plan a Sanskrit and Prākṛt Men of Letters Series, the plan of which was approved by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan.

The Institute has been functioning as one of the most significant forums for Sanskrit and allied studies in this part of the country. It is not necessary for me at all to dilate upon the sad position to which the study of Sanskrit in our Educational institutions has been reduced. However, the interest in Sanskrit has tremendously increased among the public as witnessed by the large number of voluntary classes, of private systems of examinations conducted by Registered bodies such as Amara Bharati, Chittoor Sanskrita Bhasha Pracharini Sabha, and the Saral Sanskrit examination of Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. If we consolidate on the positive signs, we may still hope to preserve and continue the study of Sanskrit and give our children an equipment in the language in which our thought and culture are enshrined. In this connection I may mention, although those nearer to us may be aware of this, that this Institute is not the only centre which we are maintaining here; there is the grand old Sanskrit College in whose grounds we are now standing, then the Sanskrita Academy, which is as old as our *Journal of Oriental Research* and through which we promote popular interest in Sanskrit literature and writers, the Sanskrit Education Society where we have a teaching and research centre,

which is giving training in an additional Śāstra to young Pandits who are qualified in one Śāstra and bringing out publications, all exhibited over there, which are very useful aids for learning Sanskrit-like Teaching of Sanskrit, Concordance of Verbal Derivatives, New Model Sanskrit Grammar and so on, and the Sanskrita Ranga which concentrates on the more attractive programme of producing Sanskrit plays which not only brings to the stage several of the masterpieces of the Sanskrit theatre but also provides an easy means of learning Sanskrit to the actors who are drawn from all walks of life. There is no official machinery by which all these institutions are brought into one set-up; but owing to their common inspiration, common office-bearers and to their habitation, they are all integrated in spirit and purpose. Although no Central Sanskrit Institute or Vidyapeetha so-called has been given to Madras by the powers that be, we, through all these organisations here, have, in spite of the many handicaps that we have to face in this part of this country, been carrying on in a heroic manner.

The work done by the Institute during these 25 years is given in the series of Triennial Reports published by us, the latest of which, for 1966-69, has been issued just now. Under the auspices of the Institute, about 25 Pandits including some seniors like Sri Agnihotram Ramanuja Thatachari carried out research work and produced Theses in Sanskrit Board for research scholarships for products of traditional Sanskrit Pathasalas.

I would like to take this occasion to make special mention of one or two matters. *Firstly*, our deep debt of gratitude to the authorities of the Madras Sanskrit College. Prof. Kuppuswami Sastrigal was the first Principal of the College, and it was very appropriate that a Research Institute founded in his memory should have found its habitation in the premises of this temple of learning. *Secondly*, the help Sri K. Balasubrahmanya Iyer has rendered to the Institute. He was a great and ardent admirer of the Maha-mahopadhyaya. It is no wonder he took such an active and abiding interest both in the foundation of the Institute and as its Secretary till his passing away. *Thirdly*, Dr. Raghavan's indefatigable labour over the years for the Institute and for the Journal of Oriental Research in a spirit of Guru-Dakshina as it were to his revered teacher whose honoured name this Institute bears and of which he has been one of the Founder-Secretaries and a sustaining force.

Friends, you would have noticed in the programme that the portraits of these two gentlemen, Mr. K. Balasubrahmanya Iyer and Dr. Raghavan, are to be unveiled in the course of these celebrations. I shall have occasion then, to speak in some detail about each of them.

I feel I could make a special appeal on this occasion to the Central authorities as well as friends and supporters of Sanskrit studies to come forward to enable us to make our work more broad-based and widespread and more intensive and effective on the popular as well as on the academic side.

Now my good friends, on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee of the Institute we must mention that the Central Sanskrit Board has given us part assistance, expecting us to raise our own share of the expenses. We decided to organise the Silver Jubilee Celebrations because it affords us an occasion to pull ourselves up and re-inforce our own self-confidence and develop fresh inspiration and enthusiasm for carrying on this work. In this we feel heartened by the response we received from scholars and friends. The Institute is most grateful to Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterji, the senior-most Sanskritist and Indologist of India, who was the Chairman of the Sanskrit Commission and is now the Chairman of the Sahitya Akademi. He has been kind enough to come and to inaugurate our Silver Jubilee Celebrations and participate in these activities. We are also sensible of the honour that Prof. K.A.S. Iyer has done us, by agreeing to deliver the Silver Jubilee Address of the Institute. He has been connected with us, as one of the founder-members of the Institute, and I may remind him that only recently he performed the ceremony of opening the extension on the eastern side of the building. He has contributed several articles to the Journal of Oriental Research from the earliest years. We are thankful to several institutions and scholars who have responded to our invitations by sending papers or are attending in person and are thereby contributing to the success of the academic sessions which we have organised for two days in connection with the Silver Jubilee.

In addition to the Section where scholars will read papers, we have also a Pandita Parishad where Pandits in different Śāstras will present their papers in Sanskrit, and there will be also a Vākyaārtha Sadas. This is most appropriate as the scholar in whose name the Institute is founded, combined in himself the deepest erudition according to the traditional method in several Śāstras with an equipment in the modern critical and comparative study of Sanskrit language and literature and philosophy. We are also having a Vedic Sadas in which those proficient in Veda and Veda Bhashya of the different Śākhās will give expositions in Sanskrit on Vedic topics. There are also other functions included in the two days' programme, all of which will conclude with the Sanskrit Drama Mudrārākshasa of Viśākhadatta which will be presented tomorrow evening by the Samskrita Ranga, Madras.

I now request you sir, Dr. Chatterji, to inaugurate the Silver Jubilee Celebrations of the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute and you Sri Prof Aiyar, to deliver the Silver Jubilee Address”.

In his Inaugural address Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterji pointed out that the modern study of Sanskrit had not only given us doyens of Indology like Bhandarkar, Isvara Chandra Vidyasagar and Kuppuswami Sastri, but also helped us to acquire a new discipline that we did not have (*yoga*), while traditional study of Sanskrit had taught them to preserve what is (*kṣema*), These two forms of study, therefore, formed the very basis of our *yoga-kṣema* in the field of learning.

Professor K. A. S. Iyer in his Presidential Address gave in detail an account of the achievements of the Institute, the work and learning of Kuppuswami Sastri, and the promises which the Institute held out for the future. The following are some extracts from his Address :—

“It was in 1922 in Calcutta that I had the pleasure of meeting Mm. Professor Kuppuswami Sastri for the first time when he came to preside over the Philosophy Section of the All-India Oriental Conference. The deep impression which he made on me then was confirmed and fortified in later years by the first-hand and glowing accounts which some of his former students like Dr. Kunhan Raja, Prof. K. R. Rama Pisharoti, Dr. A. Sankaran, Mm. Pt. Chinnaśwami Sastri, Pt. K. S. Ramaswami Sastri, Prof. V. A. Ramaswami Sastri and others gave me of their Guru. I also had the good fortune to meet him again at the Oriental Conference held in Allahabad, Lahore and Mysore. In 1928, I also called on him one morning at his house in Madras where I found him busy discussing some textual problems with Pandit S. K. Ramanatha Sastri. From all these direct and indirect sources emerged the picture of a great scholar with a massive intellect who was never satisfied till he had mastered a subject or solved a problem, a worker of uncompromising integrity, utterly devoted to teaching, inexorable in his sense of duty, indefatigable in his pursuit of knowledge, a convinced fighter and crusader for the advancement of Sanskrit whenever anybody stood on the way, calm and dignified in his complete self-confidence and full of silent benevolence towards others. These intellectual and moral qualities enabled him to acquire deep scholarship in many śāstras which he studied in the traditional way under great pandits. With a solid foundation in Vyākaraṇa, he mastered the two Mīmāṃsās, Nyāya and Sāhitya. Side by side with his education on traditional lines, he was also undergoing a modern education in present-day subjects

including Western Philosophy through the medium of English, so that he became familiar with all the work done in the nineteenth century in the field of Indology and the Comparative Study of Languages. The result was that while he was steeped in Indian scholarly traditions, he had, by the time that his education was finished, absorbed quietly the best features of the modern, critical, historical and comparative methods and had mastered, in all their details, the works of some of the great scholars of Indology and Indo-European Comparative Grammar, published in Western countries. The study of modern subjects at the post-graduate level and of the works of Western Sanskritists and Linguists had made him realise that advancement of knowledge in any subject depended on research and he spontaneously and naturally thought of his own future work in terms of research, of doing what had not yet been done before and of extending the boundaries of knowledge.

Whatever he did, he performed most conscientiously and with the utmost dedication. All those who watched him at work were immensely impressed by the dignity and weight of his personality. His students knew that they had the good fortune of being in the hands of a profound scholar, head and shoulders above the average Professors of Sanskrit in the other colleges and universities. His colleagues had before them a living model to emulate and an infallible authority in the *śāstras* to consult for removing their difficulties and resolving their intellectual doubts. Sanskritists all over the country had in him a reliable and impartial guide in planning and carrying out their schemes of work. Eminent men in the country turned to him for advice. He was called by Sir P. S. Sivaswamy Iyer, the then Vice-Chancellor of the Benares Hindu University, to help him in re-organising Sanskrit studies in that premier All-India Institution for higher studies. Even a distinguished poet and scholar like Mahakavi Ulloor Parameswara Iyer with so many solid achievements to his credit, stood in awe and reverence in his presence as he sensed the weight of his intellectual and moral qualities,

During his Curatorship of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, he added a large number of important manuscripts to the collection and they are being gradually used by research workers for enriching the library of printed Sanskrit works. It was during his Curatorship that a transcript was brought from Kerala of a manuscript in Malayalam Characters of the *Vṛtti* on the 1st and 2nd *Kāṇḍas* of the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari, believed by a tradition more than a thousand years old, to be by the author Bhartṛhari himself. As far as the 11th *Kāṇḍa* is concerned, that is the only manuscript of the *Vṛtti* now known to exist. He was keen to edit himself some of the important works the Mss. of which were being collected. The

Viṇvāsavadatta was edited and published in the *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras. In collaboration with Pandit T. V. Ramachandra Dikshitar, he edited and published the *Vibhramaviveka* of Maṇḍana Miśra in the same journal in 1932. By far the most important work which he edited and published, for the first time, with a very scholarly Introduction is the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra, a work which has added a great deal to our knowledge of the history of Vedānta. It was also an important achievement in that it rescued from oblivion a masterpiece of no less a philosopher than Maṇḍana Miśra, the great contemporary of Śaṅkara whose name has been well preserved by tradition and who, unlike other great Ācāryas, has left no commentaries, but independent works on topics related to the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. Knowing the importance of having an ancient commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana and the *Locana* of Abhinavagupta, he planned in collaboration with Sri T. V. Ramachandra Diksitar and Dr. Chintamani, a critical edition and publication of the *Kaumudī* of the Kerala King Uttuṅgodaya together with a commentary of his own called *Upalocana*. A part of the first *Uddyota* of all these four works was published in his life-time but it was only after he passed away that the whole of the first *Uddyota* was published by the Institute as a memorial to his great labour.

While his work as editor of Śāstraic works may be said to be a model of how such work should be done, the work which he liked to do and in which he excelled was that of expounding in English in a manner that would appeal to a modern mind, the ideas and doctrines lying embedded in the Śāstraic literature, considered difficult to understand even by trained Sanskritists. He was collecting material for several books in which he proposed to do just this kind of work. But, as he could not spare much time from his official duties including teaching which he discharged most conscientiously, he could not complete these books while still in service but hoped to do so after retirement. He has, however, given us an idea of what they would have been from the few small things which have been published. In his own life-time was published his 'Primer of Indian Logic'. It was very characteristic of him that, though the scholarly world expected him to tackle the advanced works of some śāstra or other, it is the *Tarkasaṅgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa which he has translated and explained in this work considered to be an elementary text book of Tarka. One has to study it carefully in order to appreciate what he has achieved even through this primer, as he himself calls it. Even after the excellent work of Athalye and Bodas which is to this day a reliable guide for understanding the *Tarkasaṅgraha*, there is so much in it that had not been explained by anybody else in English or in any other modern language. The *Tarkasaṅgraha* with the *Dīpikā*

is often referred to as the *Bālagādādhari* and Prof. Kuppuswami Sastrigal must have had that in mind when he wrote the primer. What he has done is to make the *Tarkasaṅgraha* a good introduction to Navya-nyāya for all those who have had a modern education. It is well-known that what usually bothers a modern student of Navya-nyāya is the language, the style and the special technical terms which have been used in it. He calls them thought-measuring devices and he has explained them for the first time, most lucidly in the English language. When I met him at the Mysore Session of the All-India Oriental Conference, I requested him to do for the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* what he has done for the *Tarkasaṅgraha*. He said he would consider. If he had been able to do it, not only the Navya-nyāya but also the other śāstras like Vyākaraṇa, Vedānta and even Sāhitya which have adopted the Navya-nyāya terminology, would have lost their terrors for the modern student. But his hands were already full and I do not suppose that he ever found time to take up this work.

He spoke very effectively in English and in Sanskrit. Whatever be the language in which he spoke, he spoke calmly and slowly but unhesitatingly. The first time that I heard him speak in Sanskrit was at the All-India Oriental Conference held in Allahabad when he was requested to move a vote of thanks to the participants in the Pandita Parishad. In doing so, he delivered an extempore speech. As he spoke, the words came slowly but not embarrassingly so. The sentences were long and one wondered what the next word would be and when it did come, one was struck by its appropriateness. When at last the sentence was closed, one was impressed by the beauty of its construction, and by the weightiness of its content. Even after his retirement from the Presidency College, he was not left to do what he always wanted to do, namely, to stay quietly in his village and finish writing the many books for which he had already collected much material. The year after his retirement, he was appointed as Hony. Professor of Sanskrit at the Annamalai University, Chidambaram. There he re-organised Sanskrit studies and put new life into them. After working there for four years, he retired from there also and finally settled down in his village, the Ganapathy Agraharam in the Tanjore District. He must have kept himself busy putting order into his notes, so that they may be made fit for publication. But alas! he was snatched away from us on the 5th of September 1943, at an age, which, in the present-day India with a very much higher expectation of life, is no longer spoken of as ripe old age.

His passing away came as a very great shock and spread gloom in the world of Sanskrit everywhere. Every one felt the need for doing something to perpetuate his memory, to keep alive the traditions

of scholarship which he had built up, to ensure that the influence which he had been exerting on his students and in the world of Sanskrit generally takes root in the country, so that the work which he had begun may be continued and expanded. The late Dr. S. K. Belvalkar was voicing a very general feeling when he said, in his Presidential address to the All-India Oriental Conference held in Benares in December 1943, while expressing his gratification at the starting of the Ganganath Jha Research Institute at Allahabad: "I am sure that South India will not lag behind the North, but will, in due course, devise ways and means for continuing and perpetuating the work of Mm. Kuppuswami Sastri by establishing another Research Institute before long." It is therefore, not surprising that after some preliminary meeting in 1944 in which Sri K. Balasubrahmanya Iyer and Dr. V. Raghavan played a prominent part, the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute was formally inaugurated by Mr. S. V. Ramamurti, I. C. S. Adviser to His Excellency, the Governor of Madras, on Sunday, April 22, 1945 at 6-30 P.M. at the Madras Sanskrit College premises, Mylapore, in the presence of a large gathering of ladies and gentlemen. The Right Hon'ble Mr. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri became the first President of the Institute. The dominant impression which the Institute has made on one while observing its work during the last twenty-five years is that it was run by a small but devoted band of workers who were inspired by the personality of the great scholar and teacher whose name the Institute bears and by devotion to the cause of Sanskrit and the many-sided culture for which it stands. If it is a sign of life in a people that its cultural institutions should be organised, not by direction or command from above but by the inner urge of the people themselves, then this Institute is a sign of life in the cultured section of the people of South India.

It was started with very little financial backing, without any assurance of support from the State or Central Governments and even now, after the lapse of a quarter of a century, the Institute does not give the impression of having adequate means, let alone affluence. The Institute was started before India attained Independence. We all know what has happened to the rupee since Independence, especially during the last ten or fifteen years. Where one used to speak before in terms of lakhs of rupees, one speaks now in terms of crores. I know of Research Institutes in other parts of India which are doing work similar to this Institute and their budget is also made in terms of lakhs. But this Institute is still moving in the sphere of hundreds and occasionally in the sphere of thousands. When the Institute was founded in 1945, an appeal was made for the formation of one-lakh fund. I do not know whether that amount has been collected even after the lapse of a quarter of a century. At least I do not remember to have read anywhere in the

many triennial reports published that that happy event has already occurred. But there is compensation, while observing the affairs of the Institute, one gets the strong impression of thrift, of the careful husbanding of resources, of the desire to make the rupee go as far as possible. It is amazing that with such meagre resources, there has always been a good deal of variety in the activities of the Institute. The Institute maintains a Research Library, consisting of printed books and journals and manuscripts, and publishes a Research journal. It has already published a not insignificant number of books, either critical editions and translations of ancient Sanskrit and Tamil works or independent works and lectures of scholars. It once arranged for the conducting of Sanskrit classes according to a New Method. Mr. R. Sankarasubrahmanya Iyer of Trivandrum who had evolved a method called "Panini pre-digested" was invited and employed by the Institute to conduct the New Method Sanskrit classes. These classes attracted great attention. The Institute is visited every year by a good number of scholars from India and from abroad. Some of them deliver lectures on topics relating to their specialisation at the Institute while others study some Sanskrit text or other with some scholars as arranged by the Institute.

A Research Library may be said to be the centre of a Research Institute. It is well known that to build such a library from scratch would cost a fortune. In the absence of such a fortune, the new Institute had the good fortune to receive gifts of books from a good number of persons and continues to do so even now. Hardly a year passes without some books being received as a gift, a sure proof of the place which the Institute has won in the hearts of the friends and admirers of the Professor. To begin with, the Professor's son Sri G. K. Seshagiri gave the whole library of his father to the Institute. Later some eminent scholars, statesmen and lovers of Sanskrit like Professor M. Hirianna of Mysore, the Rt. Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, Sri T. R. Venkatarama Sastri, the first two Presidents of the Institute, Sri M. S. Ramaswamy Iyer of the Madras Police Service who was doing research in the history of the Bible, Prof. K. V. Rangaswamy Iyengar, Sri Maniam Natesan, son of the late Mr. G. A. Natesan and Sri K. Balasubrahmanya Iyer have given large collections of books to the Institute. Gradually, many smaller but significant collections were added to the library. The Government of Mysore, Baroda and Kashmir, as also the authorities of the Anandastrama, Poona, and the proprietors of Messrs B. G. Paul and Co., Madras, were kind enough to present to the Library of the Institute, free of cost, a set of their publications. The Institute has been receiving books and periodicals from institutions with which it has exchange relations. A complete set of the Harvard Oriental Series was presented to it. One hundred and two books were received

from the Ranade Library. Books are being received every year for review in the Institute's Research Journal. Sometimes the gift took the form of almirahs, card-index cabinets or other aids for the preservation of books. Whatever be the number of books received, the gift was made out of genuine respect and admiration for the Master whose work was sought to be perpetuated or out of a genuine desire to build up a research centre in the main capital city of the South.

The Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, was, as I have already said, started in 1927 and had already run for 14 years during the life-time of the revered Professor who was its editor. At first, the proprietorship of the Journal was vested in Professor Kuppaswami Sastrigal and Sri K. Balasubrahmanya Iyer. But it was transferred to the Institute at the time of its foundation. Being a quarterly journal, four parts used to be published every year till the beginning of 1942. Owing to the situation created by the war in Madras in 1942, the printing and publication of the Journal had to be temporarily suspended. The same conditions persisted in 1943 and 1944. On the top of that, the Founder and the Editor and the moving spirit of the Journal passed away in September 1943 and so the activities of the Journal could not be resumed for some time more. After the Institute was founded, it was decided to resume its publication from the 15th volume onwards. Since then it is being published regularly and vol. XXXIII has been published recently.

From the very beginning, the Journal has been received well in the world of scholars. I think that Professor Sylvain Levi struck the right note when he said: "It deals with so many sides of Indian Science and in such an interesting way. What I like most in it is its genuine and regular Indian flavour, its proper Rasa". This was said many years ago and it is still a good description of the Journal. In quantity, the journal may now be publishing less than in the beginning when four parts, used to be published every year. But the quality of what is published is still quite high and it still preserves its proper 'rasa'. It is not just another journal devoted to Indology. While it is wide and comprehensive in its outlook and observes no restriction except that of quality, it does naturally reflect the culture of the area in which it is situated. It is not an accident that very early in its life, the Journal published serially a transliteration in the Roman script, and an English translation of the 'Tolkāppiyam' by Dr. P. S. Subrahmanya Sastri. That was an indication of the great interest of the Founder, notwithstanding his commanding position as a scholar of Sanskrit, in the Tamil language and literatures also. It was also an eloquent indication that the Modern Indian Language and literatures also came within the scope of

the Journal. As at the beginning, the journal continues to publish, serially, critical editions of ancient Sanskrit texts. The *Vīṇāvāsavadatta*, the *Vibhramaviveka* of Maṇḍana Miśra, the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, the *Tripāḍīnītinayana* were published in this manner in the early issues of the Journal. Recently, the commentary *Jayamangalā* on the *Artha-śāstra* of Kauṭilya has been so published. The *Cāṇakyaṭīkā* is now going through the same process. These critical editions of minor works are published as supplements to the Journal of Oriental Research. Thanks to Dr. Raghavan's contacts with scholars abroad, many foreign Scholars have been in close touch with the Institute in their efforts to make a close acquaintance with our traditional Sanskrit Learning, especially in some very technical Śāstras like Vyākaraṇa, Nyāya and Pūrva-mīmāṃsā. It is also a very worth-while activity of the Institute to provide this help to such foreign scholars, especially as they are getting such help in other centres of Sanskrit studies like Poona and Benares and Calcutta. The result is that Pāṇini's Vyākaraṇa and the Navya-Nyāya are now being studied from a new angle in the Western countries and some very interesting publications have resulted from it, which this is not the occasion to consider.

While evaluating the work already done by the Institute, it is not enough to look at its publications only. It is also necessary to look at the publications of its members, made outside the Institute, especially of those members who were students of the Professor. He left two kinds of disciples: those who had specialised in the traditional Sanskrit Learning under his guidance. Many among these disciples of both kinds have done very well and have impressive publications to their credit. It is not very long ago that a bibliography of the publications of one of his eminent disciples, Dr. V. Raghavan, was released from this very city on the occasion of his Shashtyabdupurti celebrations. How is one to resist the temptation of seeing in that bibliography a continuation and a fulfilment of the Master's work? Impressive lists of the publications of some of the other disciples of the Professor, like the late Dr. Kunhan Raja, have also been published and the influence of the master can be traced in them also. Who is not familiar with the publications of Mm. Pt. Chinnaswami Sastri, Mm. Pt. Anantakrishna Sastri, and Pt. K. S. Ramaswami Sastri who worked for many years at Baroda? His disciples have been occupying important positions not only in South India but also in North India and have spread the message of the Master. There is no doubt that they have all had a hand in keeping the flame of Sanskrit studies, both traditional and modern, burning under very adverse circumstances, in the different parts of the country. It is in order to leave behind disciples of this kind that he gave top priority to intensive teaching among his many duties as Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology at the Presidency College, Madras.

While on the subject of the publications of the Institute, I would like to say that as early as 1945, a Sub-Committee had recommended that "attempts may be made to secure copies of the Professor's University lectures as they were taken down by his students in the respective years." Besides his class-teaching, the Professor had delivered courses of Lectures under the auspices of the Madras University on many subjects such as "Hindu Philosophy with special reference to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system", "Indian Epistemology", "Methods and Materials of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit", "Indian Theism", "The Philosophy and Exegetics of the Mīmāṃsā System," "Sentence-split, beginning and end", "Thought-measuring devices in Indian Dialectics," and "Matter, Spirit, and God in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika". After his final retirement, he was busy re-writing these lectures in order to make them worthy of publications but he passed away before he was able to finish the work. If they were published even in the form of the lectures which he delivered they would represent a substantial contribution to the literature on Indian Philosophy. I do not know what happened to the recommendation of that Sub-committee. Perhaps the lecture-notes of the students could not be collected. When I read that recommendation, I was reminded of how the work called "Cours de Linguistique generale" by the great Swiss Linguist Ferdinand de Saussure was brought out in 1915 after his passing away, by his disciples Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, both eminent Professors at the University of Geneva, on the basis of lecture-notes taken by several students of the great linguist. We all know that this posthumous work proved to be an epoch-making publication in the history of General Linguistics. It is to-day looked upon as a basic work, notwithstanding the enormous progress which Linguistics has made during the last quarter of a century. It has gone through many editions and reprints. The fourth edition was published in 1949. It was hoped that some such things would happen to the lecture-notes of Prof. Kuppuswami Sastrigal. But it has not happened yet. If it can still happen, here is a work which the Institute should concentrate on and see that some valuable publication results. It would also be the fulfilment of one of the objects for which the Institute was founded. It can be done only when his senior disciples and friends are with us.

It is not only through the activities of the Institute that the disciples, friends, and admirers of the Professor are continuing and perpetuating his work. They are doing so by establishing other institutions also. The recently founded Sanskrit Education Society, Madras, is an example. The foundation of the Society can be looked upon as a continuation of the Professor's work, not only because its aims and objects are such as he would have heartily approved of and are in full conformity with those of this Institute but also

because it has been founded by the very persons, namely, the disciples, friends and admirers of the Professor who had in 1844, in an upsurge of emotion on his passing away, solemnly resolved to found the Institute.

After all that I have said so far, you will not be surprised when I affirm that the Institute has achieved signal success during the last twenty-five years and that it has done its best to fulfil the objects for the attainment of which it was founded. It is exercising a very healthy influence in the field of Sanskrit education. It is one of the attractions of Madras for Sanskritists and Indologists from abroad visiting India. They look up to it for help in their studies and they get it. The Institute will have important functions to perform in the future. Its main function of fostering Research in Sanskrit and Indology will of course, continue. After Independence, many new problems have come into existence in India. The place of Sanskrit in the different stages of education is still an unsolved problem. In the tussle that is now going on between the protagonists of the Regional languages and those of English, there is a tendency everywhere to forget Sanskrit, the mother or the foster-mother of all the languages spoken in India to-day. Not very long ago, there was agreement that, in education there should be a three-language formula for everybody. There was difference of opinion only in regard to its application in the different regions. Suddenly, one began to hear of a two-language formula. If that is adopted, there would be no hope for Sanskrit at all. On such controversial topics, the Institute is eminently qualified to give the correct, impartial advice, free from any political bias but based entirely on a knowledge of present-day conditions and of the history of Indian culture. The two ways of studying Sanskrit, the traditional method and the modern critical method, exist side by side in all parts of India. Under the leadership of scholars and educationists of the calibre of the scholar whose name this Institute bears it is now agreed everywhere that a combination of the two is what is required under present conditions. At the same time, there is a feeling in some circles that if the traditional method is diluted with the modern method, it would wither and soon there would be nobody left in the country capable of explaining the advanced works of *Vyākaraṇa*, *Nyāya* or *Mīmāṃsā*. The traditional learning can be preserved only by the Guru transmitting his learning orally to the *Śiṣya* in every generation and not merely by his writing books on his subject, however learned they might be. Faced with such problems, the country and the Government should expect to be guided by institutions like this Institute in deciding their course of action. It is very important, therefore, that this Institute should be kept in a vigorous condition and that can be done only if it does

not suffer to carry out any project which it might undertake. As it is, it is a voluntary organisation, resting purely on the contributions of Sanskritists and lovers of Sanskrit and Indian Culture.


Well, I must now close. Sanskrit is not the language of any particular Indian community nor of any particular religion or sect that arose on Indian soil, nor of the Indian people only as it had been adopted by dozens of non-Indian peoples outside India as their cultural language centuries ago. In the modern age, there is no continent where it is not studied. It is only natural that there should be scholars and institutions in India devoted to the study of this great heritage. This Institute is one such institution. It has been founded in the name of one of India's great sons and it is being run by his devoted disciples, friends and admirers in a spirit of service. I wish it a further output of scholarly activities in its steady march towards its Golden Jubilee."

The afternoon session of the day started at 2 p.m. with the unveiling of an oil portait of a former Secretary of the Institute, Sri K. Balasubrahmanya Iyer, by the Vice-Chancellor of the Madras University, Sri N. D. Sundaravadivelu. Panditaraja V. Subrahmanya Sastri then delivered his inaugural address of the Pandita Parishad, stressing the need of the traditional method of Sanskrit learning, particularly in view of the increasingly superficial and haphazard trends of modern scholarship. Then the audience distributed themselves into three sections, namely the Research Section, Paṇḍita Parishad and Vaidika-sadas for reading and discussions. These three sections continued during the forenoon and afternoon sessions of the next day also.

Towards the evening was celebrated under the Chairmanship of Mr. Oza, I. A. S., Collector of Madras, the foundation day of the Madras Sanskrit College and the Venkataramana Ayurvedic Dispensary; and two works of the late K. Balasubrahmanya Iyer, *Upanayana-mantrārtha* and *Vivāha-mantrārtha*, were released by Bṛahmaśrī Agni-hotram R. Tatacharya. Giving away the prizes to the successful students of the two institutions, Dr. S. K. Chattarji emphasized the fact that even British rulers had not only not neglected but even directly encouraged Sanskrit learning both in India and abroad. He expressed deep satisfaction that South India was still preserving and doing its best to preserve the traditions.

The day's programme closed with the sweet musical recital of Sanskrit Songs from the aṣṭapadīs of Jayadeva to those of recent times, by Kumari R. Vedavalli.

The morning session of the next day commenced with the presentation of the Sahitya Akademi Prize and Souvenir for the best



A Scene from the Mudrarakshasa presented by the Samskrita Ranga on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee Celebration



Sanskrit book to Panditaraja V. Subrahmanya Sastri for his Sanskrit work *Śābdatarāṅgiṇī*, treating in detail the *Śābdabodha* according to Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa. The Pandit had also been recently honored by the Central Government with the Certificate of Merit for his Sanskrit learning. The award was given by the President of the Akademi, Dr. S. K. Chatterji. Earlier Dr. Raghavan read some more messages received and also announced that Dr. S. Radhakrishnan had donated to the Institute his collection of Sanskrit Books and his own works on Indian Philosophy.

After this Dr. S. K. Chatterji released the Dr. V. Raghavan Shashtyabhapurti Felicitation Volume and paid a tribute to Dr. Raghavan for his multifarious work.

Several thought-provoking research papers were read during these two days and interesting and enlightening discussions followed. Scholars, Pandits and Śāstris from various States attended the celebrations and paid their homage to Kuppuswami Sastri's memory and erudition by reading their papers. Many more (particularly from abroad), however, who, could not be present, expressed their reverence and contributed learned papers on topics of their special study.

As an entertainment programme, Dr. V. Raghavan through his *Sanskrita Ranga* presented Viśākhadatta's *Mudrārākṣasa*, the tense political play, having neither heroine nor *vidūṣaka*. The open-air theatre was packed to capacity and the curtain went up punctually at the appointed hour. The play began with a grip which never slackened till the *Bharatavākya*. The audience-spectators had the satisfaction and joy of listening to fluently delivered speeches with correct pronunciation and intonation (rather rare these days), accompanied by appropriate acting and facial expressions. Scenes and acts followed in quick succession with no loss of time or unnecessary delay. Stage arrangement with the scenery and lighting arrangement had their own effect; and the whole theatre was spell-bound till the last minute. It was indeed a great treat to witness the play, and the credit goes naturally to the scholars and workers who must have bestowed a lot of care and time on the preparation of this performance.

The Silver Jubilee Celebration, on the whole, was an unqualified success well worthy of the memory of the late Kuppuswami Sastri and the high sense of devotion and duty which his disciples like Dr. V. Raghavan bear towards him.

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**Dr. V. Raghavan Founder-Secretary and the
mainstay of K.S.R. Institute, from 1944-79**

MASTER AND DISCIPLE

K. CHANDRASEKHARAN

Never was a Chela more ardently devoted to his master during his lifetime and to his memory than Dr. V. Raghavan. Never was a Guru more eager for recognition of merit in his Sishya than Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar. It was a chance that brought Raghavan to become Sastriar's student. While despairing of a seat in the Science section as a student of the Madras Presidency College, Raghavan entered the Honours Course in Sanskrit under Prof. Sastriar in 1927. Then started the arduous training of which Dr. Raghavan never failed to acknowledge with immense gratitude. Equally Sastriar never failed to remark with satisfaction of his student showing an unusual aptitude for valuable research in Sanskrit studies. Indeed he beamed with almost unconcealed pride on learning of the very high recommendation that the two eminent savants, Dr. Sylvain Levi of France and Dr. Thomas of Oxford, made for conferring the Ph.D Degree on Raghavan for his thesis 'Bhoja's *Sṛṇagāra Prakāśa*' which formed the nucleus for the much profounder *Magnum Opus* of his with the same name.

Discerning the immeasurable capacity for industry in Raghavan he was given the post-graduate assignment in 1935, as Superintendent for the new Descriptive Catalogue in the Saraswati Mahal Library. Of course it led to his being taken up in 1955, by the Oriental Research Institute of the Madras University for assisting in the compilation of the New Catalogus Catalogorum, in which he remained working till the end of his Professorship of the Sanskrit Department of the Madras University in 1968.

If Sastriar was attracted to Raghavan for his unabating hunger for knowledge and hard work in the research field, Dr. Raghavan was all the time entertaining more than a worshipful regard for Sastriar's unflagging interest in teaching and instilling in his students the need for a widening of their horizon in Sanskrit studies. No doubt it was a pity that before Dr. Raghavan's attainment of greater sustaining results in the field of research, Sastriar passed away in September 1943. It was only later that Dr. Raghavan became known outside of India and showed remarkable ability to traverse allied fields of Sahitya such as Music and Dance. Whatever may be the newer chosen activities, Raghavan's main interest remained fully rooted in Sanskrit research, which alone was responsible for the founding of the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute in 1944 within the campus of the Madras Sanskrit College. Others of

Sastriar's admirers remained satisfied with paying tributes to the memory of a great teacher of Sanskrit, but Raghavan's heart could not be sparing of its efforts to raise a memorial in the shape of a research institute to perpetuate the memory of a unique teacher and scholar as Sastriar. With vigorous endeavours for organising the whole set up for an Institute, he brought in almost all the worthies in public life such as the Rt. Hon. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, Sir P. S. Sivaswami Aiyar, T. R. Venkatarama Sastri, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Sri K. Balasubrahmaniam Iyer and a host of others to initiate the beginning of a far-sighted project in the heart of Mylapore with a library filled with valuable books which had formed part of the possessions of eminent students of literature and philosophy such as M. Hiriyanna of Mysore, Dr. Radhakrishnan, T. R. V. Sastri, and C. V. Krishnaswami Aiyar.

Unlike his master's range of Sastraic Studies, the disciple's interests having been varied and widely extended, soon Dr. Raghavan began mastering the knowledge pertaining to music, dance and the theatre. In whatever sphere of work he was thrown, he resisted fatigue and dilettanteism, making it his prime care never to omit a single source of information available about the subject he was pursuing. It became a habit with him never to lose his *morale* while totally engaged in one aspect of knowledge if called upon at the same time to take up another equally deserving claim on his attention. Something of a superhuman capacity he began to evince with the gathering years, so that by the time he attained his sixty-first year, his bibliography of publication of books, monographs and articles reached the figure of nearly a thousand. Still, till the last day he was not thinking of enjoying rest from his toils, but was planning his participating in more international conferences for which there was a continuous stream of invitations from both India and abroad.

It may not be easy to assess the worth of his many-sided activities nor can everybody be competent to judge of their quality without in himself possessing the required initiation or equipment. But one thing anyone who had made a peep into his mind and outlook could be sure of was his phenomenal memory and surprisingly ready mind to help anyone who was found searching for correct knowledge from the extant literary works.

Scholars generally will be slow to be drawn into any practical labour or move for organising a function or a body. Dr. Raghavan was unfailingly full of vision and capacity for planning a project and sometimes even with an eye on originality. Another drawback of scholars devoting themselves to the dusty tomes is their inability to be engaged in active writing along with speaking. Dr. Raghavan had, apart

from his many valuable introductions to the publications and editing work, gained an intense love for versification, which easily led him to undertake a biographical work in Sanskrit such as the Sri Muthuswami Dikshita Mahakavya. Added to it his full length play 'Anārkali' as well as his short One-Act plays and farces have enlightened audiences wherever they were staged by the Samskrita Ranga-again another of his many creations to foster the Sanskrit language.

Still, Dr. Raghavan's pet child may be termed the K.S R. Institute which in season and out of season occupied his sole interest. Wherever he essayed with some vital suggestion for developing Sanskrit or retaining its glory, he could never forget the Institute to whose list of members he carefully invited more spirits of a fresher outlook to enthuse the care of this ancient heritage of ours. If his memory should be awakening resolve in us to advance further the Institute for which he toiled day and night, the Hall above the library downstairs in the present Institue can be named after him in order to show how much we, who belong to his way of thinking, can prove our loyalty to his rare memory.

Does anything more be required to keep his memory green? He remained scholar, first and last, yet unrelieved of the obsessions of his tribe for books and books alone. He was a Rasika too with an aptitude to lisp in gentle lines and juicy conversation. It may be difficult to find another one of his mettle.

KARMAN AND RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN ANCIENT JAVA

Prof. J. GONDA, UTRECHT

As is well known the galleries of Borobudur are lavishly furnished with beautiful reliefs, executed with loving and painstaking care. Of the eleven series of reliefs, which all illustrate episodes taken from Buddhist texts, the lowest series was, already before the completion of the monument, hidden from view because in the course of the construction it became apparent that the base could not withstand the pressure of the superstructure and had therefore to be surrounded by a broad retaining embankment. The result was that not only the mass of the stupa assumed a heavier aspect than was originally intended, but also a series of one hundred and sixty nearly finished fine panels were completely buried. This lower basement was discovered and excavated in 1885 by J. W. Ijzerman.¹ An interesting peculiarity of its reliefs is that a considerable number of them preserve short inscriptions, consisting of Sanskrit words given, in the usual Javanese manner, in their stem-form,² and obviously intended for the guidance of the artists who were to carve the panels.³ They indicate what scenes were designed for the various parts of the enormous series of reliefs. They did not however enable the Dutch archaeologists who studied the reliefs to identify the text which had been followed. So much, however, was clear that the whole series was to illustrate the connection between cause and effect and that a successive group of ten panels represents scenes from the Buddhist hells. It was only in 1928 that the source of the illustrations was discovered by the French savant Sylvain Lévi, who had, six years before, found a Nepalese manuscript of the *Mahākarmavibhaṅga*.

This Sanskrit work—which also occurs in Tibetan, Chinese and Kuchaeen versions—does not only furnish us with the text followed by the Javanese artists, it also contains some of the words occurring in the above short inscriptions.⁴ The text itself was edited by Lévi in 1932: *Mahā-Karmavibhaṅga et Karmavibhaṅgapadeśa*,⁵ This “Great classification of

1. See Notulen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen 1885, p. 156; Photographs of these reliefs may be found in N. J. Krom en T. van Erp, *Beschrijving van Barabudur*, (Illustrations), 's-Gravenhage 1920, Vol. I, Series 0, p. I-XX, For particulars see the same publication, I, p. 36 f. 48 ff. (in Dutch).

2. See my Sanskrit in Indonesia, Nagpur 1952, p. 271.

3. See H. Kern, *Over de bijchriften op het beeldhouwwerk van Boro-Boedoer*, in *Verslagen en Mededelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen*, Afd. Letterkunde 3rd series, 12 (Amsterdam 1896), p. 119 ff. and Kern, *Verspreide Geschriften*, VII, 's-Gravenhage 1917, p. 147.

4. See S. Lévi in *Verslag van het Zesde Congres van het Oostersch Genootschap in Nederland*, April 1929, Leiden 1929, p. 7 f.

5. *Mahā-Karmavibhaṅga* (la grande classification des actes) et *Karmavibhaṅgapadeśa* (discussion sur le Mahā-Karmavibhaṅga), *Textes sanscrits rapportés du Népal, édités et traduits avec les textes parallèles en Sanscrit, en Pali, en Tibétain, en Chinois et en Kutchéen*, Paris 1932.

the karmic acts" is a Mahāyāna work describing in orderly sequence the operation of karma, the relations between cause and effect, in reincarnation in heaven and in hell. It deals with morality on an earthly plane, showing that every thought, act, or feeling results in some form of happiness or in some terrible mishap.⁶ On closer inspection it is a rather poor composition, an arid catalogue of similar conditions and situations, which does not do justice to the grandeur of the Buddhist doctrine of cause and effect. In harmony with this text, but in contrast to the reliefs of the higher galleries, the panels of the buried basement of Borobudur represent scenes from daily life, including even fighting, murder and the killing of animals.⁷ In addition to these they show - particularly in the second half of the series - the pleasures of heaven and the pains of hell so as to supply a full round of saṃsāra. By presenting the good and evil deeds performed in earthly life as followed by reward and punishment and by unfolding thus the chain of all those forms of delusional existence from which Buddhism brings deliverance, the reliefs of the basement were to impress upon the visitor the temporal foundation from which the Buddhist doctrine, illustrated in the upper galleries, commences.

Now, the contents of the *Mahākarmavibhaṅga* may be summarized as follows: the paragraphs 1-22 give-up to * 15 in pairs-answer to questions as to the cause of misfortune or happiness (a short life, a long life etc.), of rebirth as an animal, in the world of Yama, in that of the asuras, that of men and in various worlds of gods; the paragraphs 24-39 give definitions of various deeds - e. g. * 27 "by which deed does a being incur the torments of hell so as to stay there for a complete life of hell?"; * 33 "by which deed does a being after having become fortunate become unfortunate?"; * 37 "by which deed does a being become rich and at the same time avaricious?"; in the twelve paragraphs 40-51 (one number occurs twice) similar questions are posed with regard to individuals-e.g. "who is the individual, whose duration of life is exhausted, but not his karman?" (* 40), or "whose merits and term of life have come to an end?" (* 43), three paragraphs (48-50) discussing the circumstances under which one is reborn as an animal, while being well-shaped, ugly, etc.; the paragraphs 50-61 discuss the ten bad paths and the bad consequences for those who follow these paths - e.g. attempts on the life of fellow-creatures result in the disappearance of the power and energy of the earth and in an early death (* 52); lies and falsehood result in diseases of the mouth (* 55), in the paragraphs 62-76 answers are given to questions as to how those who worship in sanctuaries or give donations such as food, drink, a parasol, perfumes, flowers etc. are rewarded; the last four paragraphs (77-80) are devoted to the good characteristics of those who enter into holy orders etc.

6. For a Hināyanist parallel see Majjh. Nik. 135.

7. Three scenes are reproduced in H. Zimmer, *The art of Indian Asia*, New York, 1955, II, plate 479 a,b,c; cf. also Vol. I, p. 302 ff.

It is interesting to study the relations between this text and the reliefs of the great Javanese monument.⁸ The first peculiarity of the latter which does not fail to strike us is that they completely disregard the examples introduced by *yathā* which in the *Karmavibhaṅga* are added to the theoretical expositions given as answers to the questions by which the paragraphs are introduced. As these exemplifications would have lent themselves admirably to the purpose of the sculptors, the probabilities are that the text followed by them did not contain the examples at all. A second point of general interest concerns those deviations from the text which may be explained from the supposition that the sculptors who in all probability were unable to read the Sanskrit text, and who may have received oral instructions, did not succeed in reproducing its contents exactly. Now a detail contained in the text is omitted, then again a particular figure or event does not tally with the printed work.

Turning now to the illustrations of the sojourn of sinners in hell there is a striking discrepancy between the text and the reliefs. Instead of the short and generally worded * 15 of the former the sculptors have furnished us with no less than seven reliefs which in a very systematic way show, each of them, a 'cause' and an 'effect'. On the four reliefs 85-89 the eight great hells *Samjīva*, *Kālasūtra*, *Samghāta*, *Raurava*, *Mahāraurava*, *Tapana*, *Pratāpana* and *Avīci* are represented together with illustrations of the causes which have condemned the sinners to the tortures. The next three reliefs contain similar scenes which may have been intended to give an idea of the *utsāda* or 'supplementary hells'. It is of course impossible to decide whether the version of the *Karmavibhaṅga* used by the architects exhibited a more detailed description of the hells than that contained in the texts which were edited by S. Lévi. They may also have borrowed this passage from another source. The illustration of * 16 ("what is the cause of an animal rebirth?") is more detailed and more systematically arranged than the text, because it shows us two classes of animals, to wit birds and quadrupeds, whereas the *Karmavibhaṅga* speaks only of "an animal".⁹ Differences in particulars are also visible on the next panels; now some details mentioned in the text are omitted, then again the illustrations do not correspond with the text. Perhaps the sculptors used another, and somewhat more detailed version. The contents of the paragraphs 23-36; 30-32 which do not lend themselves to representation (performing a deed while being asleep) are not reproduced on the reliefs. The three cases mentioned in the paragraphs 27-29 are no doubt for practical reasons reduced to two: the experience of those men who have to stay in hell for a long time and the departure from the place of horror of the individuals who are reborn immediately after their arrival. It

8. For a detailed comparison see N. J. Krom, *Het Karmavibhaṅga of Borobudur* (in Dutch). published in *Verslagen en Mededelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen*, Afd. Letterkunde 76, B, 8, (Amsterdam 1933).

9. See S. Lévi, edition, p. 16.

is, however, just possible that, here again, the text followed did not tally with ours. Curiously enough this Sanskrit text discusses in the paragraphs 37-39 three types of individuals, the rich miser, the poor man who is liberal and the open-handed rich man. The poor miser, who may be expected but fails to turn up, is, however, mentioned in the table of contents contained in the manuscript A, in one of the Tibetan texts and in the Chinese and Kuchaeen versions. On Borobudur we see the generous rich man (panel 116 : 39), the poor miser (panel 117), whereas the relief 115 does not correspond exactly to the paragraphs 37 or 38; panel 114 was left unfinished. The contents of the paragraphs 40-50 do not figure on the Javanese monument. As to the paragraphs 51-78 they are, generally speaking, represented, but the order of the panels is not always the same as that adopted by the author of the text and sometimes a passage or a detail represented on the monument and furnished by the Chinese and Tibetan versions is missing in the Sanskrit text. Incidentally a deviation may by way of hypothesis be ascribed to the sculptors as to their text; in other cases the relation to our text cannot be determined exactly because of the imperfect condition of the representations. With regard to the paragraphs 62-76 in which the rewards of worship and gifts are enumerated there is room for the observation that in contradistinction to the Sanskrit text which in every case enumerates ten rewards or benefits, the architects made their choice, limiting themselves to part of the number. Incidentally, they seem to have made some mistakes or to have taken the liberty to depart from their source, unless, again, the latter was not identical with the texts published by S. Lévi.

In view of the above discrepancies and of the fact that on the Borobudur reliefs no trace is to be found of the introduction of the *Karmavibhaṅga*, of the paragraphs containing definitions, and of the commentaries there is, as already intimated, a great chance that the sculptors followed another version of the text. This supposition gains in probability when we realize that the scheme of the exposition as adopted on the monument is more logical and consistent than that adopted in the text published by S. Lévi. As there is little room for the hypothesis that it has been the architect or the sculptors who invented a version of their own, the chances are that they used a text, lost to us, which whilst omitting what was superfluous, set out the subject-matter in a shorter and more satisfactory way. Anyhow, what is represented on Borobudur consists of two parts, viz. a series of deeds leading to a definite effect (reliefs 1-117), and a series of effects risen from a definite cause (reliefs 118-160).

It remains to make mention of some points of difference between the edited texts: relating mainly to additions and the order of the paragraphs they seem to show that the text followed by the architects of Borobudur, the Chinese text by Gautama and the printed Sanskrit work, in contradistinction to the Tibetan versions and another Chinese text, represent the

same tradition. What is interesting, however, is the incidental difference in order between the short inscriptions – which must have been engraved before the reliefs because they were intended for the sculptors – and the scenes on the panels themselves. Whatever the cause of this remarkable fact, neither order tallies with one of the above texts, which therefore cannot guide us in expressing an opinion with regard to their mutual relationship.

Curiously enough, the working method adopted by the sculptors is modified exactly at the same point where both orders, that of the inscriptions and that of the panels, begin to diverge.¹⁰ Does this coincidence point to an intentional change made in the sculptor's scheme during the execution of the work, in the replacement of one Karmavibhaṅga text by another? Similar observations may sometimes be made in connection with Old-Javanese texts based on Sanskrit works: where the original sources or parallel texts diverge, the Javanese author incidentally has gone a third way.

Yet the very occurrence of these divergences is not surprising, because much that was taught about karman and saṃsāra, about heavenly bliss and the torments of hell must have been borrowed from popular belief.¹¹ The Mahāyāna literary sources are, then, far from being unanimous with regard to the retributions for bad and evil conduct. That the ancient Javanese were like their fellow-Buddhists in other countries much interested in these subjects, and especially in the punishments awaiting the sinners, appears also from literary sources. From an unpublished thesis by W. Kern¹² dealing with the occurrences of hells in ancient Javanese and Balinese literature it appears that many Indian ideas of the places of torture found their way also into some of the islands of the Archipelago. In the Buddhist *Kuṇḍarakarṇa*¹³ we possess for instance an interesting Mahāyānist edifying legend, in which the *yakṣa* or giant Kuṇḍarakarṇa goes, on the advice of Vairocana, the chief teacher of the Law, to the realm of Yama in order to behold the horrible torments of the sinners. Yama himself teaches him the 'physiology' of transmigration. As he finds out that this friend, the *vidyādhara* Pūrṇavijaya, is before long expected to arrive in hell, where in consequence of his misbehaviour he will be plumed

10. For particulars, Krom, *Karmavibhaṅga*, p. 65 ff.

11. See e. g. L. Feer, *L'Enfer indien*, in *Journal Asiatique* 1892, p. 185 ff.; 1893, p. 112 ff.; L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Cosmogony and Cosmology* (Buddhist) in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* IV (1911), p. 130 f.; W. Kirfel, *Die Kosmographie der Inder*, Bonn-Leipzig 1920, p. 199 ff.; J. Masson, *La religion populaire dans le Canon bouddhique pâli*, Louvain 1942, p. 89 ff.

12. W. Kern, *Oudjavaansche en Balische Hemelvoorstellungen*, Thesis. Leiden 1934 (in Dutch).

13. Edited by H. Kern, in *Verhandelingen der Kon. Akademie van Wetenschappen*, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks III, 3. Amsterdam 1902 (= H. Kern, *Verspreide Geschriften*, X, 's-Gravenhage 1922, p. 1 ff.)

down into the big kettle, he returns to the earth and tells his friend what he knows. Not being able to help him he takes him to Vairocana, who gives him instructions in ethics and physiology so that he gets an insight into the profound truths of the Buddhist doctrine. After having attained to higher wisdom he is initiated and becomes a god. Then it is Pūrṇavijaya's turn; he too receives instruction; his sins and sinful desires are annihilated and Vairocana assures him that he will be dead for a short time and endure only part of the pains of hell. He dies and is punished, but as the servants of Yama are about to throw him into the big kettle, the fire goes out and the kettle breaks to pieces. By the grace of the Lord Pūrṇavijaya rises from the dead beaming with health and youth. He calls up all the *vidyādhara*s to pay homage to Vairocana. As the gods join them Yama seizes the opportunity of asking the Lord why Pūrṇavijaya was delivered from hell so soon. Vairocana now relates the past history of both friends. In their former earthly existence they had been guilty of improper jealousy and had been without any reason whatever, angry with a poor and honest man. Because they had also performed good deeds they were reborn as a *yakṣa* and a *vidyādhara*. Vairocana inculcates the gods - who are also subject to birth and rebirth - with the truth that the good and evil deeds will inevitably result in happiness or disaster in the next life. Pūrṇavijaya and Kuṇḍarakarṇa devote themselves to severe asceticism at the foot of the Mahāmeru and are, after twelve years, released by the grace of the Lord, to be Siddhas in the abode of the blessed.

Although this legend is Mahāyānist in character it betrays like many other Javanese and Balinese works - a tendency to syncretism. The author seems to have left us under the impression that those who recognize Vairocana as the highest Lord and Teacher are neither Buddhists nor Sivaïtes in the proper sense of the terms. The gist of his philosophical instructions is a monistic pantheism in which the sovereign Vidhi, "Law" or "Destiny", corresponds to the highest Brahman of the Vedānta philosophy. Vairocana, who identifies himself with both Śiva and Buddha, is also called Yogiśvara. The (Javanese) Śivaïte doctrine of the Pañca Kuśika, i.e. The Pañca Ṛsi or Pañcendriya, is brought into harmony with the Buddhist doctrine of the Five Dhyanī-Buddhas. The well-known theory of the five *prāṇa*'s bears, in this work, an undeniable resemblance to the Buddhist doctrine of the five *skandhas*.

In answer to Kuṇḍarakarṇa's question whether those who have to stay in hell may be reborn, Yama teaches that they will successively reappear on the earth as worms or leeches, next as ants or beetles, then as snails or locusts, as birds and finally as quadrupeds, as deformed humans, as impotent, blind or epileptic men etc.: "these are the marks to show that a man stayed in Yama's realm". Where the same 'evolution' returns in a less developed way in the Chinese Buddhānumṣṭisamādhisūtra¹⁴

14. Edited by S. Beal, A Catena of Buddhist scriptures from the Chinese, London 1871, p. 56 ff.

It is elaborated in another hitherto unpublished Javanese text,¹⁵ which while enumerating the diseases or physical defects of human beings brings them into a causal connection with a variety of torments to be undergone in the infernal regions; when a person has died as a sinner or a criminal he is dragged along by his evil deeds to the abode of Yama, where he is put to the rack by the divine Yamabalādhpati (!); afterwards he is reborn as a sickly or disabled human being. This work puts in most cases the punishments on the one hand and the diseases or physical defects on the other together; for instance, the man whose tongue has been cut out by Yama's servants, returns to the world of men with a short tongue and a speech-defect. Another text, the so-called Putrapasaji,¹⁶ describes the road along which the deceased have to go; it leads through seven mountains (Mahāmeru, Malaya, Śuktimān, Vṛkṣavān, (H)imavān, Makuṭa and Vindhya). It is in these regions that they have to endure those tortures which according to other sources are to be experienced in hell. The victims are those for whom no funeral rites have been performed, those who have a deficiency of religious merits (who have not applied themselves to the dharma, or have been lacking in compassion and liberality, those who have no offspring or have not died from natural causes, those who have been envious, violated their word, duped animals etc., each of those sins being requited with special punishments. In another text dealing with physical defects resulting from crimes and offences committed in a previous existence, the Savadharmaha),¹⁷ the punishment of liars and deceitfuls are, however, not completely identical. The Putrapasaji devotes also some pages to the bliss of heaven: those who have kept their promises are admitted to the white western heaven, which is ruled by Īśvara; those who worshipped the gods, to the red heaven in the South, governed by Brahmā; those who have performed meritorious deeds to Mahādeva's yellow residence in the West; the heroes who behaved bravely to the black heaven of Viṣṇu (Viṣṇupada) in the North; those who have made the funeral sacrifices for the benefit of their parents will go to the blue north-eastern heaven which is presided over by Śambhu; the monks and nuns to the Indrapada in the South-East which is bronze-coloured; the reliable and trustworthy to Rudra's residence, which, being brass-coloured, is in the South-West; the rewards for conjugal fidelity are enjoyed in Śaṅkara's bronze-coloured heaven in the North-West; powerful ascetics are finally received in the Śivapada, Śiva's residence, which is situated in the centre of the celestial regions.¹⁸ This classification has survived in the island of Bali to modern times.

15. Javanese Ms. Leyden University Library 5344 (H. H. Juynboll. Supplement op den catalogus van de Javaansche — handschriften der Leidsche Universiteitsbibliotheek, II, Leiden 1911, p. 177 f. See p. 23 f.

16. Ms. Leyden Univ. Libr. 867 etc. (Juynboll, Supplement II, p. 270 f.).

17. Ms. Leyden Univ. Libr. 3983 (Juynboll, Suppl. I, Leyden 1967. p. 279).

18. The centre represents the higher unity of the other complementary ideas. More common is the quadripartite classification (the centre being the fifth 'part', according to which Īvara, Brahmā, Mahādeva, Viṣṇu and Śiva are in a similar way associated with the quarters of the sky, colours, metals, elements etc.

It may be seen from all these works, not only how frequently the ancient Javanese authors turned to these subjects, karman, recompenses and retaliations, life in heaven, and especially to the fate of those who were sentenced to hell, but also that there is no essential or fundamental difference between the views of the Buddhists and those of the non-Buddhists.

At this point it will be worthwhile to examine more closely an interesting Old-Javanese treatise of greater length, the *Agastyaparva*.¹⁹ This work which, in print, fills about 60 pages, consists, in the usual way, of a conversation between a guru, the famous Agastya and disciple or interrogator, his son *Dr̥dhasyu*, in which the former does, of course, most of the talking. The questions posed by *Dr̥dhasyu* suggest a convenient division into twenty-three chapters, not all of which are, however, strictly speaking, completely relevant. After four introductory chapters almost the entire book consists of a relation of the genealogy of the brahmar̥ṣis especially of Dakṣa and his offspring. These genealogies, however, serve as a framework encompassing treatises of a didactic, theological or philosophical character, alternating with short stories or legends connected with one of the persons mentioned in the course of the author's expositions. The treatise is decidedly Śivaite in character. Whereas the genealogical part of the work reminds us of a parallel in the the Old-Javanese *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa*,²⁰ it is not so easy to find parallel passages to theological and philosophical episodes, however much they resemble, in character and purport, and often also in detail, similar episodes in many Indian works of the epic, śāstraic and purāṇic varieties, as well as certain paragraphs of the Old-Javanese *San hyan Kamahāyānikan*,²¹ the *Koravāśrama*²² and similar works.

Now after discussing some other topics-e.g. the origin of the world and the gods, the Manu periods, the daughters of the patriarch Dakṣa-chapter six is introduced by *Dr̥dhasyu*'s question as to the reasons for which men go to heaven and hell. In explanation of the śloka which is given in answer²³ :

19. The text of this work was edited by myself, translated, introduced and supplied with a commentary (all in Dutch): *Agastyaparva*, by J. Gonda, 's-Gravenhage 1933 - 1936 (published by the Instituut voor Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde in Bijdragen. tot de Taal-, Land en Volkenkunde, Vol. 90 ; 92 ; 94 and separately in one volume). I published a short article on this work in the periodical 'Purāṇa', 4 (1962), p. 158 ff

20. Edited by myself : *Het Oud - Javaansche Brahmāṇḍa - Purāṇa*, Text, Bandung 1932 ; Translation (Dutch) Bandung 1933.

21. Edited by J. Kats, *San hyang Kamahāyānikan*, 's - Gravenhage 1910.

22. Edited by J. L. Swellengrebel, Thesis, Leiden 1936.

23. Edition, p. 351 (23), 1. 10 f. ; I did not at the time succeed in finding an Indian parallel for the first śloka ; cf. e.g. *Mānavadharmasāstra* 12, 3. The second stanza is, however, identical with *Manavadh.* 12, 9 ; cf. also *Yajñavalkyasmṛiti* 3, 134 ff. ; 3, 131 ; *Mānavadh.* 12, 5 ff.

*kāyiko vācikaś caiva jñānam eva tathaiva ca
 narakāṇāṃ nimittatvaṃ svargasopānam eva ca ;
 śarīrajaiḥ karmadoṣair yāti sthāvaratām naraḥ,
 vācikaiḥ pakṣimṛgatām mānasair antyajātītām.*

Agastya furnished his son with a brief account of the miserable consequences of sinful behaviour, amplified by many examples of special cases in which diseases and physical defects sprang from the sins committed in a former life. The description of the tortures to which the sinners are subjected in the nether world, the sojourn in heaven of the well-conducted who are distinguished for asceticism, sacrifices and what is called *kīrti* - i.e. *dharmakriyā* (*Mānavadh.* 12, 31) : *dānādikarmānuṣṭhāne* (*Kullūka*), to wit "the erection or laying out of places of worship monasteries, sanctuaries, ponds, fountains, terraces etc." - the digression on the five *mahāyajñas* and other particulars are completely Indian.

In order to characterize this work and to give an idea of the contents of the relevant chapter we will now examine more closely the passage following the above śloka *śarīrajaiḥ* : "through sinful acts due to the body, man is reborn in the class of plants or minerals ; through those of speech he becomes a bird or a beast ; through those of mind, he is born in the lowest class of men." This stanza - one of the many with which the work is interlarded - is in the usual way paraphrased and explained. The next śloka - which runs as follows :

*dharmasīlam naraṃ loke draṣṭum necchati kātaraḥ
 pretyabhūtya vācakṣyuh (?) syād mahārauravasambhavaḥ —*

turns to a more detailed explanation of the last part of the preceding stanza : "the faint-hearted one who in this world refuses to take notice of a man of virtuous disposition, will after death and after having stayed in the hell Mahāraurava be blind." Although blindness as a result of sin is also mentioned in various Indian texts (cf. e.g. *Mānavadh.* 11, 52). I have not succeeded in tracing the source of this particular śloka, which in all probability was followed by a pendant which though omitted by the Javanese adapter of the text, has been paraphrased as follows : "but who rejoices in seeing (people) liking fisticuffs, people thumping and kicking, people who cudgel and injure other people, the character of such a man produces the effect of his being reborn as a blind man, because the Lord has created the eyes for the purpose of seeing virtuous and correct behaviour."

Now, the cudgeling, kicking and injuring returns in the *Karmavibhaṅga*. 3, as the cause of pain and grief, whereas, however, rejoicing in, and praise of, these wicked deeds are in that text added as resulting in the same effect ; no mention is made of blindness. The next passages of the *Agastyparva* deal with the unpleasant consequences of concealing

what should be said and saying what should be suppressed : the punishment is dumbness. A similar mishap, the same text continues, will fall upon the man who does not want to hear what should be heard; he will after death be deaf and held in contempt.

It is not surprising that in literature of this variety the same sins and crimes are over and over again connected with other punishments. There obviously was no uniform and consistent tradition with regard to many details. Thus the Buddhist tradition of *Karmavibhaṅga* and Borobudur on the one hand and the Śivaite tradition represented by the *Agastyparva* on the other, though touching upon the same subjects, diverge with regard to details or to the point of view from which the facts are related. The man who is subject to the vices of envy, anger, cupidity, will, according to the latter source, be reborn as a member of a despised community of *mlecchas*, while according to the former he will go to Yama's world.

The next paragraphs of the *Agastyparva* deal with the paralysed who have in a former existence violated the *dharma*, especially by appropriating the possessions of their fellow-men (cf. e.g. *Mānavadh.* 11, 51; *Viṣṇusmṛti* 45, 14: *aśvāpahāraḥ paṅguḥ*); the scabby who have been guilty of adultery in the bed of their guru (cf. *Mānavadh.* 11, 49 *daṣṭacarmyaṁ gurutaḥpagāḥ* (sc. *prāpnoti*); *Agnipur.* 370, 32; *Garuḍapur.* Sār. 5, 4, etc. etc.) those who suffer from warts, tumours etc. who have had intercourse with women with whom cohabitation is forbidden (cf. e.g. *Padmapur.* 4, 48, 55 ff.); those who are subject to severe colds and coughing-fits who have been slanderers and instigators (*Mānavadh.* 11, 50; *Agnipur.* 370, 34 etc.); the consumptive patients who have held their parents in contempt.

Part of the passage is worth examining more closely, viz. *Ag.* p. 353, I. 27-29; "as to the man who is subject to secretions whose nose is stuffed up, *piśṇunaḥ pautināśikyam* (*Mānavadh.* 11. 50; cf. *Viṣṇusmṛti* 45, 7 etc.), i.e. he would in his former existence slander and betray his fellow-men." This sentence reminds us of *Karmavibhaṅga* * 55 "The maturation of the evil deeds consisting of lies produces as effects dental diseases, throat-diseases, a foul breath etc.....".

Roughly speaking, there is moreover a parallel in the *Karmavibhaṅga* which in * 5 condenses these topics into an answer to one question: "by which deed becomes a man mis-shapen?". The answer is: "By anger, resentfulness, hypocrisy, acerbity, speaking ill of father, mother, clerics, children, old men; neglecting religious buildings and monuments, laughing at misshapen men.....". According to * 7, however, disregard of parents, invalids, children, old and virtuous people, is together with envy and jealousy, the cause of rebirth in a low social class. There is, however, a passage in the *Agastyparva* which resembles this passage of the *Karmavibhaṅga* somewhat more closely.

viz. p. 358, l. 20 ff. : "as to the woman who though being handsome rich and of noble descent, is not liked very much, is passed over by the young men, people never give her a thought....., her character was in a previous existence :

*nininda hinadīnān yā bālavṛddhāms tathaiva ca
virūpaṃ vīryahīnaṃ vā jātabhāvā tu ninditā*

"who despises the poor (defective) and miserable and also children and old men, the misshapen and the man who is deprived of virility, (becomes) prosperous, but despised," that means : "the character of that woman formerly was such that she had a dislike of the crippled, weak and poor, she would not associate with the poor ; when she saw children, boys, paralysed men (?), epileptics and weak people, she despised them ; she found fault with a man who was devoid of virility. She did not consider them men ; only when there was wealth, beauty, noble descent, virility, she regarded them as men. Because she was devotedly attached to the Lord she was reborn wealthy, handsome and noble, but her (above) antipathy to the weak was the cause of her remaining unmarried. She will die a spinster." Although the *Karmavibhaṅga* does not limit itself to women-see *Garuḍapur. Sār.* 5, 26 ff. and for the behaviour of women e.g. *Mbh.* 13, 123, 7 ff. ; *Mānavadh.* 5, 149 ff. ; *Mahānirvāṇatantra* 8, 102 ff. it makes mention of similar defects of character.

Passing mention may also be made of *Agastyaparva*, p. 358, l. 12 ff. : the wealthy and happy man who suddenly falls a victim to arrest, looting, false accusations etc. As a counterpart of this type the *Karmavibhaṅga*, as stated above, provides us with the example of an individual who after having been fortunate becomes unfortunate. Whereas the Śivaite text ascribes the mishap to a shortcoming in the ritual sphere - *dhūpahānaḥ sadībhavat* - " he always failed to offer a sufficiency of incense," the Buddhist author sees the cause of the misfortune in regret for benevolence (* 33).

Reverting to p. 354 of the *Agastyaparva* we must speak briefly of those who suffer from paleness (who were liars), from redundancy and crookedness of limbs (they were adulterators) (of grain etc. : *Mānavadh* 11, 50) ; of dwarfs (they were corn-thieves). In answer to another question of his son *Agastya* describes the mechanism of transmigration, the arrival of the sinners in the hells, where they will be subjected to tortures for so many years as there are hairs on their bodies, and their rebirth. Next he turns to those who go to heaven and are reborn as excellent people.

Special mention must at this point be made of *Karmavibhaṅga* * 15 which may be compared to the above quoted *Agastyaparva* p. 351, l. 10 f. : 22 f. : "which deed results in a rebirth in hell? felony with body, word or mind performed by a person of depraved

character, various wrong opinions, ingratitude, implacable sin, slanderous accusations of virtuous people." However, whereas the *Karmavibhaṅga* devotes three paragraphs to those who go to heaven, viz. the *Kāmadhātu*, the *Rūpadhātu* and the *Arūpadhātu* heavens, the *Agastyaparva* contains one stanza which, being corrupt, has so far not been identified (p. 355, 1. 20. f.):

*tapo yajña śūrāmbharyam (?) akarot su va janmani
aho svargam avāpnoti yoge mokṣam avāpnuyāt*

"the man who in existence devoted himself to asceticism, performed sacrifices and took, in a correct way, care of the works intended for the gods (*surakāryam*?), ah, he gains heaven and he will in yoga attain to final deliverance." In the Javanese paraphrase and explication mention is made of asceticism, sacrifices and *kīrtis*.

In contradistinction to the *Karmavibhaṅga* which, turning, after the rebirth in the infernal regions, to those who re-enter the earthy scene as an animal, ascribes this fate to crimes and ill behaviour of the middle class, committed by thought, word or deed, i. e. to the deeds dictated by passion, hatred, infatuation etc. (* 16), the *Agastyaparva*, while combining a discussion of this point with reference to rebirth in the vegetable kingdom, expresses the opinion that sins committed in speech lead to the existence as a bird or a wild animal. (Cf. e.g. *Mānavadh.* 12, 62 ff.; *Viṣṇusmṛti*, -44, 14 ff.). At this point the Borobudur relief showing garuḍa birds and nāgas obviously inserts two scenes - or, what is more probable, follows a text exhibiting these - dealing with the rebirth of a being as a garuḍa or a nāga, obviously as an answer to the questions: by which deed is a being reborn as a garuḍa and by which deed as a nāga? The published *Karmavibhaṅga* is silent on this point. However, these representatives of the animal kingdom turn up in another part of the *Agastyaparva*, viz. p. 372. There it is taught that Vinatā, while being Kaśyapa's wife, was always characterized by a pure and honest mind, by being devoted and submissive to her husband etc. That was why she became the mother of the king of birds, Garuḍa. The double nature of this bird, which is a god as well as an animal, is explained from the ambiguous character of its mother who was not free from foolish trustfulness. The reason why Kadru gave birth to the nāgas was, the text continues, that while being Kaśyapa's wife, she turned a deaf ear to good words; whatever she saw she wished for, she disregarded other advice, she did not miss the opportunity of injuring other people. Such is up to now the character of snakes. The curious śloka quoted on p. 372, 1. 26 f. has not been found elsewhere:

*śrotrendriyasya daurbalyāt cakṣurviṣayam icchati
rasanendriyasāmarthyād mugdhā kadrū dine dine*

"by weakness of her sense of hearing Kadrū has a desire for the visible objects; on account of the sense of taste she is daily foolish." Thus character and inclination are, in this passage, explained from hereditary transmission.

No useful purpose would be served by enumerating the other more or less complicated cases of cause and effect, of deeds and rewards or punishments touched upon by the author of the Agastyaparva. Let it suffice to emphasize that the very existence of this interesting text and of the other texts dealing with the same topic furnished a clear proof of the special interest roused, in ancient Java, by the Indian doctrines of karman and retributive justice. Though running parallel at many points, the text or texts used, at the end of the VIIth and in the beginning of the IXth century by the architects of the Borobudur and the Agastyaparva of uncertain date (perhaps \pm 1000 A.D. ?) are, as to details, nowhere in entire agreement. They are, moreover, each of them based on Indian sources which, while being similar in the main and representing the same view of life, differed in particulars. Yet, it is clear that the consensus of opinion with regard to the importance of this aspect of ethics and religion and the similarity of the relevant traditions must have been factors of considerable consequence in the process of fusion and amalgamation of Buddhism and Hinduism which was to take place in the islands of Java and Bali.

"The mental natures are the result of what we have thought, are chieftained by our thoughts, are made up of our thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with an evil thought, sorrow follows him (as a consequence) even as the wheel follows the foot of the drawer (that is, the ox which draws the cart).

He abused me, he struck me, he overcame me, he robbed me'—in those who harbour such thoughts, hatred will never cease.

Not at any time are enmities appeased here through enmity but they are appeased through non-enmity. This is the eternal law.

Some (who are learned) do not know that we must all come to an end here; but those who know this, their dissensions cease at once by their knowledge."

The Dhammapada (The Path of Virtue)

Chap. I. vv. 1, 3, 5.

Eng. Transl. by

Dr. S. RADHAKRISHNAN

UTSĀHA *

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The meaning of the word here referred to is usually understood as "energy," or "manly valour." However, beside these general usages, it is also used as a technical term in Hindu dramaturgy and political treatises, and its meaning is not altogether stable. In this paper, we shall present its usages in different genres of the Sanskrit literature and try to ascertain various aspects of its meaning. First, we shall quote a few passages from Sanskrit literature in order to obtain a general view of the word; second, we shall discuss its usages in Hindu dramaturgy and political treatises; and, last, we shall examine certain of its derivative forms, such as *utsāhana*, *mahotsāha*, *protsāha*, and others.

I

In the *Mahābhārata* we read,

asurair nirjitā devā nirutsāhās ca te kṛtāḥ
yajñās caiśām hṛtāḥ sarve pītybhyaḥ ca svadhā tathā

(MBh. 13. 140. 2)

* I would like to express my thanks to my friend, Mr. W. H. MacArthur, who kindly took the trouble to read through my original Manuscript and to correct my English and who gave me many suggestions. For the texts the following editions are used in this paper. *Mahābhārata* (MBh), the Poona Critical Edition (1933—1966); *Ramāyaṇa*, the Baroda Critical Edition (1960—); *Kathāsarisāgara*, The Kathāsarisāgara of Somadevabhatta, ed. by Durgaprasad and Parab (Nirnayasagar Press, 1930); *Pañcatantra*, The Pañcatantra I—V, ed. by F. Edgerton (Poona, 1930), and The Panchatantra in the Recension called Pañcākhyānaka of the Jaina Monk, Pūrṇabhadra, ed. by J. Hertel, Harvard Oriental Series 11 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1908); *Hitopadeśa*, The Hitopadeśa of Nārāyaṇa, ed. by M. R. Kale (Bombay 1924); *Kauṣīlya Arthaśāstra*, The Kauṣīlya Arthaśāstra Part I, a Critical Edition with a Glossary by R. P. Kangle (Bombay, 1960); *Kāmasūtra*, The Kāmasūtram of Śrī Vātsyāyana Muni ed. by Śrī Devduṭṭa Śāstri (The Kashi Sanskrit Series 29, Varanasi 1964) and Das Kāmasūtram des Vātsyāyana, aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt von R. Schmidt (Berlin, 1922); *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni (Gaekwad's Oriental Series 36 and 124); *Indische Sprüche*, Indische Sprüche, Sanskrit und Deutsch herausgegeben von O. Böhtlingk (Petersburg, 1870—1873); *Jātakamālā*, The Jātakamālā by Ārya-sūra, critically edited in the Original Sanskrit by H. Kern (Harvard Oriental Series 1); *Svapnavāsavadattā*, Bhāsanāṭakacakram, Poona Oriental Series 54 (Poona, 1951); *Mālavikāgnimitra*, Nirnayasagara ed. (Bombay 1950); *Raghuvamśa*, Nirnayasagara ed. (Bombay, 1948); *Kumārasambhava*, Nirnayasagara ed. (Bombay 1955); *Priyadarśikā*, The Priyadarśikā, A Sanskrit drama by Harsha, ed. and tr. by G. K. Nariman, A. V. W. Jackson, Ch. J. Ogden (Columbia University, Indo-Iranian Series 10, 1923).

"Gods are overpowered by demons and made without *utsāha* (energy). All their sacrifices are plundered and so is their invocation to the manes."

In the Pūrṇabhadra's recension of the *Pañcatantra*, it is said,

*puruṣeṇa sadaivodyogavatā viśeṣeṇa bhāvyamuktam ca
yatrotśāha-samāmbho yatrālasya-vihīnatā
naya-vikrama-saṁyogas tatra śrīr akhilā dhruvam*

(2. 144—O. Böhtlingk, *Indische Sprüche* 5084)

"Man, above all, should always be imbued with fighting spirit. For it is said, where there is reliance upon *utsāha* (Böhtlingk, Willenskraft), and where there is no room for idleness, and there is a joining with cleverness in policy and military valour, there certainly resides complete success."

Further, we read in the *Mālavikāgnimitra*,

*teṇa hi puṇo aṇujāṇādu maṁ ajoj|jāva se ajjassa paritosa-
nivedaṇeṇa ussāhaṁ vadāhemi* (I. 6 prose, Nirṇayasagar ed.

1950, p. 9, lines 1-2)

"Please give me leave, sir, (to go and see her). I shall increase her *utsāha* (in the art of dancing) by informing her of your (=her teacher's) being so pleased with her."

These examples suffice to testify to the fact that *utsāha* is an essential element to success in general¹ and to a ruler's victory over

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1. The goddess of success (*śrī*, *lakṣmī*) approaches to the man of *utsāha*,
*utsāha-saṁpannam adīrgha-sūtram kriyā-vidhijñāṇaṁ vyasaneṣv asaktam
śūram kṛtajñāṇaṁ dr̥gha-sauhṛdam ca lakṣmīḥ svayaṁ vāñcchati vasa-hetoḥ*
(*Pañcatantra* 2.60)

*utsāha-śakti-yuta-vikrama-dhairya-rāśir
yo vetti goṣṭhādāṁ īvalpataraṁ samudram
valmika-śyāga-śadyaṁ ca sadā nagendram
lakṣmīḥ svayaṁ tam upayāti na dīna-sattvaṁ* (*Pañcatantra* 2.64)

Gods also protect and favour the man of *utsāha*,
*dhīraṇ utsāha-saṁpannān svadharmānavamāninaḥ
devatā abhiraḥṣanti puṣṇanty eṣāṁ ca vāñchitam* (*Kathāsaritsāgara* 72-119)

The man of *sattva* and *utsāha* is able to accomplish a great achievement,
sattvotsāhau svocitau te dadhānā duṣprāpām apy artha-siddhiṁ labhante
(*Kathāsaritsāgara* 25.295 cd)

In brief there is nothing unattainable for the man of *utsāha*,
na hy aprāpyaṁ kiṁcid utsāha-bhājāṁ (*Kathāsaritsāgara* 99.46 a)

On the other hand a man destitute of *utsāha* fails and incurs a blame even from his kinsmen,

bhagnotsāho vatsa ko nāvasīdet (*Kathāsaritsāgara* 99.46 b)
*utsāha-śakti-hīnatvād vṛddho dīrghāmayas tathā
svair eva paribhūyete dvāv apy etāv asaṁśayam* (*Hitopadeśa* 4.41 —
Bohtlingk, *Indische Sprüche* 1223)

his enemy in particular.² It is not merely a military concept, but is also a necessary motivation for artistic and cultural achievement. *Utsāha* is, then, valour, intellectual as well as physical.

II

Following this general survey over its usages in the classical Sanskrit literature, we shall see how this concept of *utsāha* is dealt with in the treatises of the classical Hindu dramaturgy.

As is well-known, *utsāha* is the *sthāyī-bhāva* of the *vīra rasa*. The sentiment "heroic" (*vīra*) becomes experienced in theatre by the audience in whom the permanent condition (*sthāyī-bhāva*) "energy" (*utsāha*) is always present and inherent. That is to say, the permanent condition (*sthāyī-bhāva*) on the part of audience is stimulated and cultivated in the course of a theatrical performance to be experienced as a taste (*rasa*) of the "heroic" (*vīra*) by the audience itself. For example, the permanent condition or sensitivity (*sthāyī-bhāva*) to love (*śṛṅgāra*) on the part of the audience, that is *rati* (pleasure), is always ready to be stimulated, and when members of the audience are watching a romantic performance of an actor and actress, this sensitivity is stimulated and becomes experienced as a taste (*rasa*) of love (*śṛṅgāra*), although members of the audience themselves are not actually in love with anybody. Here the permanent condition or sensitivity (*sthāyī-bhāva*) of pleasure (*rati*) is essential and basic to the sentiment or taste (*rasa*) of love (*śṛṅgāra*). As is *rati* to *śṛṅgāra*, so is *utsāha* basic to the *vīra rasa*, the sentiment of heroism. In the description of *vīra rasa* (heroic sentiment) Bharata says as follows,

*atha vīro nāmottama-prakṛtir uṣṣāhātmakaḥ|sa cāsammoḥādhy-
avasāya-naya-vinaya-bala-parākrama-śakti-pratāpa-prabhāvadibhir
vibhāvair utpadyate|tasya sthāyī-dhairya-śaurya-tyāga-
vaiśāra-dyādibhir anubhāvair abhinayaḥ prayoktavyaḥ|bhāvās cāsyā
dhṛti-mati-garvāvegagryāmarṣa-smṛti-romāṇcādayaḥ|atrārye rasa-
vicāra-mukhe,*

*utsāho 'dhyavasāyād aviśāditvād avismayāmohāt
vividhād artha-viśeṣād vīra raso nāma sambhavati (67)*

*sthitī dhairya-vīrya-garvair utsāha-parākrama-prabhāvaiś ca
vākyais cākṣepakṛtair vīra-rasaḥ samyag abhineyaḥ (Nāṭyaśāstra 6.68)*

"The heroic sentiment relates to the superior type of persons, and has energy (*utsāha*) as its basis. It is created by determinents (*vibhāva*), such as presence of mind (*asammoha*), determination (*adhyavasāya*), cleverness in policy (*naya*), discipline (*vinaya*), military strength (*bala*), aggressiveness (*parākrama*), ability (*śakti*), vigour (*pratāpa*), dignity (*prabhāva*), and the like. It is to be represented on the stage by consequents (*anubhāva*), such as firmness (*sthāyīya*), steadfastness

2. The *utsāha-śakti* is the indispensable factor in fighting,
*utsāha śakti-śampanno hanyāc chairuṃ laghur gurum
yathā kaṇḥhiravo nāgaṃ bhāradvajāḥ pracakṣate* (Böhtlingk, op. cit. 1222)

(*dhairya*), heroism (*śaurya*), munificence (*tyāga*), skilfulness (*vaiśāradya*), and the like. Transitory states (*bhāva*), in it are contentment (*dhṛti*), judgement (*matī*), audacity (*garva*), commotion (*āvega*), ferocity (*augrya*), indignation (*amarśa*), presence of memory (*smṛti*), horripilation (*romāñca*), and the like. There are two *āryas* in the *Rasa-vicāra-mukha*,

The heroic sentiment originates out of *utsāha* (through) determination (*adhyavasāya*), the state of being never distressed (*aviśāditva*), the absence of surprise (*avismaya*), presence of mind (*amoha*), and various other conditions (of the spirit). This heroic sentiment is to be represented properly on the stage by firmness (*sthiti*), steadfastness (*dhairya*), heroism (*vīrya*), audacity (*garva*), energy (*utsāha*), aggressiveness (*parākrama*), dignity (*prabhāva*) and harsh words (*vākya-ākṣepakara*).³

The *utsāha* itself is further defined by Bharata as follows,

*utsāho nāma uttama-prakṛtiḥ|sa cāviśāda-śakti-dhairya-śauryādibhir
vibhāvair utpadyate|tasya dhairya-tyāga-vaiśāradyādibhir anubhāvair
abhinayah prayoktavyaḥ|atra ślokaḥ,
asammohādibhir vyakto vyavasāya-nayātmakāḥ
utsāhas tv abhineyaḥ syād apramādo|ithitādibhiḥ (Nāṭyaśāstra 7. 21)*

“*Utsāha* relates to persons of the superior type. It is created by determinants (*vibhāva*) such as absence of distress (*aviśāda*), ability (*śakti*), steadfastness (*dhairya*), heroism (*śaurya*), and the like. It is to be represented on the stage by consequents (*anubhāva*) such as steadfastness (*dhairya*), munificence (*tyāga*), skilfulness (*vaiśāradya*), and the like. On this point there is a *śloka*,

Utsāha which originates out of determination (*vyavasāya*), and cleverness in policy (*naya*), and which is made manifest through presence of mind (*asammoha*) and the like is to be represented on the stage with watchfulness (*apramāda*), manly exertion (*utthita*) and the like.⁴

3. For the *vīra-rasa*, cf. also *Daśarūpa* 4. 72 (Nirayasaagara ed. 1941)

*vīraḥ pratāpa-vinayādhyava-sāya satīva mohāviśāda naya vismaya vikramādyaiḥ
utsāhabhūh sa ca dayā-roṣa-dāna-yogāt tredhā kilātra matī garva-dhṛti praharṣāḥ*

For further references, see George C. O. Haas, *The Daśarūpa, A Treatise on Hindu Dramaturgy* p. 141 (4.79), notes (Delhi, Varanasi, Patna 1962, reprint)

4. Cf. *Sāhityadarpaṇa* 3. 178 ab (Bibliotheca Indica text, p. 76, line 1)

kāryārambheṣu saṃrambhaḥ stheyān utsāha ucyate

On this a commentary *Lakṣmī* says as follows,

*kāryārambheṣu saṃnikṛtākāryeṣu stheyān sthairya-taraḥ saṃrambha utkāṣa-
veśaḥ udyoga iti yāvat utsāha ucyate (Kasisaṃskṛta-grantha-mālā 145,*

Benares 1955, p. 183, line 5)

From the above two quotations we can glean the following points. *Utsāha* is an essential attribute of men of superior type (*uttama-prakṛti*) and is an element of a manly, vigorous and aggressive nature, as other concepts which surround and accompany it⁵ substantiate this proposition. However, it is a natural conclusion for *utsāha* to possess such manliness and aggressiveness, because it is a condition pre-requisite to heroic deeds (*vīra*). Without *utsāha* one can never expect any great achievement. This heroic achievement is, however, not confined only to military action or battle-scenes, but is further extended to the moral and religious sphere, for one can be heroic even in virtuous deeds. It is in connection with the ninth *rasa*, *śānta* that the heroic sentiment (*vīra*) is further differentiated and classified into four kinds, viz. *yuddha-vīra* (heroic in battle),⁶ *dharma-vīra* (heroic in religious conduct), *dāna-vīra* (heroic in giving) and *dayā-vīra* (heroic in compassion). Beside these four, *pāṇḍitya-vīra* (heroic in learning) and *kṣamā-vīra* (heroic in patience) are further set forth, and all these are considered to be originated from the single *utsāha*.⁷ It is in aiming at the *pāṇḍitya-vīra* (heroic in learning) that Mālavikā could have *utsāha* for further advancement in the art of dancing, as we have seen in the beginning. *Utsāha* is, then, a concept essential and basic to heroic achievements, - heroic on the battle-field as well as in religious, moral and cultural activities. It is an energetic aggressiveness, physical as well as intellectual.

III

These statements in the Hindu dramaturgy illustrate that *utsāha*, being the *sthāyī-bhāva* of the *vīra rasa* (heroic sentiment), is fundamental to heroic activity. But, then, how is this same concept *utsāha* treated in Hindu political treatises? We now proceed to examine the *utsāha* as dealt with in the *Artha-śāstra* and others.

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5. To these concepts, compare also the following passages,

*utsāhaḥ pauruṣaṃ sattvaṃ ānyāśaṃsyam kṛtājñatā
vikramaś ca prabhavaś ca santi vānara rāghave (Rāmāyaṇa 5.35.15)
naiya tesāṃ gatir bhīmā na tejo na parākramaḥ
na matir na balotsāho na rūpa-parikalpanam (Rāmāyaṇa 5.44.11)*

6. As for *raṇotsāha*, cf. *Rāmāyaṇa* 3.26.4,

*ahaṃ vāsya raṇe mṛtyur eṣa vā samare mama
vinivartya raṇotsāhaṃ muhūrtaṃ prāśniko bhava*

7. Cf. V. Raghavan, *The Number of Rasas* (Adyar 1940), pp. 73-77. As for Abhinavagupta's discussion on the *Śānta rasa*, see J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, *Santarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics* (Poona 1969), p. 101 *Locana*, pp. 129 and 133 (*Abhinavabhārati*). Further, as regards *utsāha* in connection with Bhoja's conception of *rasa*, cf. V. Raghavan, *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa* (Madras, 1963), pp. 410, 414, 419 and 440-441.

As is well-known, *utsāha* is considered to be one of the three powers (*śakti-traya*), which are supposed to be possessed by the king. These three powers are that of counsel (*mantra-śakti*), that of dignity (*prabhu-śakti*), and that of energy (*utsāha-śakti*).⁸ According to Kautilya these three are given the following definitions—

śaktis trividhā-jñāna-balaṃ mantra-śaktiḥ, kośa-daṇḍa-balaṃ prabhu-śaktiḥ, vikrama-balaṃ utsāha-śaktiḥ (6. 2. 33)

“Power is three-fold: the power of counsel (*mantra-śakti*) is the power of knowledge, the power of dignity (*prabhu-śakti*) is the power of the treasury and punishment, and the power of energy (*utsāha-śakti*) is the power of valour (*vikrama*).”⁹

8. The trinity of power (*śakti-traya*) is referred to in various contexts in Sanskrit literature. For example,

*sarpasyeva śiro-ratnaṃ nāsyā śakti-trayaṃ paraḥ
sa cakarṣa parasmāt tad ayaskānta ivāyasaṃ* (Raghuvamśa 17.63)
*tādṛśasyāpi nāmāpratihata-śakti-trayaśya raghu-dilīpa-nala-tulyasya
devasya dṛḍhavarmanō—* (Priyadarśikā, I. 4 prose, 8, lines 1-2)
*sa bālyāt prabhṛty eva vṛddhopāsana ratir vinayānurakto ’nurakta-
prakṛtiḥ prakṛti medhavitvād aneka-vidyādhigama-vipulataramatir
utsāha-mantra-prabhava-śakti-daiva-saṃpannaḥ svā iva arājṣṇ prajāḥ
pālayati sma* (Jātakamālā, p. 6, lines 15-17)
*tasyotsāha-mantra-prabhu-śakti saṃpat-prabhṛtinām prakarṣiṇām api
rāja-guṇānām vibhūtim atisīṣye daiva-saṃpad-guṇa-sobha* (Jātakamālā,
p. 14, lines 18-19)
*trīṇi prabhāva-mantrotsāhātmakāni sādhanāny utpādakāni yasyāḥ sā
trisādhanā śaktiḥ* “*śaktayas tīraḥ prabhavotsāha-mantrajāḥ*” *iti
Amarāḥ* (2. 8. 1. 19), Mallinātha on Raghuvamśa 3.13

According to V. Raghavan, the *daiva śakti* (power of destiny) is added to this trinity of powers in the *Śyṅgāra Prakāśa* Chapter 29. Cf. V. Raghavan, *Bhṛja's Śyṅgāra Prakāśa* (Madras, 1963), p. 54.

In the following passage these three are replaced by *prajñā*, *svaprabhāva*, and *utsāha*, *evaṃ utsāhavato pañḍopakāriṇaḥ sthāpayet, svaprabhāvavataḥ koṣopakāriṇaḥ, prajñāvato bhūmy upakāriṇaḥ* (Kautilya 7. 16. 9). Cf. also J. J. Meyer, *Das altindische Budh vom Welt und Staatsleben* (Leipzig, 1956), p. 476, note 3.

Again, in the *Kumārasambhava niti*, *sampad*, and *utsāha* correspond to the three powers,

*sā bhūddharāṇām adhipena tasyāṃ samadhimatyām udapādi bhavyā
samyak prayogād aparikṣatāyāṃ nītāv ivotsāha-guṇena sampad* (1. 22)

As for *prajñā* in place of *mantra*, cf. also *Pañcatantra* 2.62 prose,
artha-rahito ’pi bhavān prajñotsāha-śakti-saṃpanno ’sāmānya-manuṣya-saḍṛśaḥ
(p. 64 line 20)

H. Kern takes the word *guṇa* in *Yogā-yātrā* of Varāhamihira 1, 2 (*vakṣyāmi bhūpam adhikṛtya guṇopapannam*) as synonymous with the *śakti-traya*. Cf. H. Kern, “Die Yogayātrā des Varāhamihira,” *Indische Studien* 10, pp. 194–5.

9. A similar definition of these *śakti-traya* is given in Utpala’s commentary on Hemacandra,

*balārogya-parākrama-sampad utsāha-śaktiḥ, daiva-puruṣa-vijñānam mantra-
śaktiḥ, durga-kośa-daṇḍa-sampad, prabhu-śaktir iti.*

Cf. H. Kern. *op. cit.* p. 195.

The success (*siddhi*) of the king is of three kinds, *mantra-siddhi*, *prabhu-siddhi*, and *utsāha-siddhi*, and they are based upon those three powers (*śakti*).¹⁰ Kauṭilya further gives a definition to the (*utsāha*) itself as follows:

śauryam amarśaḥ śighratā dākṣyaṃ cotsāha-guṇāḥ (6. 1. 5)¹¹

"Heroism, resentment, alertness and dexterity, these are the qualities inherent to energy (*utsāha*)."

On the other hand, if cowardice and disability prevail, there seems to be left no room for energy (*utsāha*). Thus, we read in the *Svapnavāsavadatta*,

kātara vāpy aśaktā vā notsāhas teṣu jāyate
prāyeṇa hi narendra-śrīḥ sotsāhair eva bhujyate (6. 7)

"The energy (*utsāha*) is never born to those who are cowardly (*kātara*) and disable (*aśakta*). Generally, the kingly success is only enjoyed by those who have the energy (*utsāha*)."

These passages confirm the fact that the energy (*utsāha*)¹² is one of the powers (*śakti*) which the king is expected to possess,¹³ and is indispensable to the prosperity of the king (*narendra-śrī*). It is composed of the four qualities, heroism, resentment, alertness and dexterity and is incompatible with cowardice and disability.

The presence or absence of *ustāha*, then, causes the king to act actively or passively. Kauṭilya says in this connection as follows:

putraṃ bhrātaram anyam vā kulyam rājya-grāhīṇam utsāhena
sādhayet/
utsāhābhāve gṛhītānuvartana-saṁdhi-karmābhyām ari-saṁdhāna-
bhayāt (9. 3. 15)

10. *evam siddhis trividhaiva - mantra-śakti sādhyā mantra-siddhiḥ, prabhu-śakti-sādhyā prabhu-siddhiḥ utsāha śakti-sādhyā utsāha-siddhiḥ* (Kauṭilya 6. 2. 34)

11. Yaśodhara, the author of *Jayamaṅgala*, seems to be familiar with this Kauṭilya passage while commenting upon *Kamasūtra* 6. 1. 12, *yathoktam* - "*śauryam amarśatā śighratā dākṣyaṃ cotsāha-guṇāḥ*"

12. References to the *utsāha śakti* itself with no regard to the other two powers are found also in Kauṭilya 7. 15. 6 (*tulyotsāha-śaktinām...*) and 9. 6. 42 (*utsāha śaktimato vā...*)

13. *Yogayātrā* enumerates the qualities which the king is expected to possess as follows:

medhavi matimān adīna-vacano dakṣaḥ kṣamavān ṛjur
dharmātmā tv anasūyako laghukaraḥ śāḍgunyavac chaktivān
utsāhī para-randhravit kṛta-dhṛtir vṛddhi kṣaya sthānavit
śūro na vyasanī smaraty upakṛtaṃ vṛddhopasevi ca vaḥ (2. 10).

“He should overcome with energy (*utsāha*) a son, a brother, or other members of his family who is planning to usurp the kingdom. If he lacks the energy (*utsāha*), he should bypass them by acquiescing in what is seized, and by entering into a pact (with them), for the fear that he might join the enemy”

Thus, the king who lacks *utsāha* is destined to perish.¹⁴ Predecessors of Kauṭilya say as follows:

nirutsāhas tu prabhāvavān rājā vikramābhipanno naśyati ity ācāryāḥ (9. 1. 5)

“A king who lacks *utsāha*, though he may have dignity, perishes when overpowered by valour. Thus, say the teachers.”¹⁵

As is the case with the king, so it is with his subjects.¹⁶ That is, if the subjects are furnished with full energy (*utsāha*), the king is recommended to proceed in attacking the enemy.

yadā vā paśyet “utsāha-yuktā me prakṛtayaḥ, saṁhatā vivṛddhās svakarmāṇi avyāhatāś carīṣyanti parasya vā karmāṇy upahaniṣyanti” iti tadā vigrhyāśīta (7. 4. 6)

“Or, when he were to see ‘my subjects full of energy, united and thriving, will carry out their works unhindered, or will destroy the works of the enemy,’ then he should make war.”

On the other hand, if the king sees that his army lacks the energy (*utsāha*),¹⁷ then he must consider other ways of protecting his kingdom.

14. Cf. also *Jātakamālā* (p. 81, lines 22—25)

anayā hi rūpa-sobhayā niyatam asyonmādita-hṛdayasya dharmārtha-kārya-pravṛtter viśrasyamānotsāhasya rāja-kārya-kālātīkramāḥ prajānāṃ hita-sukhodaya-paṭham upapīḍayantaḥ parābhavāya syuḥ

15. As for the meaning of *ācāryas* in the *Arthaśāstra*, cf. P. V. Kane, ‘The Meaning of ‘Ācāryāḥ’,’ *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 23, pp. 206-213.

16. Also in the case of ministers, the *utsāha* is enumerated among their indispensable attributes (*amātya-sampad*), in the *Arthaśāstra* 1. 9. 1, *jānapado ’bhijātāḥ svavagrahaḥ kṛta-śilpaś cakṣuṣmān prājño dharayiṣṇur dakṣo vāgmī pragalbhaḥ pratipattimān utsāha-prabhāva-yuktaḥ ity amātya-sampat*

17. As for the lack of *utsāha* references should be made to the following passages of Kauṭilya; *nirutsāha* 6. 2. 13. 7. 4. 15. 7. 11. 29. 9. 1. 5; *pratihātotsāha*, 7. 15. 12; *nivṛttotsāha*, 9. 6. 22; *upahātotsāha*, 7. 1. 33.

For other similar usages in *Jātakamālā*. cf. p. 30 line 13 (*gharmaklamātrotsāha*), p. 79, line 5 (*anutsāha-jaḍa*), p. 92, lines 10—11 (*viśrasyamānagātrotsāha*) and p. 201, line 8 (*kṣat-tarṣa pariśrama-vihatotsāha*).

utsāha-hīnaḥ śreṇī-pravīra-puruṣāṇām cora-gaṇāṭavika-mleccha-jātinām parāpahārīnām gūḍha-puruṣāṇām ca yathā-lābham upacayaṃ kurvīta (7. 14. 27)

"If weak in energy (*utsāha*), he should secure the services, to the extent they may be available, of heroic men from bands, robber-bands, foresters, and Mleccha tribes, and of secret agents capable of doing harm to enemies."¹⁸

Thus, the *utsāha* is indispensable for the king and his army in military action. But what position does the *utsāha* hold among these three kinds of power (*śakti-traya*)? That is, which is the most important power for the king among these three? Kauṭilya enumerates various opinions which had been advocated by ancient teachers (*ācāryas*), but according to what Kauṭilya himself opines, the *utsāha* is allotted to the lowest position. First, dignity (*prabhu*) prevails over energy (*utsāha*).

prabhāvavān utsāhavantam rājānam prabhāveṇātisaṃdhattu tad-viśiṣṭam anyam rājānam āvāhya bhṛtvā kṛtvā pravīra-puruṣān (7) *prabhūta-prabhāva-haya-hasti-rathopakaraṇa-saṃpannaś cāsya daṇḍaḥ sarvatrāpratihataś carati* (9. 1. 8)

"The king, possessed of dignity, overreaches the king possessed of energy, by his dignity, by inviting another king superior to him (in energy), by hiring or purchasing heroic men. And his army, richly endowed with abundant might, horses, elephants, chariots, and equipment, moves unhindered everywhere."

Again, *mantra* is superior to *prabhu*,

mantra-śaktiḥ śreyasī (14) *prajñā-śāstra-cakṣur hi rājālpēnāpi prayatnena mantram ādhātum śaktah parān utsāha-prabhāvavataś ca sāmādibhir yogopaniṣadbhyām cātisaṃdhātum* (15) *evam utsāha-prabhāva-mantra-śaktinām uttarottarādhiko 'tisaṃdhatte* (9. 1. 16)

"The power of counsel is superior. For, the king with the eyes of intelligence and science is able to take counsel even with a small effort and to overreach enemies possessed of energy and dignity by conciliation and other means and by secret and occult practices. Thus, the king, superior in each latter one among the powers of energy, dignity and counsel, overreaches (the enemy).

18. In Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa*, the *utsāha* is referred to as one of the qualities which a love-messenger is supposed to possess. Cf. V. Raghavan, *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa* p. 53 (*sambhāvanātha viśvāsaḥ pravṛttir mantra-saṃgrahaḥ mano-nirvāṇam utsāha āśvāsaḥ kārya-nirṇayaḥ*).

The order of rank, *mantra*, *prabhu*, *utsāha*, seems to be a result of priority, ascribed to by Kauṭilya, of intelligence over simple energetic valour. But we must not overlook here the fact that in the usages of Kauṭilya the concept *utsāha* is confined to the meaning of physical or military valour. As has been discussed above, in the treatises of Hindu dramaturgy the *utsāha* has a wider connotation, being basic not only to physical military heroism (*yuddha-vīra*), but also to heroism in virtuous (*dāna-dayā-dharma-vīra*) and cultural (*pāṇḍitya-vīra*), deeds. It is in the sense of physical and military energy that Kauṭilya uses the word *utsāha*.

The same limited and derogatory connotation of word *utsāha* can be discerned in its derivative *autsāhika*, when Kauṭilya classifies various sorts of army (*sainya*). He gives a definition to the *autsāhika* type of army as follows:

sainyam anekam anekastham uktam anuktaṃ vā vilopārthaṃ yad uttiṣṭhati tad autsāhikam (9. 2. 9)

“An army not in one unit, coming from many regions, which whether asked or unasked, gets ready with the object of getting plunder, is called *autsāhika* army.”

This *autsāhika* type of army is nothing but a gathering of people, though they may be brave and heroic, who aim only at plunder. It is further said that they are liable to be divided by the enemy, because they neither have intelligence, nor a sense of royalty.

Again, a type of man who has only energy (*utsāhin*) is said to be easily dispensed. The text reads as follows:

tikṣṇam utsāhinam vyasaninam sthita-śatruṃ vā gūḍha-puruṣāḥ śastrāgni-rasādibhiḥ sādhayeyuh (9. 6. 53)

“Secret agents should dispose of a fiery or energetic enemy, or one in a calamity or one entrenched in a fort, by weapon, fire, poison and so on.”¹⁹

These examples are sufficient to convince us that in Kauṭilya the word *utsāha* is used almost synonymously with lack of the intelligence and proper judgement.

19. For *utsāhin*, cf. also Kauṭilya 7. 15. 5, 7. 16. 16.

IV

Utsāhas compounded form, *mahotsāha* (great energy). occurs also in various contexts. *Yājñavalkyasmṛiti* enumerates it among the various attributes essential to the king,

*mahotsāhaḥ sthūla-lakṣaḥ kṛtajño vṛddha-sevakaḥ
vinītaḥ sattva-saṃpannaḥ kulīnaḥ satya-vāk śuciḥ* (1. 309)

"The king should be of great energy, ambitious, grateful, subservient to the elders, well-disciplined, furnished with courage, of reputed family, truthful, and pure..."²⁰

The same *mahotsāha* is one of the qualities which the *nāyaka*, the hero of a poetic composition, is supposed to possess. Thus, we read in the *Kāmasūtra*,

*mahā-kulīno vidvān sarva-samayajñah kavir ākhyāna-kuśalo vāgmī
pragalbho vividha-śilpajño vṛddha-darśi sthūla-lakṣo mahotsāho
dṛḍha-bhaktir-anasūyakas tyāgi .iti nāyaka-guṇāḥ* (6. 1. 12)

"He must be of a great family, learned, versed in every kind of texts, poetic, good in story-telling, eloquent, resolute, conversant in various arts, respectful to the elders, ambitious, of great energy (von grosser Ausdauer, R. Schmidt), firm in love, not jealous, munificent...such are the qualities expected to be possessed by *nāyaka*"

Courtesans are recommended to resort to such a man of great energy (*mahotsāha*) even at her own expense,

*prasannā ye prayacchanti svalpe py aganitam vasu
sthūla-lakṣaṇ mahotsāhāms tān gacchet svair api vyayaiḥ* (6. 5. 39)

"A courtesan should resort, even at her own expense, to those men of ambition and great energy, who, when pleased, give away abundant wealth even in matters of small importance."

Its causative form *utsāhaya-* (make one energetic) is, then, used in the sense of "to incite, to inspire, and to encourage." Three examples may suffice to illustrate its usage in Kautīlya,

20. In the enumeration of *svāmi-saṃpad* by Kautīlya the word *mahotsāha* appears, *mahākulīno daiva-buddhi-sattva-saṃpanno vṛddha-darśi dhārmikaḥ satya-vāk avis-māvādakaḥ kṛt-jñah sthūla-lakṣo mahotsāho 'dirghasūtraḥ śakya-samanto dṛḍha buddhir-akṣudra-pariṣakto vinaya-kāma ity ābhigāmikā guṇāḥ* (6.1.3)

Also in a description of Hanūmat, *mahotsāha* appears together with its similar concepts,

*torana-sthaṃ mahavegaṃ mahā-sattvaṃ mahā-balaṃ
mahā m .hotsāhaṃ mahā-kāyaṃ mahā-balaṃ* (Rāmāyaṇa 5.44.18)

mantri-purohitābhyām utsāhayed yodhān vyūha-sampadā (10. 3. 32)

"He should make the minister and the chaplain encourage the warriors by (pointing out) the excellence of the array."

kumārakān viśiṣṭa-chandikayā hīna-chandikān utsāhayeyuh (11. 1. 9)

"They should stir up princelings enjoying low comforts with (a longing for) superior comforts."

yad vā mitram āvāhayed ātavikaṃ vā tam utsāhayet "vikramya samruddhe bhūmim asya pratipadyasva" iti (13. 4. 44)

"Or, he should invite an ally or a forest chieftain (and) incite him to 'fight against the besieged and seize his land!'"²¹

Its nominal form *utsāhana* appears twice in Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*, while he introduces opinions as held by ancient teachers.

kośa-mūlo hi durga-saṃskāro durga-rakṣaṇaṃ janapada-mitrāmitra-nigraho deśāntarītiānām utsāhanaṃ daṇḍa-bala-vyavahāraś ca (8. 1. 35)

"For, dependent on the treasury are building of the fort, protection of the fort, control over the country, the allies and the enemies, incitement (Aufmunterung, J. J. Meyer) of those away from the land, and the use of armed forces."

daṇḍa-mūlo hi mitrāmitra-nigrahaḥ para-daṇḍotsāhanaṃ sva-daṇḍa-pratigrahaś ca (8. 1. 42)

"For, dependent on the army are control over the allies and the enemies, rousing alien troops to action, and reinforcement of one's own troops."

Utsāhana (encouragement) is also described as one of the duties ascribed to a love messenger. *Nāṭyaśāstra* 23. 11-12 prescribes it for a female messenger,

tayāpy utsāhanaṃ kāryaṃ nānā-darśita-kāraṇaṃ (11)
yathokta-kathanaṃ caiva tathā bhāva-prādarśanaṃ (12)

"She should encourage (the beloved one) by mentioning the various ways of seeing (the lover) and should communicate the exact words (of the latter) and describe his emotional conditions."²²

21. For *utsāhaya-*, cf. also Kauṭilya, 9.7.9, 9.7.10, 13.1.14, 13.1.20, 13.3.29. In comparison with Kauṭilya 10.3.33, 13.1.1 (*svapakṣam uddharṣayet*) and 10.3.47, we learn that *utsāhaya* is almost synonymous with *uddharṣaya-*.

22. As for *utsāhayitṛ-* (Aufreizet, J. J. Meyer), cf. Kauṭilya 7.14.10.

The same causative form, when it is preceded by the preverb *pra-*(*protsāhaya-*), occasionally conveys an evil connotation, that is, to incite in an evil way, or to seduce (*aufstacheln*, J. J. Meyer).

*maṇḍalam vā protsāhayet "atipravṛddho yaṁ madhyamaḥ sarveṣāṁ
no vināśāyābhyutthitaḥ, sambhūyāsyā yātrāṁ vihanāma iti*
(Kauṭilya 7. 18. 6)

"Or, he should exhort the circle 'the middle king, grown ever powerful, has risen for the destruction of us: let us join together and frustrate his expedition.'"

The same verb appears in the *Kāmasūtra* when it describes the life of the elegants.

*grāma-vāsī ca sajātān vicakṣaṇān kautūhalikān protsāhya nāgaraka-
janasya vṛttaṁ varṇayan śraddhāṁ ca 'janayaṁs tad evānukurvita*
(1. 4. 36)

"Living in the country, he must incite his fellow-colleagues, who are clever and curious, by telling them about the life of the elegants and stimulating their longing for it, and imitate the same mode of life of the elegants."

The *Kāmasūtra* prescribes how a man should treat two women,

*yāṁ tu nāyako 'dhikāṁ cikīrṣet tāṁ bhūta-pūrva-subhagayā
protsāhya kalahayet (9) tataś cānukampeta (4. 2. 10)*

"The man should instigate the favorite woman to be on bad terms with (*entzweien*, R. Schmidt) the woman whom he loved previously and make the first quarrel with the second. And then he must show (the first) compassion."

The same word appears in the *Jātakamālā* 34,

protsāhyamāno 'pi sādhuḥ nālaṁ pāpe pravartitum anabhyāsāt
(p. 235, line 18)

"Even though provoked, a virtuous person is incapable of betaking himself to wickedness, having never learnt to do so."²³

Its nominal form *protsāhana* conveys a sense of seduction. For example,

23. Cf. also *Jātakamālā* p. 238, lines 19-20.

*daivatopahāra-śrāddha-pravahāṇa-nimittam ārakṣiṣu
madana-yoga-yuktam anna-pānam rasam vā prayujyāpagacchet,
ārakṣaka-protsāhanena vā* (Kauṭilya 7. 17. 44)

“Or, on the occasion of offering to deities or worship of manes or picnic parties, he should administer food and drink mixed with a stupefying mixture or poison and depart, or (he should leave) by seducing the guards.”

Jayamaṅgalā equates the *protsāhana* with *upacchandana* (seduction) in his commentary upon the *Kāmasūtra* 2. 10. 4, which tells us of how the elegants treat women,

*sanṛttam anṛttam vā gītam vāditram/kalāsu saṁkathāḥ/punāḥ
pānenopacchandanam* (*Jayamaṅgalā*, *protsāhanam*) (2. 10. 4)

“Singing and musical instruments with, or without dance: conversation in the arts: then stimulation (Anregung, R. Schmidt) by means of drink.”

Protsāhana (incitement, seduction, cheating) is, then, enumerated as one of the qualities expected for a love-messenger to possess. Thus, we read in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* 23. 10-11,

*protsāhane 'tha kuśalā madhura-kathā dakṣiṇātha kālajñā
lāḍhā saṁvṛta-mantrā dūtī tv ebhir guṇaīḥ kāryā*

“Any woman should be employed as a messenger when she is skilled in inciting (the beloved), is sweet in her way of speaking, dexterous, able to act suitably to the occasion, charming in her behaviour and is able to keep to secrets.”

In the *Kāmasūtra* these qualities of messenger (*dūta-guṇa*) are described as follows,

*patutā dhārṣṭhyam ingitākārajñatā pratāraṇa-kālajñatā viśahya-
buddhitvam laghvī pratipattiḥ sopāyā ceti dūta-guṇāḥ* (1. 5. 36)

“Alertness, audacity, understanding of intention through internal and external signs, understanding of appropriate time for cheating, presence of mind, and quick apprehension, together with suitable means.”

Here, *Jayamaṅgalā* paraphrases *pratāraṇa* (cheating) by *protsāhana* (*pratāraṇa-kālajñatā kāle 'smin. protsāhayitum śakyata iti*).

Another compounded form *anuprotsāhana*, occurs in the *Jayamaṅgalā* on *Kāmasūtra* 1. 3. 14, where the manners of women in the bedroom are prescribed.

*śayanopacārikāḥ ṣoḍaśa|tad yathā-puruṣasya bhāva-grahaṇam,
sva-rāga-prakāśanam, pratyāṅga-dānam...anuprotsāhanam...guhyā-
gūhanam iti*

"Service in bed are of sixteen kinds: to grasp the sentiment of man, manifestation of passion of her own, delivering of every part of her body...to incite him in response to his incitement (Aufstacheln R. Schmidt)...(and at the end) to hide her privacy (again)."

Here the concept of *anuprotsāhana* seems to be a proper mutual incitement of man and woman to the end that both of them heighten a romantic mood in the bed chamber.

Another compounded form *samutsaḥ* - appears three times in the *Jātakamālā*. The first instance is as follows,

*...duḥkhitam anātham atrāṇam aparīṇāyakam lokam avekṣya karuṇayā
samutsāhyamānas tat-paritrāṇa-vyavasita-matir...(p. 225, lines 1-3)*

"Seeing that the world was woe-begone, without protector, without help, without guidance, he (the Bodhisattva) was impelled by his compassion to determine to save it."

The second example is,

*sa rājā taṃ ruruṃ...samutsāhayamānaḥ sāntaḥpuro 'mātya-gaṇa-
parivṛtaḥ prīti-bahumāna-saumyam udīkṣamāṇo dharmam papraccha
(p. 174, lines 1-4)*

"Then, the king with his wives and the whole retinue of his officers exhorted Ruru (deer) to preach the Law, and raising his eyes to him with a kind expression of gladness mixed with reverence entreated him in this manner."

The last one is,

*paratra caiveha ca duḥkha-hetūn kāmān vihātuṃ na samutsahante
tapo-vanam tad viparītam ete tyajanti mām cādyā dhig astu moham
(20. 36)*

"They are not capable of parting with worldly pleasures, the cause of suffering both in this world and in the next, but forsake both the penance-grove, which frees from those sufferings, and me! Fie upon their infatuation!"

In the above, the first two examples show us that *samutsāhaya-* is not significantly different from *utsāhaya-*, its meaning being to impel or to exhort. In the last example, *samutsah-* is nothing but a formal variation of *utsah-*, the commonest sense of which denotes capability, taking with it an infinitive. Here the preverb *sam-* does not add as much semantic force to the specification of meaning as the case of the preverb *pra-*.

THE STORY OF THE BIRTH OF PĀṆDAVAS*

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Once Pāṇḍu happened to kill a pair of antelopes at the time of copulation, but in reality it was a *ṛṣi* who had assumed its form to enjoy unbridled pleasures of love. Being enraged at the disturbance in their pleasures, he pronounced a curse on Pāṇḍu that he would die as he died. Pāṇḍu, thereupon, decided to renounce the pleasures of love and to lead the life of an ascetic. But, once he was told by the sages who were repairing to heaven that he would have no place there, as he was sonless. He was touched by this remark and urged Kuntī to have sons by *niyoga*,¹ as he was incompetent to beget sons in her due to curse. He argued out his case very forcefully and cited instances where *niyoga* or freedom in sex-life was practised for the purpose of providing sons to the family. He pointed out further that he also was born by *niyoga*. Kuntī disdained the obnoxious advice which Pāṇḍu administered. But she complied with his request of begetting sons by remarking that when she practised penance in her maidenhood, Durvāsas, the renowned sage was pleased to grant her *mantras* by the power of which she would beget sons to provide descendants to the royal family. Accordingly, from Dharma, the god of justice, she had Yudhiṣṭhira; from Vāyu, the god of wind, she had strong Bhīma and from Indra, the god of gods, she had Arjuna. The remaining *mantra* was transferred over to Mādri, the second wife of Pāṇḍu, who got twins - Nakula and Sahadeva - from Aśvins, the twin gods. This is in brief the "mythological account"² of the birth of Pāṇḍavas.

* I am thankful to Dr. B. J. Sandesara, Director, Oriental Institute, Baroda, for kindly permitting me to consult the MSS of the MP and the BVP in the Oriental Institute, Baroda.

1. On *niyoga* vide Kane P. V., *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. II, Part I, Ch. XIII, pp. 599 ff.

2. Vaidya C. V., *The Mahābhārata : A Criticism*, 1929, p. 96.

This mythological account of the birth of the Pāṇḍavas occurs in the Purāṇas.³ In this paper, it is proposed to discuss this account in the light of the *Matsya Purāṇa* (MP) and some other Purāṇas from a textual point of view. The passage from the MP in the ASS edition is as follows :

(a) माद्री कुन्ती तदा चैव पाण्डोर्मायै बभूवतुः ॥ 50.48

देवदत्ताः सुताः पञ्च पाण्डोरर्थेऽभिजज्ञिरे ।

धर्माधिष्ठिरो जज्ञे मारुताच्च वृकोदरः ॥ 50.49

इन्द्राद्धनञ्जयश्चैव इन्द्रतुल्यपराक्रमः ।

नकुलं सहदेवं च माद्वश्विभ्यामजीजनत् ॥ 50.50

The account is referred to in MP 46.8 ff (ASS edition) also as follows :

(b) ** सा जज्ञे देवपुत्रान् मनोरथान् ॥ 46.8

धर्माधिष्ठिरो जज्ञे बायोर्जज्ञे वृकोदरः ।

इन्द्राद्धनञ्जयश्चैव शत्रुतुल्यपराक्रमः ॥ 46.9

माद्वत्स्यां तु जनितावश्विभ्यामिति शुश्रुम ।

नकुलः सहदेवश्च रूग्णगशोऽन्वितौ ॥ 46.10

The discussion is called forth, because one of the MS viz. *ga* as noted in the ASS edition of the MP reads 'पाण्डोः क्षेत्रेऽभिजज्ञिरे' at 50.49 in the passage *a* quoted above. The passage *b* quoted above does not present a Variation of the type in *a*, but it records merely the divine birth of the five Pāṇḍava princes. Hence, the point of discussion is in connection with the passage *a* quoted above. The MSS of the MP in the Oriental Institute, Baroda, read 'पाण्डोरर्थे प्रजज्ञिरे' or 'पाण्डोरभिजज्ञिरे'; thus they go with the lection of the printed ASS edition of the MP. The BVP describes the Pāṇḍavas as *kṣetrajā* sons categorically in the following stanzas :

कुन्त्याश्च क्षेत्रजाः पुत्राः केवलं भर्तुराज्ञया ।

कलौ निषिद्धं त्रियुगे प्रसिद्धं परपैतृकम् ॥ BVP 4.114-110

युधिष्ठिरो धर्मपुत्रो भीमश्च पवनात्मजः ।

महेन्द्रपुत्रो धर्मिष्ठः फाल्गुनो विजयी भुवि ॥ BVP 4.115.111

यस्मै पाशुपतं शम्भुः प्रददौ च स्वयं पुरा ।

अश्वमेधं गवालम्भं संन्यासं पलपैतृकम् ॥ BVP 4.115.112

देवरेण सुतोत्पत्तिं कलौ पञ्च विवर्जयेत् ।

द्रौपद्याः पञ्च भर्तारः शंकरस्य वरेण च ॥ BVP 4.115.113

The lines in this passage appear to be misplaced; of course, it will be finally decided in the critical edition, but looking to the context the passage may be restated tentatively as follows:

कुन्त्याश्च क्षेत्रजाः पुत्राः केवलं भर्तृगञ्जया ।

युधिष्ठिरो धर्मपुत्रो भीमश्च पवनात्मजः ॥

महेन्द्रपुत्रो धर्मिष्ठः फाल्गुनो विजयी भुवि ।

यस्मै पाशुपतं शम्भुः प्रददौ च स्वयं पुरा ॥

द्रौपद्याः पञ्च भर्तारः शंकरस्य वरेण च ।

कलौ निषिद्धं त्रियुगे प्रसिद्धं पलपैतृकम् ॥^{3a}

अश्वमेधं गवालम्भं संन्यासं पलपैतृकम् ।

देवरेण सुतोत्पत्तिं कलौ पञ्च विवर्जयेत् ॥

The MSS of the BVP in the Oriental Institute, Baroda, read 'क्षेत्रजाः पुत्राः', i.e. Pāṇḍavas are Kṣetrajā sons. Elsewhere in the BVP, Kuntī is spoken of as "a woman in love with four",⁴ i.e. Sūrya in her maidenhood, and Dharma, Vāyu and Indra after her marriage.

3a. Cf. अग्निहोत्रं गवालम्भं संन्यासं पलपैतृकम् ।

देवराच्च सुतोत्पत्तिं कलौ पञ्च विवर्जयेत् ।

स्मृतिमुक्तं फलं (वर्णाश्रम p. 176)

Quoted by Kane P. V., *History of*

Dharmaśāstra Vol. III, p. 929, fn. 1802.

P. V. Kane also notes that "Hemādri in the *Danakhṇḍa* quotes passage from the *Garuḍapurāṇa* in which seven matters are mentioned as forbidden in Kali, viz. Aśvamedha, Gosava, human sacrifice, Rājasūya, remarriage even of a girl whose marriage is not consummated, the carrying of a Kamaṇḍalu and procreation of a son on a widow by her husband's brother." (*Ibid.*, p. 929).

4. Cf. कुन्ती चतुर्णां कामिनी भुवि । BVP 4. 115 71

Kāminī, 'a woman in love' (Macdonell A. A., *Practical Sanskrit Dictionary* 1954, p. 66.)

Likewise the Mbh, Bhp 9. 24. 32 says that Kuntī had obtained the *mantras* from Durvāsas, and she obtained three sons - Yuchiṣṭhira, Bhīma and Arjuna - from Dharma, Anila (= Vāyu) and Indra respectively and Mādri obtained two sons - Nakula and Sahadeva - from Aśvins as Pāṇdu was prohibited from pleasures of sex on account of curse (9. 22. 27-28).

Likewise the Mbh (Cr. Ed. 1. 115. 25), the MP 50. 49 describes Pāṇdavas as *devadattāḥ*,⁵ "given by the gods."

The Mbh (Cr. Ed. 1. 114. 2-3) states Kuntī recited the *mantras* and having *saṅgama* with Dharma who is described as *yogamūrtidhara* she obtained a son, i.e. Yudhiṣṭhira.⁶ The MS D4 of the Mbh (Cr. Ed. Ādiparvan, p. 505) has the following additional stanza noted in the critical apparatus:—

पाण्डोरथे महाभागा कुन्ती धर्ममुगमत् ।
ऋतुभाले शुचिस्नाता शुक्लवस्त्रा यशस्विनी ।
शय्यां जग्राह सुश्रोणी सह धर्मेण सुव्रता ।

Thus, the passages from D4 and Cr. Ed. 1. 114. 2-3 bring out that Kuntī had a son after cohabitation. It is significant to note that M. Winternitz uses the term 'cohabit' in connection with the account of the birth of Pāṇdavas.⁷ Likewise the Mbh the *Devī-*

5. Cf. "देवांनी उत्पन्न केले" The MP with the Prakrit *ṭīkā* by Janārdanācārya and Anantacārya, Part I, p. 390.

"देवताओं की प्रसन्नता से दिये गये"

Ram Pratap Tripathi, *Matsyamaḥāpurāṇa* (Hindi Translation), p. 140.

6. Cf. जजाप जप्यं विधवदत्तं दुर्वाससा पुरा । Mbh. Cr. Ed., 1. 114. 2.

संगम्य सा धर्मेण योगमूर्तिरेण वै ।

लेभे पुत्रं वरारोहा सर्वप्राणभृतां वरम् ।

Mbh. Cr. Ed., 1. 114. 3.

Sam+√gām, "have sexual intercourse with (Macdonell A. A., *Op. cit.*, p. 82; Apte V. S., *The Student's Sanskrit English Dictionary*, 1968, p. 182)

7 Winternitz M., *History of Indian Literature* Vol. I, p. 330. Elsewhere M. Winternitz discusses this account under the caption 'Niyoga'. (Notes on the Mahābhārata with special reference to Dahlamann's Mahābhārata, JRAS, 1819, pp. 713 ff.). Chitrav Shastri also takes the account of the birth of Pāṇdavas as a case of *niyoga* (Prācīna-caritrakośa, (Hindi), p. 411). Anand Sadhale observes that had Kuntī begotten the sons through Dhṛtarāṣṭra or Vidura, they could have been legitimate ones according to the institution of *niyoga*, but the children produced through others, when they, i.e. Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Vidura, were alive, cannot be considered to be legitimate even in accordance with the institution of *niyoga* (हा जय नांवाचा इतिहास आहे. Bombay, 1964, p. 19). C. V. Vaidya remarks that "during his (i.e. Pāṇdu's) life-time or after his (i.e. Pāṇdu's) death his wives raised by *niyoga* five sons." (*Op. cit.*, p. 96).

bhāgavata-Purāṇa also states that she invoked the gods with the *mantras* and having cohabited with them she gave birth to Yudhiṣṭhira and others.⁸ It is significant to note that the phrase '*Pāṇḍor arthe*' in the MP has a prototype in the Mbh-MS D4 as noted above.

The foregoing discussion brings out that the Purāṇas record two streams of thought, viz. 1. Pāṇḍavas' miraculous birth through the gods and the *mantras* and 2. Kuntī's cohabitation with the gods. This tends to suggest that the Purāṇas also recognise this episode as a case of *niyoga* which is different from the one taught in the Dharmaśāstras and hence the Pāṇḍavas are *kṣetraja* sons of Pāṇḍu as stated in the BVP. Note also in this connection the term *kṣetre* as *varia lectione* in the passage *a* In qualifying them as *devadattāḥ* (in the passage *a*, cf. *devaputrān* in the passage *b*); the real genitor's name is suppressed and a divine halo is created around the royal levitation, probably to put Kuntī in a favourable light as M. Winterintz observes that "in the mouths of these bards (*i.e.* epic bards) these alterations were undertaken which made Pāṇḍavas appear in a more favourable light and Kauravas in an unfavourable one, without its being possible to eradicate completely the original tendency of the songs."⁹

8. Cf. तं कुन्ती वचनं प्राह मम मन्त्रोऽस्ति कामदः ।

दत्तो दुर्वाससा पूर्वं सिद्धः सर्वथा प्रभो ॥

निमन्त्रयेऽहं यं देवं मन्त्रेणानेन पार्थिव ।

आगच्छेत् सर्वथा सो वै मम पार्श्वे नियान्वृतः ॥

मर्तुर्वाक्येन सा तत्र स्मृत्वा धर्मं सुरोत्तमम् ।

संगम्य सुषुप्ते पुत्रं प्रथमं च युधिष्ठिरम् ॥

वायोर्वृहोदरं पुत्रं जिष्णुं चैव शतक्रतोः ।

वर्षे वर्षे त्रयः पुत्राः कुन्त्या जाता महाबलाः ॥

माद्रो प्राह पतिं पाण्डुं पुत्रं मे कुरु सत्तम ।

किं करोम महाराज दुःखं नाशय मे प्रभो ॥

प्रार्थिता पतिना कुन्ती दशै मन्त्रं दयान्विता ।

एकपुत्रबन्धेन माद्रो पतिमते स्थिता ॥

स्मृत्वा तदाऽश्विनौ देवौ मद्राजपुत्रा सुतौ ।

नकुलः सहदेवश्च सुषुप्ते वावर्णिनी ।

एवं ते पाण्डवाः पञ्च क्षोत्रेभ्यः सुरात्मजः ॥

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9. Winternitz M., A History of Indian Literature, p. 462. Adolf Holtzmann put forward a theory in 1884 - later on styled as "Inversion Theory" by Hopkins - according to which Kauravas were the heroes of the original poem. (*vide*, Pusalker A.D., *Studies in the Epics and Purāṇas*, 1955, Introduction, pp. xxvii ff.)

Considering the two lections of the MP in the light of the above discussion the lection "*Pāṇḍoh kṣetre abhijajñire*" appears to be significant and forceful. Of course, the final lection will be decided in the critical edition of the MP which is under preparation under the able editorship of Dr. V. Raghavan. *En passant* it may be mentioned that this tends to show how Purāṇas preserve the different phases of the episodes.

Abbreviations : ASS — Anandashram Sanskrit Series

BhP — Bhāgavatapurāṇa

BVP — Brahmavaivartapurāṇa

Cr. Ed. — Critical edition

Mbh — Mahābhārata

MP — Matsyapurāṇa

MS(s) — Manuscript(s)

"OUT-ŚAMKARING ŚAMKARA"

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In a recent work *Vedanta: the Culmination of Indian Thought* by Dr. R. D. Ranade, which is a study of the Vedānta Sūtras, we are given to understand that the author while giving credit to the great Vedāntic teachers of the past for correct interpretation of some of the Sūtras has exercised the right of putting new interpretation on many of the Sūtras. We gather from the remarks in the Appendix (A) of the said work that by "Out-Śamkaring Śamkara" in this way, Śamkara's conclusions have been established and strengthened by interpreting the Sūtras in a different way from Śamkara in five to seven places. (p. 221).

Having regard to the acknowledged eminence of Dr. Ranade, it becomes necessary to examine this claim before accepting it at its own estimation. I propose to examine here two such instances given.

(1) *Parābhidyānāttu tirohitam tato hyasya bandhaviparyayau*

This Sūtra is part of the *Samādhyādhikaraṇa* which according to Śamkara consists of Sūtras III, 2, 1-6. Śamkara has argued and established in this *adhikaraṇa* that the dream-creations are projected by the individual souls and that they are mere appearances (*māyāmātram*). Prof. Ranade is in complete agreement with Śamkara's interpretation of the first four Sūtras. But he feels there is room and need for improving and strengthening Śamkara's position by giving a fresh interpretation of Sūtra III. 2. 5, differing from what is generally associated with Śamkara's commentary on it as we have it.

In Sūtra 4, Śamkara concedes, following the Sūtrakāra's pronouncement that although the dream as such may be illusory, its indications about the future may be real enough. In the next Sūtra, he passes on to answer the other question mooted in the *Pūrvapakṣa* as to why since the individual soul is himself a part of the Supreme Brahman and therefore sharing in its power of knowledge and rulership he cannot be deemed to be able to create things in the dream by his own will and power.

The answer to this question is provided by Sūtra 5. The Sūtra as we find it interpreted by Śamkara explains what prevents the

soul from being able to make its dream-creations by its own will power. It is because the power of the soul is covered by Ignorance in its state of bondage and it comes to be manifested only when this Ignorance is destroyed by meditation on the Supreme and attaining release.

Prof. Ranade's emendation starts at this point. He makes the startling remark at the very outset that "Śaṅkara understands by the word "Para" here the objective world and says that the true nature of the soul is hidden on account of its contemplation of the objective world" (*Op. cit.* p. 33). The next point he makes is that "the term Parābhidyāna which, in our opinion means, on account of the contemplation of the Lord, upsets the meaning of Śaṅkara as meditation on the objective world" (pp. 180-181).

Turning however to Śaṅkara's actual and authentic interpretation of the Sūtra in question, we find there is really no justification for any of these deductions. For Śaṅkara carefully avoids connecting the word "*tirohitam*" and "*Parābhidyānāt*" and thus gives no room for the Professor's supposition that he understands "Para" in the sense of the objective world. To Śaṅkara *tirohitam* represents a separate affirmation (or better still an *anuvāda*) that the nature of the soul is hidden. The cause of this *tirodhāna* (concealment) is the well-known Avidyā of Śaṅkara's philosophy. The termination of this *tirodhāna* is to be achieved by knowledge of Brahman born of its contemplation. For bondage (*bandha*) and its reversal (*bandhaviparyaya*) i.e. Mokṣa are due respectively to the play of ignorance and realisation of Brahman.

There is nothing in this position of Śaṅkara to suggest that he interprets the phrase "Parābhidyāna" as "contemplation of the objective world." The citation of the Śruti text "*Tasyābhidyānāt*from *Śvet. Up.* in Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya here, must be sufficient to show that he is anxious to connect *abhidyāna* with Īśvara or the Supreme Brahman and not with the objective world.¹

The Professor's suggestion (p. 179) that "*Viparyaya*" is understood as "*mithyājñāna*" in the *Yoga-Sūtras* is irrelevant to the present context. And it does not make Śaṅkara's interpretation here, defective. Reflection would show that if *Viparyaya* should stand for

1. किं पुनर्जीवस्यैव समानधर्मत्वं नास्त्येव ? न नास्त्येव । विद्यमानमपि तत् तिरोहितमविद्यादि व्यवधानात् । त'पुनः तिरोहितं सत्, परमेश्वरमभिधायतो यत्तमानस्य जन्तोर्निघ्नतध्वान्तस्य, कस्यचिदेवाभिभवति । न सभावत एव सर्वेषां जन्तुनाम् । कुतः ? ततो हीश्वरादेतो . अस्य जीवस्य बन्धमोक्षौ भवतः । ईश्वरस्वरूपापरिज्ञानात् बन्धः, तत्स्वरूपपरिज्ञानात् मोक्षः । तथा च श्रुतिः—तस्याभिध्यानात् ततोयं देहमेदेवि र्वेश्वर्य... (श्वे.उ. II) इत्येवमाद्या (S.B.S. III. 2.5).

mithyājñāna here, there would be no need for the Sūtrakāra to have made a separate mention of *bandha* as it is only the outcome of Viparyaya.

Starting with the baseless assumption that Śamkara has construed "Parābhidhyāna" as contemplation of the objective world, Prof. Ranade tries to find the clue to the proper interpretation of the Sūtra by turning to Sūtra III, 2, 4 which tells us that dreams have a prophetic quality. He then suggests by way of an improvement to Śamkara that we split the fifth Sūtra (*yogavibhāga*) into two and read "*Parābhidhyānū tu*" as one Sūtra and the rest "*tato hyasya...*" (p. 33) as another. The former will thus "account for the prophetic quality of dreams; for it is by the meditation on the true nature of God (*parābhidhyāna*) that the soul reaches reality and to the extent to which the soul shares in this Divine contemplation to that extent the dreams turn out real" (pp. 33-34).

Is it not too much to believe with Prof. Ranade that in respect of dreams which come true the dreamer is in meditation on the true nature of God? Can it be seriously contended that when we are dreaming we are really meditating on God? Can it be a serious type of meditation as in the waking state?

(2) *Itaravyapadesādhikaraṇam*

According to Śamkara this *adhikaraṇa* consists of Sūtras II. 1. 21-23. It explains how in spite of the non-difference of the individual self and Brahman, the latter is not free to do what is always beneficial to itself and avoid getting into unpleasant situation and experiences like birth, death, old age etc. According to Śamkara the first Sūtra raises the *pūrvapakṣa* and the second answers it (*siddhānta*) and the third one elucidates it with suitable illustrations.

Regretting that there has been a welter about the interpretation of these three Sūtras among the great commentators, Prof. Ranade observes that "these Sūtras do not seem to have been accurately interpreted by any of the commentators. According to us, the Sūtras are to be interpreted as follows: If we identify God with the individual self (*itara*) then the objection that he does not help the performance of good actions will stick to him. If we say that he is different (*bheda*) from the individual self, the objection will press against him still closer (*adhikam*) — the word *adhikam* is neuter in gender—because he cannot prevent the performance of bad actions. *Tu* need not in the Sūtra be interpreted as introducing the *Uttarapakṣa*.

It may be taken to show *a fortiori* aspect of the argument. The argument brings into bolder relief the powerlessness of God. The third Sūtra gives the solution where we agree with Śaṅkara" (p. 96).

The Professor here has overshot the mark in trying to improve upon Śaṅkara's interpretation of the second Sūtra, by construing the words "*adhikam tu bhedanirdeśāt*" in the manner he has done, without realizing the syntactical pitfall into which the grammatical construction proposed by him for "*adhikam*" would lead his interpretation. For, the predicate of the first proposition is (Hitakaraṇādi)-(doṣaprasaktiḥ) (the contingency of the flaw of not getting done what is beneficial and doing what is disagreeable). If the second Sūtra is intended to draw attention to the intensification of this *Doṣaprasakti* as Prof. Ranade would have it, we should expect the Sūtrakāra, with proper regard for the grammar of the Sanskrit language, to have used the correct form of the adjective in the feminine *adhikā tu bhedanirdeśāt* अधिका तु भेदनिर्देशात् instead of neuter अधिकं तु...). It is because of his knowledge and respect for Sanskrit grammar that Śaṅkara has refrained from going in for such hasty interpretations,

PĀṆINI AND ṚGVEDIC INTERPRETATION

(*ajuryamuh* in ṚV 5. 6. 10)

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The utility of Pāṇini's grammar in interpreting the ṚV has been generally admitted, though not without a word of caution. I have already shown¹ how P's rules help us to decide the exact meaning of two variously interpreted ṚV passages, namely 1. 25. 7c. and 2. 39. 4a. Here we shall see if it is possible to do so in the case of ṚV 5. 6. 10a by discussing the expression *ajuryamuh*, which has been variously discussed and understood.

On the face of it, *ajuryamuh* appears to be not one but two words, both of them finite verbs, however irregular they may be. The two words are *ajuh* and *yamuh*. In the ṚV we have unreduplicated perfect participles like *dāśvas*, *vidvas*, and *sāhvas*, and even an unreduplicated perfect form of *√yam*.² It may not, therefore, be quite incorrect to understand *yamuh* as an unreduplicated pf. 3rd pl. of *√yam*. Similarly *ajuh* also may be taken to be perfect 3rd pl. of *√aj* without reduplication. Thus *ajuryamuh* may be described as containing two separate finite verbs, namely *ajuh* and *yamuh*, both of them unreduplicated pf. forms of *√aj* and *√yam* respectively. According to P's rules of accentuation they will both of them be oxytone by *pratyayasvara*.³ But actually they are both of them enclitic-

Now the fact of its enclitic in the case of *ajuh* can be easily explained. For, it is a finite verb (*tiñ*), not standing at the beginning of a verse (*apādādaū*),⁴ and not coming after another finite verb (*atinah*).⁵ But the case is quite different with *yamuh*. It is a finite verb not standing at the beginning of a verse. But it comes after the finite verb *ajuh*: and hence, according to P's rules, it

1. See ABORI, Golden Jubilee Volume, (1967) pp. 75-81, reprinted in Indian Antiquary (Third Series) Vol. II No.3 pp. 1-8.
2. The form is *yamatuḥ* (RV 6. 67.1). We also get the regular forms *yematuḥ* (1.119. 5), (5.61.9); *Yemahuḥ* (8.25.6), *yemathuḥ* (1.30.19; 5.73.3); etc. For the forms *ajuh* and *yamuh* from *√aj* and *√yam* respectively see Delorück, *Altindische Varbum*, p. 65.
3. By what is known as *saṭiṣṭasvarabaliyastvanyāya*. Of all the *udattas*, the *udatta* of that part (of a formation) which is enjoined and appended i.e. enjoined last is stronger than all the rest. That *udatta*, therefore, becomes the *udatta* of the final formation.
4. Cf. *anudattaṁ sarvaṁ apādādaū* (PA 8.1.18).
5. Cf. *tinatinah* (PA 8.1.28)

cannot be enclitic. This shows that P's rules cannot admit *ajuryamuh* as comprising two separate and independent finite verbs in view of the fact that it is enclitic.

The RV affords us several instances where more finite verbs than one stand one after another in close succession. In all these cases it is found that the accent of the first is determined by the general rules as given by P; and it is enclitic or otherwise accordingly. The succeeding verb, however, is always found to retain its original accent and is never enclitic. Thus in *tarāṇir ij jayati kṣeti puṣyati* (RV 7. 32. 9c.) we have three finite verbs in succession, the first is enclitic; while the other two, because they stand after another finite verb, are not so.⁶ Similarly in RV 8. 1. 30 we have *stuhi stuhī*, where the former *stuhi* is not enclitic because it stands at the beginning of a verse; and the second is not so because it stands after a finite verb. Thus according to P's rules (and also according to RV practice) a finite verb, coming closely after another (independent and separate) finite verb, cannot be enclitic. This shows that if *ajuh* and *yamuh* (both enclitic) are taken to be two words separate and independent from each other the former cannot be admitted as (being) a finite verb; and in that case we shall have to say what it is and also explain why it is enclitic. If, on the other hand, it is admitted as a finite verb, we shall have to find some explanation for the enclitic accentuation of *yamuh* or admit that the accentuation is irregular. It may be seen that almost all the attempts made so far to explain the expression *ajuryamuh* have sprung up from one or the other of these considerations.

It was only Ludwig⁷ who had two quite ingenious suggestions to offer. The originally intended word according to him was perhaps *jajuryimuh*, turned into *jajuryamuh* (under the influence of pf. forms in *athus* and *atus*) which he would construe as pf. 1st pl. of √jvari. This would make the expression as only one word—a finite verb (and hence naturally enclitic). In the alternative, he would split the expression as *ajuri* (a finite verb) and *amuh* (= *adah*).⁸ But neither of these can be said to be satisfactory; and Oldenberg has left both these out of consideration without any critical remark.⁹

6. For other similar occurrences see: *tēṣām pahi śrudhī hāvam* (RV 1.2 1c); *agnir jambhāis tigitāir atti bharvati* (1.143.5C); etc.

7. See *Commentar zur Rigveda Übersetzung*, 1 Teil zu dem ersten Bande der Übersetzung (Prag 1881), p. 331.

8. With this he would translate the verse as follows: so hab ich damals Agni verert, er gebe uns den reichthum an helden und raschen rossen (raschheit der rosse), (die er uns damals dafür gegeben hat). *ibid* p. 331.

9. Oldenberg writes: Mit Ludwig's *jajuryamuh* für *jajuryimuh* oder *ajuri amuh* beschaftige ich mich nicht. (*Noten*, I, p. 315f).

All other scholars (except perhaps in some sense *Grassmann* alone) understand *ajuryamuh* as comprising two separate words, namely *ajur* and *yamuh*. About *yamuh* there is a general agreement that it is an unreduplicated pf. form. But there is a sharp difference of opinion regarding *ajur*. *Oldenberg* admits it as a finite verb, while *Pischel*, *Bartholomae* and *Bloomfield* do not admit it as such and try to explain it in their own way.

Thus *Pischel*¹⁰ proposes to understand *ajur* to be equal to *ajuṣ* (to be contrasted with *sajūs*, *sajūr*). Then *ajur yam*, according to him, means, 'äuseinandersteh. absondern', and hence 'auszeichnen'.¹¹ But here it is hard to understand why we should have *ajuṣ* (and not *ajūs* like *sajūs*). Secondly, the correct antonym of *sajūs* is *asajūs*, (and not *ajūs*, as *Pischel* would have it). Thirdly, the development of the sense of *ajūs* or *asajūs* as shown by *Pischel* is, to quote *Oldenberg*, 'sehr bedenklich.' Finally, even after all this the enclitic accent of *ajur* stands unexplained; for, being a *nañ-samāsa*, it is bound to be oxytone (if *Bahurvr̥hi*)¹² or barytone (if *Tatpuruṣa*).¹³

*Bartholomae*¹⁴ being conscious of the untenability of *Pischel's* suggestion, proposes to take *ajur* as loc. sg. (with no case ending) of the word *ajur* (to be understood as a synonym of *ajman*).¹⁵ But neither the word *ajur* nor a loc. (ending-less) formation from such a base is attestable in the *Ṛgveda*; and even after this explanation, the enclitic nature of *ajur* remains unexplained. For, loc. sg. of such a base is bound to retain the base accent.¹⁶

None of the explanations offered so far could give full satisfaction; and hence *Bloomfield* boldly rejected the splitting up of *ajuryamuh* into *ajuh* and *yamuh* as being monstrous. It must have appeared monstrous, says he, even to the *Padakāra* who has declined to analyse it. He, therefore, sees here a case of haplology.¹⁷ Thus, according to him *ajuryamuh* = *ajuryām*, *yamuh*.¹⁸ Here we see that with the disappearance of the accented syllable *yām*, what remains is

10. *Ved. Stud*, 2, 127 noticed by *Oldenberg*, Loc. cit.

11. *Pischel's* translation is : so haben sie Agni gründlich ausgezeichnet. (quoted by *Oldenberg*)

12. By *nañsubhyām* (PA 6.2.172)

13. By *tatpuruṣe tulyār̥iṭha* — (PA.6.2.2) and the var., *avyaye nañkunipātānām iti vaktavyam*, on the same.

14. *Studien* 2, 159 A.2 noticed by *Oldenberg*, loc. cit. Also see SBE Vol XLV Part II, p. 381.

15. *Bartholomae's* translation as given by *Oldenberg* is : sie haben ihn jetzt auf seiner Bahn festgehalten.

16. The case endings (*sup*) and endings with a mute *P* (*pit*) are enclitic (Cf *anudātau suppitau*, PA 3.1.4).

17. *Ṛgveda Repetitions* (HOS, XX), p. 245.

18. For references see *Bloomfield*, loc. cit.

ajur yāmuḥ all enclitic (*yāmuḥ* being enclitic because it is a finite verb). Haplology, he says, is a common occurrence in a variety of cases, and there should be no difficulty to see it in the case under consideration. Plausible as this explanation appears to be, one cannot but entertain a doubt whether haplology could take effect on an accented syllable (like *yām* in the present case).¹⁹ Moreover it must be observed that any explanation that requires some (even the slightest) deviation from the traditional text, howsoever satisfactory may appear to be, will be accepted only as a necessary evil or as a last resort; and the moment a suitable explanation requiring no deviation becomes available, it is bound to be discarded as not correct. Such an explanation, even if it be adopted by great authorities²⁰ like Geldner and Renou, may not be easily declared to be the final word on the point. As Oldenberg²¹ has rightly pointed out, the duty of the Vedic exegetist is often, even mostly, not to amend the text, but to expound the text as he has it before him.

But before turning to such attempts we must take note of one more attempt at emendation. *Visva Bandhu*,²² taking note of all the previous explanations of *ajuryamuḥ* given by scholars and commentators ancient and modern, points out the drawbacks in each one of them and declares that original reading must have been *evāgnim ajuryām aguh* which was corrupted into its present reading. In spite of the explanation offered by *Visva Bandhu*, his emendation must be said to

19. Thus, for example, in *viśvasuvidāḥ* (= *viśvasasuvidāḥ*) it is the enclitic *va* that is elided. (RV 1. 48.2a); in AV 13.2.9 *apāvṛktamaḥ* (= *apāvṛkta tamaḥ*) see *Wackernagel*. KZ 40, p. 546 f; *akṣṇayāvan* RV 8.7.35 (= *akṣṇayā-yāvan*), *Wack. AIG*, II; 1, p. 128f. JAOS 17. p. 416-418 for other illustrations. Only an *anudatta* syllable appears to fall a prey to haplology. And even where an accented syllable appears to be so affected, it is seen to transfer its accent to the following syllable as in *Karśapha* (= *Karśā-śapha*, Bahuvrihi accent). *Wack.*, AIG, II I, p.129. Perhaps here only the unaccented *sa* may be said to have fallen off.
20. Geldner wholly approves of Bloomfield's suggestion, and translates: so haben sie den alterlosen Agni mit lobesiwarten und Opfern richtig gelenkt, (HOS, Vol. 34, p.9). Renou translates: Ainsi (les pretres-poetes) ont-ils dirigés Agni exempt de vieillir, ave deschants, — (*Etudes Védiques et Pañinēennes*, Tome XIII, p.23). But he has not passed any remark on *ajuryamuḥ*. Neisser, *Zum Wörterbuch des Rgveda*, (Leipzig 1924) also follows Bloomfield and translates: haben den nicht alternden (Agni) festgehalten.
21. Oldenberg's words are:- Gerade im Rgveda wird oft, sogar meistens, seine aufgabe nicht sein, den Text zuverbessern, sondern zu zeigen, dass voreiligen Besserungsversuchen der recht verstandene Text widersteht: mit andern Worten, seine Aufgabe wird sein den Text zu erklären. (*Noten Voræmerkung* P. III).
22. See *Vaidikapadānukramakośa*, (*Saṁhitās*, Book I, part 1, P. 66 note on *ajuryamuḥ*). In the pretty elaborate note in Sanskrit he has ultimately resorted to haplology of *g* and *agur* under the influence of, the *g* in *gīrbhiḥ* which follows. This must be said to be more laboured than the haplology as suggested by Bloomfield. Furthermore, one wonders how the *udatta yā* (in *ajuryām aguh*) could lose its accent and give us *ajuryamuḥ* (even if haplology is admitted).

be too drastic. Secondly, in view of *yamatuḥ* occurring in RV, we can legitimately understand *yamuh* (and on its analogy *ajuh* also) as an unreduplicated pf. form of *√yam* (and *√aj*)

According to another view only passingly hinted at by Oldenberg,²³ *ajur* would be voc. and should be taken to mean 'O never-aging (Agni)'; and hence it is enclitic. The other word *yamuh* also is enclitic as a finite verb. But this is hardly acceptable because *ajur* (voc.) appears to be hardly possible, especially in that context.

Oldenberg²⁴ himself takes *ajuh* and *yamuh* both as two separate, independent finite verbs, pf. 3rd pl. forms of *√aj* and *√yam* respectively. But he is not sure about the correctness of the enclitic nature of *yamuh*. It may possibly be due, he says, to a misunderstanding about *a* (in *ajuryamuh*) which looks like the augment *a*. This suggestion, however, is neither offered nor to be taken as more than a mere hypothetical suggestion. The implication is that owing to this misapprehension *ajuryamuh* was looked upon as one word-one finite verb; and hence made enclitic. Oldenberg appears, to have missed the truth by a very narrow margin, as we shall presently see.²⁵

Grassmann²⁶ is the only modern scholar who declares that *ajuryamuh* appears to be a Zusammenrückung aus *ajus* und *yamus*. But evidently because no parallel instance of the type is available in the *Ṛgveda* (or even in the *Veda*), he did not venture to declare that it is a compound, though he would possibly welcome the suggestion if it could be made on some plausible ground.

Indian tradition, as represented by the *Padapāṭhakāra* and by Sāyaṇa is definitely in favour of taking *ajuryamuh* as one *pada*. Sāyaṇa understands it as a compound formed out of two finite verbs, namely *ajuh* and *yamuh*; and this he tries to establish on the basis of the *gaṇasūtra*, *ākhyātam ākhyātena kriyāsātaye*.²⁷ But it must be observed that the rule occurs in the *gaṇapāṭha* under the rule *mayūravayamsakādayasca*, in which P gives sanction to some irregular

23. Loc. cit., schwerlich *ajur* Vok., nicht Altender".

24. *Noten* I, p. 316.

25. cf. Ob die Akzentlosigkeit auch der zweiten Fork korrekt ist, wage ich nicht zu entscheiden; es wäre denkbar, dass bei derartig eignem Auseinanderschluss zweiter nahezu synonyme, dasselbe Objekt regierender Verba die sonst geltende Auffassung des zweiten als eignem Satz bildend und darum Akzent verlangend eine Ausnahme zugelassen hätte. Die überlieferte Auffassung als ein Wort beruht vielleicht darauf; dass der eingang *ajo* den Eindruck augmentierter Form hervorrief. (Oldenberg, loc. cit.). It may be noted here that the idea of *eignen Satz* above comes very close to Pāṇini's *amreṣita* discussed below.

26. *Wörterbuch*, p. 19.

27. Sāyaṇa explains *ajuh* and *yamuh* by *gacchanti* and *yamayanti* (= *sthāpayanti*) respectively. The difficulty about the person (i.e. 3rd person being used where 1st person is expected by the context) he resolves by the remark: *evam ātreyaḥ svām paravattaya nirdiśanti*. Then he explains the formation by quoting the *gaṇasūtra* saying: *ajuryamur ity atra ākhyātam ākhyātena kriyāsātaye iti samāsaḥ*.

tatpuruṣa compounds.²⁸ This means that the compound formed on the basis of the *gaṇasūtra* will be a *tatpuruṣa* compound and hence it is difficult to accept such a compound as a finite verb.²⁹ And if it is not a finite verb, it is simply impossible to explain how and why it has become enclitic. An enclitic compound (unless it is vocative) is an impossibility. Secondly, even according to the *gaṇapāṭha*, such compounds are nouns singifying a *kriyā* (an act) involving the repeated employment of the component verbs.³⁰ If *ajuryamuh* could [be explained as one finite (compound) verb, it would be easily understood why it is enclitic. But the explanation offered by Sāyaṇa fails to prove that the compound formation is a finite verb. Hence the problem still remains unsolved.

Turning to the *padapāṭha* we see that there it is treated as one word. But that the fact, the word is not analysed there, leaves scope for doubt; and in fact on this basis it has been declared that the explanation of *ajuryamuh* as a compound of *ajuh* and *yamuh* must have appeared monstrous to the *Padakāra*. But this is not quite correct. For, we have several instances³¹ in the *R̥gveda* of compound words (above all ambiguity) which have been left unanalysed in the *Padapāṭha*. Absence of analysis in the *Padapāṭha* cannot, therefore, be adduced as a trustworthy and definite ground to conclude that the *pada* in question is not a compound.³² Whether a *pada* is or is not a compound has to be determined not on the basis of the *padapāṭha* but on the basis of grammar.³³ So, on the strength of the *padapāṭha* we can only conclude that *ajuryamuh* is one *pada*; and if it is a finite verb (as apparently it is) it is but natural that it should be enclitic.

28. This is clear from the remark of the *Kāśikā* under PA 2.1.72. *avihitakṣaṇas tatpuruṣo mayūrayamaṣakādiṣu draṣṭavyaḥ*.

29. A Compound is a *prātipadika* (according to 1.2.46). But this designation cannot be extended to *dhātus* (see *adhātuḥ* in PA 1.2.45), nor to finite verbs (*tin*). For, it is applicable only to such verbal formations as are obtained by appending *kṛt* suffixes to roots. And Paṇini has expressly defined *kṛt* as a verbal suffix other than *tin* (cf. *kṛdatiṇ*, PA 3.1.93).

30. This is clear from the following remarks of the *Nyāsa* on this *sūtra*—*tiṇantaṁ tiṇantena saha samasyate kriyāsātatyē gamyamāṇe asnita pibata ity aṣakṛdyatrocyate tatra aśnitapib atā ity praṇujyate|kriyāpradhānas cāyam samāsaḥ*.

31. We have the following instances in *ṚV*—*viśpati*, *viśpatni*, *āhorātrātrāṇi*, *dyāvā bhūmī*, *uśāsānaktā*, *sūryāmāsā*, *satyāṇṛte*, *sāśanānaśane*, etc. It may be observed here that the *AV*. *Prātiśākhya* (ed. W. D. Whitney) IV. 7-72 deals with this topic. Also see *Vāj. Prātiśākhya V. 1-46*; and Siddheshwar Varma, *The Etymologies of Yāska*, pp. 150 ff.

32. For, as Varma (loc. cit) remarks, the real principles underlying the convention of PP. is still a mystery, and will be a subject for future research.

33. For, as has been well said by Patañjali, the *Padakāras* are to follow the *lakṣaṇa* (grammar) and not vice versa. cf. *nahi lakṣaṇena padakāra anuvartyāḥ. padakārair nāma lakṣaṇam anuvartyam|yathālakṣaṇam padam kartavyam* MBh on PA 3.1.109.

At this stage we turn to Ṛgvedic passages³⁴ where we get two finite verbs coming closely one after the other. The *Padakāra*, has not only treated these as one *pada* but even analysed them. In ṚV. 2. 11. 11a and 10. 22. 15a we have the word *pibāpiba* which in the *Padapāṭha* is given as *pibāpiba*. In the case of *stuhī stuhī*, the two words are independent and separate finite verbs; and hence both retain their accent. In *pibāpiba*, the two parts are not separate and independent verbs, but are only parts of one whole (as it is indicated by its being analysed in the *Padapāṭha*).

But in this connection, we have to note that P does not expressly admit such words as *samāsa*. He only lays down that a word (any part of speech including a finite verb) is repeated twice in full, when *nityatva*, *vīpsā*, etc. are to be conveyed. The latter portion of such a formation he designates as *āmreḍita* and further lays down that an *āmreḍita*³⁵ is enclitic. From all this it is evident that though P has not included such formations, in his treatment of *samāsa* (for some technical reasons), and hence though they cannot be technically so designated, they are to be treated as one word³⁶ which is obviously a compound word.

It may thus be seen that a verb repeated twice may be considered as one (compound) verb, if *nityatva*, *vīpsā*, etc. are intended to be conveyed. Otherwise, however, the two verbs are to be treated as independent and separate and hence have their own independent accentuation. Hence *pibāpiba*, being one word³⁷ (a finite verb), retains its accent (only one *udātta* for the whole compound formation) since it stands at the beginning of a *pāda*; while in the case of *stuhī stuhī* both the words have their independent accentuation, because they do not form one word.

In the light of this discussion we now turn to *ajuryamuh*. Here we see that no word is repeated; but at the same time it is possible to say that here there is repetition by sense, though not by the form. For *aj* and *yam* are both of them connected with the act of driving.³⁸ So *ajuh* and *yamuh* (nahezu synonymar, Oldenberg) may

34. *pibāpibēd indra sūra somam*

35. The rules laid down by Pāṇini are: *sarvasya dve|tasya param āmreḍitam| anudāttaṁ ca|nityavīpsayoḥ* (PA 8. 1. 1-4)

36. That Pāṇini considered such formations as one word is shown by the word *tasya* (in 8. 1. 2) which is explained in the *Kāśikā* as *tasya dviruktasya yat param śabdarūpaṁ (tad āmreḍitasṁ jñam bhavati)*. Also see *Kāśikā* on PA 8. 1. 9 (*ekam bahuvrīhivat*).

37. Pāṇini has laid down that as a general rule all the syllables of *pada* (and a finite verb is a *pada* cf. *suptinantaṁ padam*. PA. 1. 4. 14) shall be enclitic except one. Cf. *anudāttaṁ padam ekavarjam* (PA 6. 1. 158)

38. Oldenberg also has remarked: ich meine, dass die Verba *aj* und *yam* gut in zusammenhang passen. Agni wird wie ein Ross angetrieben und gelenkt. Ebenso Grassmann: ähnlich Sayapa. (loc. cit.)

be understood as forming one compound word, a compound finite verb out of two finite verbs, namely *ajuh* and *yamuh*.³⁹ There are in the *Rgveda* many illustrations of repetition of form as well as sense.⁴⁰ Hence it is but natural that P's rule should be explained as requiring both these by the word *sarvasya dve* therein.⁴¹ In the *Veda*, *ajuryamuh* appears to be the solitary example of repetition by *artha* (sense) only. This is why it has been neglected. But we may not be far from right if we say that even such cases could be justified by the rule of Pāṇini noted above.

Here we may refer to a parallel from the field of poetics. For the figure *ananvaya*, the condition is that the *upameya* and the *upamāna* must be the same. Ordinarily this means that they must be identical not only in sense but also in word. Thus *rājīvam iva rājīvam* is a proper illustration of this figure. But, it is further admitted, occasionally identity in sense alone may also do, so that *rājīvam iva pāthojam* may also be admitted as an illustration of *ananvaya*. Identity in word as well as sense is the ideal condition, but identity in sense (but difference in words) may also be considered enough to constitute the figure.⁴² And what is true in the case of the figure, may also be accepted as such in the case of the rules of P that we are considering here.

If this analogy is accepted, there is no reason why *yamuh* (in *ajuryamuh*) should not be admitted as *āmreḍita*; and if it is so admitted, there is no difficulty about the accentuation of *ajuryamuh*, which then can be understood to comprise two finite verbs, the latter being *āmreḍita*. Thus we can translate 5. 6. 10ab with Grassmann as: So trieben lenkten Agni sie durch Lied und Offer fort und fort (a translation which would be acceptable even to that greatest of *Rgvedic* exegetist, *Oldenberg*).⁴³

39. See note 25 above for *Oldenberg's* parallel suggestion, which ultimately should mean what we have said here on the basis of P's rules.

40. For these see Macdonell, *Vedic Grammar*, p. 155.

41. This is how *sarvasya dve* has been explained in the *Kāśikā*, *sarvasya sthāne dve bhavataḥ/ke dve bhavataḥ/ye śabdāḥ cārthataḥ ubhayathāntaratame/ekasya pacatiśabdasya dvau pacatiśabdau bhavataḥ*.

42. Viśvanātha in his *Sahityadarpaṇa* has remarked that for *ananvaya* it is, of course better if the *upamāna* and the *upameya* are identically worded. But at the same time he admits that it is not absolutely necessary that it should be so. For, it can be distinguished from *lāṇūprāsa* on that account only. cf. *rājīvam iva pāthojam iti cāsyā lāṇūprāsād vivikto viśayaḥ/kiñtvatra ucitātvaḥ ekaśabdaprayoga eva śreyān/tad uktam*.

*ananvaye ca śabdaikyam aucityād ānuṣaṅgikam/
asmīnstu lāṇūprāse sāḥśādeva prayojakam*

(SD, Kane's edition 1923 P. 21f)

(The *Karikā ananvaye ca* etc. is found in the *Alaṅkārasarvasva* of Ruṣyaka, a 12th century Kashmirian author, whom Viśvanātha follows in the *Alaṅkāra* section. S. S. Janaki).

43. *Oldenberg* translates: Thus they have driven, they have led, Agni in the due way by prayers and sacrifices. (SBE XLVI, Part II, p. 380).

PĀṆINI AND PĀṆINĪYAS ON DIALECTAL VARIATION IN SANSKRIT

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1. INTRODUCTION

1. In his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, Pāṇini treats two phases of Sanskrit language, i. e. *bhāṣā* 'colloquial speech (in the days of Pāṇini)' and *chandas* 'speech of the Vedic texts.' His general rules are applicable to both of these stages of Sanskrit. Those rules which apply only to the speech of the Vedic texts are specified by the use of the words *chandasi*, *mantrē*, *ṛci*, *yajusi* etc.¹ The colloquial speech termed as *bhāṣā* was a living spoken language of his days. Other Apabhraṃśa and Prakrit speeches were not as prominent as they were in later centuries.² This colloquial speech described by Pāṇini had living pitch distinctions and variations in different domains.³ While describing this colloquial

1. For instance; *vibhāṣā chandasi*, P. 1. 2. 36, *mantrē ghasa*—... P. 2. 4. 80° *devasumnayor yajusi kāṭhake* P. 7. 4. 38; *ṛcaḥ śe* P. 6. 3. 55. For a detailed exposition of the significance of these references, see: Thieme (1935).
2. "Pāṇini uses the term *bhāṣā* for Sanskrit language. From this it is clearly inferred that in his days only Sanskrit used to be spoken; there did not exist other speeches, or their usage was very restricted." (*pāṇiniḥ saṃskṛtabhāṣām bhāṣāpadena vyavaharati tena; tasya kāle saṃskṛtabhāṣaiḥ bhāṣyamāṇāḥ, bhāṣāntarapravyūṭhiḥ na babhūva, svalpīyāsī vā babhūva iti sphuṭam anumīyate*) Chaturvedi (1954), p. 27. Chaturvedi's first alternative cannot be accepted, and the second alternative can be accepted with certain qualifications. However, it is clear that, in his view, Sanskrit was a living reality for Pāṇini and its scope was much wider, than what it was later on. Misra offers good reasons to support that Sanskrit was a living reality for Pāṇini. See: Misra (1966). p. 13.
3. A number of accentuation rules clearly apply to colloquial speech. For instance: *vibhāṣā bhāṣāyām* P. 6. 1. 181 says that in the colloquial speech a vowel before the case ending in forms like *pañcabhiḥ* etc. is optionally high-pitched. By the rule *udak ca vipāśaḥ* P. 4. 2. 74, the forms such as *dāttaḥ* and *gauptaḥ*, if they are names of the wells, are *ādyudātta* on the northern bank of the river Vipāt, while on its southern bank, they are *antodātta*. For a number of rules on compound-accentuation, Vedic examples are not available. See: Joshi (1969), p. 11, Fn. 30. For a detailed discussion on the significance of the term *bhāṣāyām* in Pāṇini's rules, see: Renou (1941), p. 248 ff. We may not agree with Renou's comment: "The word *bhāṣā* is not necessarily the "spoken language" in the sense in which we understand it. It is perhaps... the spoken portion of the religious language, opposed to the sung or psalmed portion represented by the *chandas*. One must not forget that the grammar of Pāṇini is adapted to the needs of the exegetic prose and ritual much more than to those of a "common" language." p. 248, Fn. 1.

speech, Pāṇini not only describes the speech as he observed in his own scholastic or regional domain, but he also refers to a number of dialectal variations. Renou⁴ pointed out that these variations noted by Pāṇini are very scanty and insufficient to draw any clear isoglosses. Emeneau echoes Renou when he remarks: "He (Pāṇini) mentions geographical variants, but not so that we can do much in the way of identifying dialects. All that we are told is that there were other dialects in North India, besides the one he described."⁵ Emeneau here refers only to the geographical variants but leaves out other kinds of dialectal variants which Pāṇini noted by referring to the names of some of his contemporaries or predecessors.

2. Though we agree with Renou and Emeneau that the dialectal specifications in Pāṇini are insufficient for a detailed study of the dialects and we also agree with Misra that Pāṇini's grammar is "neither intended to be a comparative grammar, nor a dialect survey (p. 12)", yet the available dialectal specifications are certainly important and have bearing on the historical development of Sanskrit through centuries. They reveal important aspects of the dialectal distribution. The treatment of these Pāṇinian rules with dialectal references in the works of Kātyāyana and Patañjali shows post-Pāṇinian developments in the linguistic situation. This paper does not aim at giving the details of dialectal variation, but rather at deriving some theoretical conclusions concerning the patterns of dialectal distribution and the importance of dialectal reference in a synchronic description of Sanskrit.

3. V. S. Agrawala, in his magnificent work *India as Known to Pāṇini*, gives details about the linguistic geography in the days of Pāṇini.⁶ *Udīcyā* 'Northern' and *Prācyā* 'Eastern' are the two broad divisions mentioned by Pāṇini. *Kāśikā* speaks of the river Śarāvati which divided the Northern region from the Eastern region.⁷ Pāṇini uses the terms *prācām* 'according to the Easterners' and *udīcām*

4. Louis Renou quoted by Emeneau (1966), p. 123.

5. Emeneau (1966), p. 123.

6. Agrawala (1953), p. 33 ff.

7. *prāgudañcau vibhajate haṁsaḥ kṣīrodake yathā | viduṣām śabdāsiddhyartham sūnaḥ pātu śarāvati |*

"May that (river) Śarāvati protect us, which divides the Eastern region and the Northern region for helping the scholars to derive (proper) words, as a swan separates milk from water." *Kāś.* ad P. 1. 1. 75. Vol. I, p. 260.

'according to the Northerners' as dialectal specifications.⁸ Both the home of standard usage in Pāṇini's times. Pāṇini also refers to the Eastern division and the Northern division were taken to be the peculiar dialectal usages in the provinces of Gāndhāra,⁹ Bharata,¹⁰ Suvīra,¹¹ Sālva,¹² Vāhika,¹³ Uśinara,¹⁴ Kuru,¹⁵ Madra,¹⁶ Trigarta.¹⁷ etc. However insufficient to draw clear isoglosses, these references are significant in that they show the importance of dialectal references for Pāṇini in his synchronic description of Sanskrit. Pāṇini also mentions names of some of the teachers who either described certain forms or used them in their speech. He names Śakaṭāyana,¹⁸ Śakalya,¹⁹

8. The term *prācām* occurs in the following rules: 1) *eṅ prācām deṣe* P. 1. 1. 75, 2) *kuṣirajoḥ prācām śyan* P. 3. 1. 90, 3) *prācām śpha taddhitaḥ* P. 4. 1. 17, 4) *prācām avṛddhāt phin bahulam* P. 4. 1. 160, 5) *striṣu sauvirasālva-prākṣu* P. 4. 2. 76, 6) *vṛddhāt prācām* P. 4. 2. 120, 7) *ropadhetoḥ prācām* P. 4. 2. 123, 8) *ekacca prācām* P. 5. 3. 94, 9) *prācām kaṭādeḥ* P. 4. 2. 139, 10) *khāryaḥ prācām* P. 5. 4. 101, 11) *prācām kriḍāyām* P. 6. 2. 74, 12) *pure prācām* P. 6. 2. 99, 13) *gurorāṇṛto 'nantyasyāpyekaikasya prācām* P. 8. 2. 86, 14) *prācām nagasānte* P. 7. 3. 24, 15) *prācām grāmanagarāṇām* P. 7. 3. 14. The term *prācya* occurs twice: 1) *bahvaca iṇaḥ prācyabharateṣu* P. 2. 4. 66, 2) *na dvyacaḥ prācyabharateṣu* P. 4. 2. 113. Burnell holds that *prācām* refers to the views of the Indra School of Grammar. (Qt. in Agnihotri (1963) p. 10). Kaiyaṭa and Mbh. and P. 1. 1. 74 (Mbh. Vol. I. Sec. I. p. 396) says that Kuṇi, a pre-Patañjali commentator on Pāṇini, considered *prācām* as a reference to certain teachers and not to the dialect of the Easterners. He further says that Patañjali followed Kuṇi's view. Recently published *Dīpikā* of Bhartṛhari says that *prācām* is a reference to the Eastern region, and this is supported by *eṅ prācām deṣe* P. 1. 1. 74. (*tatra yad deśaśīlanam tat tadviśayam iṣyate 'eṅ prācām deṣe' ityevamprakāram*, *Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā*. P. 259). Also see: Phandarkar (1933), Vol. I, p. 133. Pāṇini mentions *udicām* in the following rules: 1) *āragudicām* P. 4. 1. 130, 2) *udicām iṇ* P. 4. 1. 153, 3) *udicām vṛddhādagotrāt* P. 4. 1. 157, 4) *amahannavam nagare 'nudicām* P. 6. 2. 89, 5) *udicāmātaḥ sthāne yakapūrvāyāḥ* P. 7. 3. 46. The term *udicya* occurs in *udicyagrāmāt ca bahvaco 'ntodātītāt* P. 4. 2. 109.
9. *sālveyagāndhāribhyām ca* P. 4. 1. 167.
10. *na dvyacaḥ prācyabharateṣu* P. 4. 2. 113. and *bahvaca iṇaḥ prācyabharateṣu* P. 2. 4. 66.
11. *vṛddhāt ṭhak sauviṣu bahulam* P. 4. 1. 148, and *striṣu sauvirasālva-prākṣu* P. 4. 2. 76.
12. *striṣu sauvirasālva-prākṣu* P. 4. 2. 76, and *apadātau sālvaṭ* P. 4. 2. 135
13. *āyudhajivisaṅghāṇṇāyadvāhikeṣvabrāhmaṇarājanyāt* P. 5. 3. 114, and *vāhikagrāmebhyas ca* P. 4. 2. 117.
14. *saṃjñāyām kanthośināreṣu* P. 2. 4. 20, and *vibhāsośināreṣu* P. 4. 2. 118.
15. 1) *kurunādibhyo nyaḥ* P. 4. 1. 172, 2) *vibhāṣa kuruyugandharābhyām* P. 4. 2. 130, 3) *ṛṣyandhakavṛṣṇikurubhyas ca* P. 4. 1. 114, 4) *striyam avantikuntikurubhyas ca* P. 4. 1. 174.
16. 1) *diṣo 'madrāṇām* P. 7. 3. 13, 2) *madrebhyo'ñ* P. 4. 2. 108, 3) *madravṛjyoḥ kan* P. 4. 2. 131, and 4) *kṣemapriyamadre 'ñ ca* P. 3. 2. 44.
17. *bhargāt traigarte* P. 4. 1. 111.
18. 1) *laṇaḥ śakaṭāyanasyaiva* P. 3. 4. 111, 2) *triprabhṛtiṣu śakaṭāyanasya* P. 8. 4. 50, and 3) *vyor laghuprayatnatarāḥ śakaṭāyanasya* P. 8. 3. 18.
19. 1) *sambudāhau śakalyasyetāvanārṣe* P. 1. 1. 16, 2) *iko 'savarṇe śakalyasya hrasvaḥ ca* P. 6. 1. 127, 3) *sarvatra śakalyasya* P. 8. 4. 51. and 4) *lopaḥ śakalyasya* P. 8. 3. 19.

Āpiśali,²⁰ Gārgya²¹ Gālava,²² Kāśyapa,²³ Bhāradvāja,²⁴ Senaka,²⁵ Sphoṭāyana,²⁶ and Cākravarmaṇa,²⁷ Sometimes Pāṇini refers to certain teachers just by the terms such as *ācāryāṇām* 'according to the Ācāryas',²⁸ *sarveśām* 'according to all.'²⁹ Gīridharasarma Chaturvedi, Yudhishtir Mimamsaka and Robert Birwe have discussed the nature of the works of these teachers and other matters concerning them.³⁰

2. SOME MISUNDERSTANDINGS

1. Some recently published studies on Pāṇini have misunderstood the significance of these references to other teachers (*acāryanirdeśa*) in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. In a recently published article, B. K. Shivaramaiah says: "There must have been in vogue during his (Pāṇini's) time popular dialects with wrong word-forms from the viewpoint of Pāṇini."³¹ The author does not make clear what he means by "popular dialects with wrong word-forms from the viewpoint of Pāṇini." This can be taken as a reference to the Prakrits or Apabhraṃśa speeches which must have existed in Pāṇini's days in some form, but there is no proof in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* to hold that Pāṇini considered Prakrit-forms as "wrong word-forms." If Shivaramaiah means to refer to the dialectal forms mentioned by Pāṇini, even then he is not justified in saying that those dialectal forms were "wrong word-forms from the viewpoint of Pāṇini." The first alternative may draw support from the discussions in Patañjali about Apabhraṃśa-forms which he treats as *apaśabdas* 'wrong word-forms,' but the second alternative has absolutely no basis. But this line of thought is carried further by V. N. Misra. He speaks of one of the purposes of Pāṇinian grammar as: "to give some of the views of his predecessors which he does not discard totally out of a feeling of deference towards them."³²

20. *vā supyāpiśaleḥ* P. 6. 1. 92.

21. 1) *oto gārgyasya* P. 8. 3. 20, 2) *aḍ gārgyagālavayoḥ* P. 7. 3. 99, and 3) *nodāt-tasvaritodayam agārgyagālavakāśyapānām* P. 8. 4. 67.

22. 1) *iko hrasyo 'nyo gālavasya* P. 6. 3. 61, 2) *ṛṭiyādiṣu bhāsitapuṃskam puṃvād gālavasya* P. 7. 1. 74 3) *aḍ gārgyagālavayoḥ* P. 7. 3. 99, and 4) *nodātta-svaritodayam agārgyagālavakāśyapānām* P. 8. 4. 67.

23. P. 8. 4. 67. See: fn. 22 above.

24. *ṛto bhāradvājasya* P. 7. 2. 63.

25. *gireśca senakasya* P. 5. 4. 112.

26. *avañ sphoṭāyanasya* P. 6. 1. 123.

27. *ī 3 cākravarmanasya* P. 6. 1. 130.

28. *ādācāryāṇām* P. 7. 3. 49, and *dirghad ācāryāṇām* P. 8. 4. 52.

29. *adaḥ sarveśām* P. 7. 3. 100, and *hali sarveśām* P. 8. 3. 22.

30. Chaturvedi (1954), p. 2-8, Mimamsak (1963), pt. I, p. 63 ff., Birwe (1966) p. 7-13.

31. Shivaramaiah (1969). p. 7.

32. Misra (1966), p. 18.

This is a misconception about the rules of Pāṇini. Pāṇinian tradition starting from Kātyāyana considers the references to these Ācāryas' honorifics, to be in consonance with the doctrine of the eternality of language. The language was considered to be eternal and these teachers were just *smartāraḥ* 'rememberers or recorders.' However, nowhere there is any suggestion that these forms were wrong word-forms or the views of these Ācāryas were wrong views worthy of being discarded. For Pāṇini, these forms are, in no sense, a matter of controversy. V. S. Agrawala is certainly right in pointing out that Pāṇini is "generally reluctant to express his opinion on controversial matters which engaged the attention of previous grammarians and etymologists."³³ The mention of the Ācāryas as specifications of certain forms are not expressions of controversies. They express the observed differences of linguistic facts in different regional or scholastic domains.

2. This point needs further clarification. Some expressions used by the later Pāṇinīyas are perhaps the cause of this misconception which is seen in Misra's statement. The traditional commentators often explain these references in Pāṇini to other Ācāryas by the phrase *ācāryasya matena* 'in the opinion of the Ācārya,'³⁴ and it is perhaps the word *matā-* 'opinion' that creates a confusion. In my view, it is a wrong description of Pāṇini's references to different Ācāryas. In the context of linguistic analysis and description, a difference of opinion should be clearly distinguished from a difference in the facts observed. If a certain linguistic unit *L* is analysed by one teacher in a manner *X*, and if the same linguistic unit *L* is described and analysed by another teacher in a manner *Y*, such that *X* and *Y* are different, then this is a case of difference of opinion. For example, Pāṇini and Āpiśali have different opinions concerning the constitution of the forms *asti*, *santi* etc. For Pāṇini, the root is √as. The root √as is fully preserved in the form *asti* (*as* + *ti*), while *a* of the root is deleted in the form *santi* (*s* + *anti*) by p. 6. 4. 111 (*śnasor allopaḥ*). For Āpiśali, the root is simply √s. It is preserved in the form *santi* (*s* + *anti*), while it is augmented with *a* in the form *asti* ((*a* + *s*) + *ti*).³⁵ Similarly, some grammarians

33. Agrawala (1953), p. 348.

34. For instance: 1) *adaḥ sarveṣāṃ* P. 7. 3. 100., *sarvēṣāṃ matena*, SK, p. 207, 2) *halī sarveṣāṃ* P. 8. 3. 22, *sarveṣāṃ matena*, SK, p. 13, and 3) *ṛto bhāradvājasya* P. 7. 2. 63, *bhāradvājasya matena*, SK, p. 183. Similarly, 1) *laṇaḥ śakaṭāyanasyaiva* P. 3. 4. 111, *śakaṭāyanasyācāryasya matena*, Kāś. Vol. III. p. 236, 2) *gireṣ ca senakasya* P. 5. 4. 112, *senakasyācāryasya matena*, Kāś. Vol. IV. p. 405, 3) *vā supyāpiśaleḥ* P. 6. 1. 92, *āpiśalerācāryasya matena*, Kāś. Vol. IV. p. 560.

35. *astim sakāramātram ātiṣṭhate* (āpiśaliḥ), Kāś. on P. 1. 3. 22, Vol. I. p. 426. *stāḥ santītyadau sakāramātrasya darśanāt 'sa bhuvi' ityeva dhātuḥ pāṭhyaḥ/astītyadau...aḍagamo vidheya ityāpiśalā manyante*, *Padamañjari* (Vol. I. p. 426). Also see *Nyāsa*, Vol. II. p. 426.

like Pāṇini give the nominative singular affix as *su*, while some other grammarians give *si* as the affix.³⁶ However, there is no difference in the forms to be derived. As it can be easily seen from these examples, in cases of difference of opinion, there is no difference in the linguistic facts. The difference is simply caused by the way of analysis which is considered by the Pāṇinian thinkers as a grammatical fiction. All divisions and parts of speech belong to the realm of grammatical fiction (*kalpanā*). What constitutes the linguistic reality is the undivided and unanalysed linguistic usage.³⁷

The difference in the facts observed is, however, different. One grammarian observes a linguistic fact L_1 and records it, while the other grammarian observes another linguistic fact L_2 . This difference in description is caused not by the difference of opinion on the manner of analysis, but by the difference between the linguistic facts L_1 and L_2 . All the references to different provinces and different Ācāryas are to be understood in the light of the difference of linguistic facts. Unlike the works on Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā etc. or even the works of Kātyāyana and Patañjali, Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is not a work of polemic, but is a plain synchronic description. He does not refer to any teacher just because he differs from him in the way of analysis, but refers only to take notice of the actual differences in usage prevailing in various domains.^{37a} From the recorded

36. *ata eva hi kecit su-pratyayam vidadhati, apare sim, Śabdakaustubha*, p. 5. Bhaṭṭoji gives some more cases. For Pāṇini the affix in *paṇhita-* is *ita*, for Patañjali it is *ta*. For Pāṇini the affix in *tāvat* is *vatup*, while for Kātyāyana it is *āvatu*. (*tathā sūtrarītyā paṇhitam ityatra ita-pratyayaḥ, bhāṣyarītyā ta-pratyayaḥ | sūtrarītyā tāvān iti vatup, 'āvavatavarthavaigēṣyat' iti vātītikoktariyā āvatuḥ*), *Śabdakaustubha*, p. 5.

37. *prakṛtyādivibhāgakalpanayā*, *Kāś.* Vol. I. p. 16; *kalpanāmātram prakṛtyādivibhāgaḥ, paramāṛthavastu pratyastamita-prakṛtyādivibhāgaḥ samudāya eva*: The division of affixes and stems etc. is just a fiction; what is ultimately real is only the total expression where all the divisions of stem, affix etc. have disappeared.' See *Nyāsa*, Vol. I. p. 17. This thought it carried over upto Nāgēśa in the form of indivisibility of *sphoṇa*.

37a. I was unaware that Thieme had already established that the mention of Ācāryas in Pāṇini are not meant to be indications of options. I am thankful to Dr. George for giving me this reference Thieme says: "His (Pāṇini's) intention must have been to draw attention to forms used or taught in the works of various well-known scholars, whose practice or theory he could not help taking into consideration, lest he should be charged with being incomplete, or implying that men like S'ākalya were wrong. What under the hands of the traditional interpretation has become a rather circumstantial device for intimating what could have been expressed easier and clearer by the words *va* or *vibhāṣā*, thus recieves a concrete sense." Thieme (193e). p. 337; also p. 335. K. Chattopadhyaya in his footnote to the above statement of Thieme says: "I would, however, explain Pāṇini's manner of citing names in another way. He was writing a complete grammar of the *bhāṣā* and the *bhāṣā* only. What form or

traditions of these Ācāryas, Pāṇini must have culled out the usages which differed from the dialect which he considered as the basis of his description, mostly a dialect native to him and used in everyday life by a class of people in his part of the North Western India.³⁸

4. Another element which underlies Misra's misconception that Pāṇini does not discard totally the views of his predecessors out of a feeling of deference towards them, can also be traced to post-Pāṇinian explanations of Pāṇini's references to different Ācāryas and provinces. Though the tradition does not think of the views of these teachers as wrong views worthy of being really discarded, the references to Ācāryas etc. are all taken to be indications of out-right options, and then the tradition says that instead of using the words *vibhāṣā* or *vā* to show the option directly, Pāṇini used the names of these teachers to show respect towards them.³⁹ For

forms he took to be correct or normal, he gave himself. For differing or specific forms guaranteed by other authorities, he cited their names, without implying whether they might or might not be followed. This he did to complete his picture. We need not believe that in these sūtras citing authorities Pāṇini wanted us to take the rules as *vaikalpika*. ... Pāṇini's intention was simply to record 'other opinions'." Thieme (1937), p. 337, Fn. 10. Thieme and K. Chattopadhyay, both, must be applauded for putting a step forward in the right historical direction. However, neither the dialectal significance, nor the clear distinction between "opinion" and "observation" has been brought out. Thieme and K. C. use term "opinion" all the time. Also, Thieme regards eternality of words to be the only reason behind the interpretations of Kātyāyana and Patañjali (See: Fn. 53), while the historic aspect of the situation remains in the dark. Thieme does say: "They (Kātyāyana and Patañjali) start from the assumption that the ideas of 'right' and 'wrong' are unchangeable ...; what was so centuries ago must be so to day. They assume, further that the words of the law-giver must be logically and technically correct." (1955), p. 23. Thus, he is aware of the change in the formal attitude; but he does not investigate the "why" of it. For these reasons, I believe that the purpose of the present paper still remains undefeated.

38. Bloomfield says that the basis of Pāṇinian grammar was a dialect native to Pāṇini and spoken by the Brahmins in their everyday life. (Misra, 1966, p. 12). For Whitney and D. C. Sircar, Pāṇini wrote grammar of language which was not a colloquial spoken tongue. (Misra (1966), p. 13. and Sircar (1939), p. 40). We cannot accept Whitney and Sircar, and even Bloomfield to the extent that Sanskrit is not necessarily restricted to Brahmins in Pāṇini's days. For instance: Pāṇini's rule *pratyabhi-vāde*, *śadre* P. 8.2.83, and the two *Vārttikas* of Kātyāyana, i.e. *āśūdrastryasūryakeṣu* and *bho rājanyaviśām vā* on P. 8.2.83, would allow us to believe that the scope of Sanskrit usage was extended to the Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas also.
39. *yasya punar nityāḥ śabdāḥ, gālavagrahaṇam tasya pūjārtham, deśagrahaṇam ca kīrtiyārtham*, *Mbh.* Vol. I. Sec. I. p. 233. Also see: 1) *vā supyāpīśaleḥ* P. 6.1.92, *āpīśaligrahaṇam pūjārtham*, *SK.* p. 6, 2) *oto gārgyasya* P. 8.3.20, *gārgyagrahaṇam pūjārtham*, *SK.* p. 13, 3) *giresca senakasya* P. 5.4.112, *senakagrahaṇam pūjārtham*, *SK.* p. 64.

Pāṇini himself, however, these references were neither indications of the usages being wrong nor just a way of showing respect, but were meant to show the dialectal character of the usages and their restricted domain of occurrence. Sometimes a particular feature is shared by two or three dialectal domains and in such cases Pāṇini mentions two or three teachers or provinces. This shows that only those dialectal domains shared those features, while the others did not.⁴⁰ Sometimes a feature is shared by colloquial speech in general to the exclusion of one or more dialects. We have such cases of dialectal exclusions in Pāṇini.⁴¹ It is however not always clear as to what was the nature of these particular dialects with which the names of these Ācāryas are associated. They might have been restricted to ritual, scholastic or family groups. Geographical isoglosses are far more clear than the isoglosses represented by the references to different Ācāryas. Though some of them are known to have been grammarians, very little of their works have been handed down to us. We do not know whether they belonged to the same or different regions, and also very little is known about their dates. All that we are told is that the speakers of Sanskrit belonging to the domains represented by the names of the Ācāryas had this type of linguistic usage or that they preferred to speak in this particular way. However, it helps us to realize that there existed numerous sub-spheres within the general sphere of Sanskrit usage in Pāṇini's days. Pāṇini's references to the dialectal domains are by no means exhaustive. He had nearly sixtyfour predecessors,⁴³ but he does not refer to all of them. Similarly he does not refer to all the differences of usage noted by a particular Ācārya. For instance, he refers to

40. For instance : 1) *aḍ gārgyagālavayoḥ* P. 7. 3. 99, 2) *pariskandaḥ prācya-bharateṣu* P. 8. 3. 75, 3) *nodāttasvaritodayam agārgyakāśyapagālavānām* P. 8. 4. 67, 3) *bahvaca iñāḥ prācyabharateṣu* P. 2. 4. 66, 5) *na dvyacaḥ prācya-bharateṣu* P. 4. 2. 113, 6) *strīṣu sauvirasālvaprākṣu* P. 4. 2. 76.

41. For instance : *diṣo 'madrāṇām* P. 7. 3. 13. Compare the structure with *prāgekadaśabhyo' chandasi* P. 5. 3. 49,

42. *nahī pāṇinisūtreṣu yeṣām nāmollekhaḥ te sarve 'pi vyākaraṇanirmātāraḥ ityabhyupagamo nyāyāḥ* | 'ta evam bhāṣante,' *prayogaviśeṣe teṣām evamvidhā abhiructḥ* | ityevam bodhanenāpi teṣām nāmollekhasyopapannatvāt | Chaturvedī (1954), p. 2. It is also difficult to say whether the difference in usage is due to regional difference, or due to the time-gap between the teachers. For instance, by *turustusamyamaḥ sārvaadhātuke* P. 7. 3. 95. we get both the forms *stutaḥ* and *stuvitaḥ* usable in colloquial speech and elsewhere. Āpiśali forms his rule as *turustusamyamaḥ sārvaadhātukāsu o chandasi* (See : Mimamsaka (1963), Pt. I. p. 46), so that for him *stuvitaḥ* can occur only in the Vedic speech and not in the colloquial speech. Either we have to say that the forms such as *stuvitaḥ* disappeared in Āpiśali's days from usage and were reintroduced in the usage in Pāṇini's days, or that these forms were preserved in Pāṇini's dialect, while they had long disappeared from Āpiśali's dialect.

43. Shivaramaiah (1969), p. 7.

Gālava in four rules, but Puruṣottamadeva, the author of *Bhāṣāvṛtti*, quotes certain other differences of usage noted by Gālava.⁴⁴ Some of the additions suggested by Kātyāyana can also be explained by saying that Pāṇini perhaps did not come across these forms in the domains familiar to him and hence did not take notice of them.⁴⁵ Thus there could have existed a number of dialects or dialectal forms which have left no trace behind and may remain undiscovered for ever.

3. DIALECTAL AND NON-DIALECTAL VARIATION IN PĀṆINI

1. To investigate further the descriptive significance of the dialectal specifications, it is necessary to study the concept of *vibhāṣā* 'option' in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. In the rule P. 1. 1. 44 (*na veti vibhāṣā*), Pāṇini defines *vibhāṣā* as 'an option preceded by a negation.' It is not necessary to discuss this peculiar formation of the definition of *vibhāṣā*. However, every *vibhāṣā* ultimately results in pairs of optional forms, with the exception of only one kind of *vibhāṣā*. In *vyavasīhita-vibhāṣā*, we do not get pairs of optional forms, but out of the two optional operations, one applies to a sub-class of examples which is distinct from the sub-class where the other operation applies. In all other kinds of *vibhāṣās* we get pairs of optional forms.⁴⁶ The nature

44. *ikām yaṅbhir vyavadhānam vyāḍigālavayoh* Qt. from *Bhāṣāvṛtti* by Mimamsaka (1963). Pt. I. p. 26. For Pāṇini, the *sandhi* of *dadhi* + *atra* and *madhu* + *atra* can only be *dadhiyatra* and *madhuyatra*. For Vyāḍi and Gālava, the forms used to be *dadhiyatra* and *madhuvatra*. Bhaṭṭoji informs us that Cākravarman's grammar had accepted *dvaya* - as a *sarvanāman*. (*cākravarmanavyākaraṇe dvayapadasyāpi sarvanāmatābhyupagamat, Śabdakaustubha* Qt. by Mimamsaka (1953), Pt. I. p. 34.). Pāṇini derives *vaiyākaraṇa* from *vyākaraṇa*. Normally in such *taddhita* formations, we expect to have *vrddhi* of the first vowel, but then we would end up with *vyākaraṇa* and not *vaiyākaraṇa*. Therefore Pāṇini had to introduce a special rule to insert *ai* before *y* in *vyākaraṇa*. Perhaps, following Vyāḍi and Gālava, we may be able to reconstruct a pre-Pāṇinian dialectal form **viyākaraṇa* (*vi* + *ā* + *karaṇa*), and then *vaiyākaraṇa* would be a normal *taddhita* derivation from **viyākaraṇa*, by *i* being substituted by its *vrddhi* grade, i.e. *ai*. However, the way Pāṇini handles the form *vaiyākaraṇa* - shows that the phonetic tendency that existed in the dialect of Vyāḍi and Gālava was absent in his dialect. Still the question remains that if Pāṇini was aware of Gālava's teachings, then why he didn't mention him. There is no answer.

45. See: Joshi (1969), Intr. p. 8-9, Fn. 25.

46. There are three major kinds of *vibhāṣās*, 1) *prāptavibhāṣa*: - If a rule R_n prescribes optional application of an operation O_n to a set of elements E , such that a previous rule R_m , ($m < n$), already prescribes a universal application of the operation O_n to a set of elements E' which includes E , then the rule R_n is a *prāptavibhāṣā*. 2) If a rule R_n prescribes optional application of an operation O_n to a set of elements E such that no previous rule has prescribed operation O_n to the set of elements E , then R_n is *aprāptavibhāṣā*. 3) If a rule R_n prescribes optional application of an operation O_n to a set of elements E such that E has two subsets, i.e. E_1 and E_2 ; there is a rule R_m such that it prescribes universal application of the operation O_n to the subset E_2 . Then, with respect to the subset E_1 , R_n is *prāptavibhāṣā*, while with respect to the subset E_2 it is *aprāptavibhāṣā*, and with reference to the set E , it is called *ubhayatra-vibhāṣā*.

of these optional forms can be described in general terms of optional allomorphic variation, where the stem-morpheme and the suffix-morpheme remain the same with their semantic and syntactic significance unchanged by the allomorphic variation. The forms F_1 and F_2 are optional forms if both have the same semantico-syntactical, significance and are such that the allomorphs of the constituent morphemes alternate according to the *vibhāṣā* rules. Both, F_1 and F_2 are transformations of the same basic string and both are valid in the standard usage in the days of Pāṇini. Such *vibhāṣās* are out right options in the sense that F_1 and F_2 alternate unconditionally in all the constructions; they do not result in any semantico-syntactic difference as well as in the difference of dialect.

3-2. This is the synchronic aspect of the presentation of these forms in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. He does not explain the diachronic aspect of these forms, not does his grammar aim at the diachronic study of Sanskrit language. He takes care of the Vedic speech just by treating it as a sub-domain of Sanskrit usage and explains it in synchronic terms. It is however possible to investigate diachronically how the optional forms F_1 and F_2 came to be regarded as valid alternants in the Pāṇinian colloquial speech. For instance, by P. 7. 1. 51 (*ṇaluttamo vā*), we get pairs of optional forms (in the first personal singular, past perfect, active) such as *cakhāda*/*cakhada* (*ṇkhad*), *jagāda*/*jagada* (*ṇgad*) etc. We know that the first singular never takes *ṇddhi* in the RV and AV, while in *Upaniṣads* and *sūtra* literature we get forms with *ṇddhi* such as *cakāra* and *jigāya* in the first person.^{46a} Similarly, by P. 7. 1. 97 (*vibhāṣā tṛtīyādiṣvaci*), we get pairs of optional forms such as *kroṣṭṛā* *kroṣṭunā*, *kroṣṭre* *kroṣṭave* etc. We can say that the original word is *kroṣṭṛ*-derived from *krośati*, while *kroṣṭu-* represents Prakritic tendencies and is later assimilated back in Sanskrit.^{46b} Thus one may be able to find a diachronic explanation for a large number of optional forms. Pāṇini is not concerned with the history of the forms, but for him the criterion for considering forms to be optional is the unconditional interchangeability in the synchronic state of the normal usage which he takes as the basis of his description. To be optional, the forms must not have dialectal limitations. If a certain form is restricted to a particular dialectal domain, then the interchangeability of that form is conditioned by this dialectal domain. We may safely say that the optional forms generated by the *vibhāṣā* rules have no dialectal limitations.

3-3. In Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, there is no justification to hold the view that all the forms labelled with the name of a province or a

46a. Macdonell (1916), p. 149, and Whitney (1889), p. 283.

46b. Mayrhofer (1956), p. 281.

teacher are optional forms. They are to be regarded as dialectal usages restricted to certain domains. P. 4. 1. 17 (*prācām śpha taddhite*) prescribes the affix *śpha* to the family - names ending in the affix *yañ*, for the dialect of the Easterners (*prācām*). By normal Pāṇinian morphophonemics, we get the form *gārgī* 'feminine offspring of Garga,' while by P. 4. 1. 17, we get the form *gārgyāyañi* in the same sense for the dialect of the Easterners. Both the forms; *gārgī* and *gārgyāyañi* fulfill all other conditions of optional forms but they are not treated as optional forms by Pāṇini, since *gārgyāyañi* is not unconditionally interchangeable for *gārgī*. Its interchangeability is conditioned by the dialectal domain specified as the Eastern region. Pāṇini's rule P. 3. 4. 111 (*laṇaḥ śakaṭāyanasyaiva*) has the particle *eva* 'only,' which expressly limits the imperfect past tense forms such as *ayuh* to the dialectal domain of Śakaṭāyana, while the forms such as *ayān* are the normal forms. This restrictive particle does not occur in other rules such as P. 4. 1. 17 quoted above. However, we can have the meaning of *eva* even in its absence, and Patañjali offers several such examples.⁴⁷ Thus all the forms generated by rules with a reference to a province or a teacher are strictly confined to those particular domains.

3-4. Pāṇini nowhere made explicit his own concept of the domain of the normal usage or that of the dialectal usage. We have no clear statement on whether these domains were such that one could include the other, or both of them were totally exclusive of each other. If D_1 be the domain of the norm and D_2 be the domain of a given dialect, then is D_1 inclusive of D_2 , or is it exclusive of D_2 ? Let F_1 be the normal form occurring in the domain D_1 and F_2 be the dialectal form occurring in the domain D_2 . In such a case, we are sure that F_2 does not occur outside the limits of D_2 . But if D_1 is inclusive of D_2 , then F_1 will occur in D_1 also. If it is not inclusive of D_2 , then F_1 will not occur in D_2 . In the first alternative, D_1 has only one form, F_1 , while D_2 has both the forms F_1 and F_2 . In the other alternative, D_1 has only F_1 , and D_2 has only F_2 . Taking P. 4. 1. 17 as the example, we can demonstrate the difference between these two alternatives. In the first alternative, the non-Easterners can use only *gārgī*, while the Easterners would be able to use *gārgī* as well as *gārgyāyañi*. On the other hand, in the second alternative, the non-Easterners can use *gārgī* alone, while the Easterners can use *gārgyāyañi* alone. It is to be decided as to which alternative represents the dialectal distribution in Pāṇini.

47. For instance: 1) *athavā santyekapadhānyayadhānāni/tadyathā abbhakṣo vāyubhakṣa iti/apa eva bhakṣayati, vāyum eva bhakṣayati gamyate* | Mbh. Vol. I. Sec. I. p. 48. 2) *siddhe vidhir ārabhyamāno 'ntareṇatvakāram niyamārtho bhaviṣyati* | Mbh. Vol. I. Sec. I. p. 442.


3-5. As pointed out earlier, there is no direct statement on this matter, in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. But it is possible to infer his view by studying the patterns of distribution of forms in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. When Pāṇini says *bhāṣāyām* 'in the colloquial speech,' then that rule is restricted to the colloquial speech. When he says *chandasi* 'in the Vedic speech,' then that rule operates only with respect to the Vedic speech. An unqualified rule operates with reference to Sanskrit speech in general. If he gives a general option rule, then the forms generated alternate unconditionally in the whole sphere of usage. Along with these general patterns, we have cases of restricted options. For instance, the rules such as P. 6. 2. 164 (*vibhāṣā chandasi*), P. 3. 4. 117 (*chandasyubhayatā*), P. 6. 1. 106 (*vā chandasi*) etc. show that a form F_1 occurs in both the colloquial speech as well as in the Vedic speech, while another form F_2 alternates with F_1 only in the restricted domain of the Vedic speech. Thus there is no option in the general speech, but there is option only in a restricted domain. This helps us to realize the fact that when Pāṇini simply says *chandasi* 'in the Vedic speech', there occurs only one form in the Vedic speech and it does not alternate with the form that occurs in the colloquial speech. We can extend this to dialectal usages and justify the second alternative (in 3. 4.) as representing the normal distribution of dialectal usages in Pāṇini. Thus the non-Easterners can use *gārgī* alone, while the Easterners can use *gārgyāyaṇī* alone and hence the domains of their occurrence are mutually exclusive. Only in case of a restricted option, one of the domains is inclusive of the other. Just as in the case of the option restricted to Vedic speech, the domain D_1 of the form F_1 extends over speech in general, while the domain D_2 of the form F_2 is restricted to the Vedic speech, and at the same time is included in the larger domain D_1 .

3-6. Parallel to the usages which are restricted to the Vedic speech and alternate with other usages common to speech in general, we have cases of dialectally restricted options in Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. For instance, P. 6. 1. 92 (*vā supyāpiśaleḥ*) and P. 4. 2. 118 (*vibhāṣośinareṣu*) are clearly examples of dialectally restricted options. By the normal Pāṇinian morphophonemics, we get the form *prārṣabhīyati* from *pra + ṛṣabhīyati*, where $a + r \rightarrow \bar{a}r$ by the general rule P. 6.1.91 (*upasargād ṛti dhātau*). In P. 6. 1. 92 (*vā supyāpiśaleḥ*), Pāṇini says that according to Āpiśali, if the verb-form is derived from a nominal (e.g. *ṛṣabhīyati* derived from *ṛṣabha*), then the final *a* of the preverb and the sound *r* in the beginning of the verb optionally take *vṛddhi* substitute. The form with *vṛddhi* ($\bar{a}/ai/a\bar{a}$) is *prārṣabhīyati*, while without it, the form is *prarṣabhīyati*. This shows that in the dialectal domain of Āpiśali, the forms *prārṣabhīyati* and *prarṣabhīyati* are optional, while, in the normal usage, only *prārṣabhīyati* occurs. Similar is the case of P. 4. 2. 118 (*vibhāṣośinareṣu*). In the

normal speech only *saudarṣanīyā* occurs, while in the provincial dialect of the Uśīnara, *saudarṣanīyā* optionally alternates with *saudarṣanikī* and *saudarṣanikā*. Such other cases may also be traced in Pāṇini.⁴⁸


3-7. All the above discussion presents three major patterns of the distribution of forms in Pāṇini's grammar.

A) General Option




Supposing that D_1 is the domain of the normal standard usage in general, if two forms F_1 and F_2 are such that they have the same morphemic origin etc. and are unconditionally interchangeable within D_1 , then it is a case of general option.

B) Simple Dialectal Variation



Supposing that D_1 is the domain of the normal usage, and D_2 is the domain of a given dialect, if F_1 occurs only in D_1 and F_2 occurs only in D_2 , then it is a case of simple dialectal variation. Here the domains D_1 and D_2 are mutually exclusive.

C) Dialectally Restricted Option



Supposing that D_1 is the domain of the normal form F_1 and D_2 is the dialectal domain of the form F_2 , if D_1 is inclusive of D_2 , then this is a case of dialectally restricted option.

48. By *prācām upāder aṇajvucāu ca* P. 5. 3. 80. we get six optional forms for the dialectal domain of the Eastern region. Out of these six, four i. e. *upikaḥ*, *upiyah*, *upilaḥ* and *upendrettākaḥ* are common for Easterners and non-Easterners, while two, i. e. *upadaḥ* and *upakaḥ* are restricted to the dialect of the Easterners. See: SK, p. 161, and P. 5, 3. 80. Another rule *vrddhāt śhak sauvireṣu bahulam* P. 4. 1. 148 also falls into this category of dialectally restricted option. Similar is the case of *ekācca prācām* P. 5. 3. 92, where there is a dialectal specification *prācām* in the rule, while the rule by itself occurs in a section where a general option is continued in every rule. This would strictly mean that the option, in this case, prevails in the dialectal domain *prācām*. Kātyāyana interprets it just to mean a simple option. See: Fn. 49 below and * 4. 1. and 4. 2. Also see: Thieme (1937), p. 337.

4. TOTAL OPTIONALISM OF THE LATER PĀNINIYAS

The distinctions between general option, simple dialectal variation and dialectally restricted option were living facts for Pāṇini. Surprisingly enough, all these distinctions disappeared in Kātyāyana and Patañjali, and so for the whole of the later tradition. They consider dialectal specifications as simply the signs for general options. For instance, P. 5. 3. 91. (*ekacca prācām*) has the dialectal specification *prācām* 'in the dialect of the Easterners.' Kātyāyana in his *vārttika* 7 on P. 5. 3. 92 says: *prāgvacanānarthakyam ca vibhāṣāprakaraṇāt* 'the mention of *prācām* is purposeless, since a general option prevails in the whole section (from P. 4. 1. 82, *samarthānām prathamād vā*)'.⁴⁹ By mentioning *prācām*, Pāṇini would derive two forms, one for the norm and the other for the dialect of the Easterners. Kātyāyana simply cares for the two forms and not for their respective domains. He thinks that the general option prevailing in this section is sufficient to derive two forms. This phenomenon occurs in Kātyāyana a number of times.⁵⁰ In Kātyāyana and Patañjali, we find discussions on whether language is eternal (*nitya*) or non-eternal (*(anitya/kārya)*). If the grammar were to control the usage, then it could restrict the usage of particular forms to particular domains. But linguistic usage is thought to have been eternal and without beginning. Kaiyaṭa says; "In the view of the eternality of language, the linguistic usage has no beginning and hence there is no restriction on the users of language. Gālava etc. are mentioned as the recorders (*smṛṭ*) of certain grammatical operations just to show their authority, and hence the mention of a teacher is for his worship."⁵¹ This is in accord with Patañjali's remark: "One who accepts the words to be eternal, for him, the mention of Gālava is for (his) worship, and the mention of provinces is for (declaring their) fame."⁵² Nāgeśa

49. *prācām grahaṇam pūjārtham | vikalpo 'nuvartata eva; Kāś. on P. 5. 3. 94, Vol. IV. p. 309. anantoktasūtrād vā ityarthata eva iti vikalpa ityuktam, tenaiva pratyayavikalpaḥ tasmāt pūjārtham eva prāggrahaṇam, na vikalpārtham | Nyāsa, Vol. IV. p. 309.*

50. *kāraṇānmi vāvacanārtham...*, *vārttika* 1 on *kāraṇānmi ca prācām* *halāḍau* P. 6. 3. 10; *prāgvacanam vibhāṣārtham*, vi. 3 on *gurorṇṛto'-nantyasyapyekaikasya prācām* P. 8. 2. 26.; *prācām iti grahaṇam vikalpārtham*, *Kāś. on P. 8. 2. 86, Vol. VI. p. 457.* Thieme quotes the view of Bakkrishna Ghosh: "in Pāṇini's system reference to older authorities only signifies that the sūtra in question is *vaikalpika*." Thieme regards Ghosh to be "more orthodox than the Pope" and emphatically disagrees with him. Thieme (1937), p. 335.

51. *anādityāt śabdavyavaharasya nityatvapakṣe nāsti prayokṭṛ niyamah | kevalam gālavah smṛṭṛivena nirḍiṣṭasya śāstrasya prāmāṇyam pratipādayitum iti pūjārtham ācāryagrahaṇam | Pradīpa, Vol. I. Sec. 1. p. 343.*

52. *yasya punar nityāḥ śabdāḥ gālavagrahaṇam tasya pūjārtham, deśagrahaṇam ca kṛtṭiyartham | Mbh. Vol. I. Sec. I. p. 243.*

explains the formalism behind Patañjali's statement as follows: "These references to different teachers are explained as honorifics by Patañjali. They do not have any other significance, and in fact, Pāṇini should have just said that these forms are optional."⁵³ Patañjali has been followed by the whole of the later tradition, *Kāśikā* and *Siddhānta Kaumudī*, the representatives of later Pāṇinian tradition, consider such mentions as simply honorifics and indicating general options.⁵⁴

4-2. This poses a great problem in the understanding of the historic development of Sanskrit, and the exact reasons behind these interpretations. Are we justified in accusing Kātyāyana and Patañjali of being ignorant of the dialectal significance of these Pāṇinian references? Did they become undesirably formalistic, so as to ignore the living distinctions in linguistic usages? This is the view of Siddheshwar Varma, when he vehemently charges against Kātyāyana for mistreating Pāṇinian rule P. 5. 3. 92 (*ekācca prācām*). He says:⁵⁵ "But the height of formalism, which will be received by the modern age with indignation, was Kātyāyana's rejection of the word *prācām* 'according to Eastern grammarians' in Pāṇini's sūtra describing *tara-*, *tama-* optionally, because in Kātyāyana's view, the word *prācām* was superfluous, the purpose of *prācām* being only to indicate that the use prescribed was to be optional, the sūtra being already under the domain of option coming down from P. 4. 1. 82 (*samarthānām prathamād vā*). Kātyāyana here failed to appreciate Pāṇini's specification of the option here, viz. its location in the Eastern part of the country. So a historical fact was victimized at the altar of formal consistency." Is it possible to justify Kātyāyana and Patañjali on the basis of a hypothesis of drastic linguistic change forcing them to give such interpretations? Is there a possibility that the dialects which existed in Pāṇini's days had either disappeared or merged in the standard usage in the days of Kātyāyana and Patañjali? Was the philosophy of the eternality of language the sole reason behind this change or were there any other formal or practical reasons to disregard the dialect-distinctions? These are the problems which need to be solved before one can arrive at a reasonable conclusion.

53. *vagrahane eva kartavyo gālavagrahaṇam vyartham iti saṅkānirāsārtham bhāṣye pūjārtham ityuktam*. Udd. Vol. I. Sec I. p. 243. "It appears that the interpretation of references like *Śākalyasya*, ... etc. as mere indications of optional validity without any value to the concrete name is based on the well-known Mīmāṃsā-axiom of the eternal nature of words." Thieme (1937), p. 3-6

54. See Fn. 39 above.

55. Siddheshwar Varma (1963), pp. 15-16.

4-3. If the forms F_1 and F_2 are correct forms, have the same semantico-syntactic content and morphemic origin, then they might be regarded as optional in the view of Kātyāyana and Patañjali. We may put forward two major hypotheses to explain this situation. A) There was a basic change in the formal outlook, so that Kātyāyana and Patañjali did not accept dialectal references as conditions to be valued and described by a grammatical system. B) The formal outlook of Pāṇini and Kātyāyana was essentially the same, but a drastic linguistic change forced Kātyāyana to regard all Pāṇinian dialectal forms as general options. Perhaps, Pāṇinian dialects had either died out or merged in the days of Kātyāyana, making these dialectal distinctions just a matter of history. Just as Pāṇini regards so many forms as outright options, though historically they might have belonged to different dialects,⁵⁶ similarly, Kātyāyana and Patañjali might have been forced to consider all the Pāṇinian dialectal variations as simple options, since in their days these forms were no more dialectal forms. These two hypotheses are to be subjected to a critical historical enquiry, before we can justify ourselves in joining Siddheshwar Varma in his charges against Kātyāyana.

4-4. The proposition that language had considerably changed from the days of Pāṇini to the days of Kātyāyana and Patañjali has been much debated. Devasthali⁵⁷ accepts such a linguistic change and explains the interrelations between the three grammarians by saying that their works are good and faithful descriptions of three different stages of Sanskrit and each succeeding grammarian interprets and criticizes the earlier description in order to make it adequate and applicable to the then existing state of language, the state which is different in some respects from the state described by the earlier grammarian. Bhandarkar pointed out that some new usages had come up in the days of Kātyāyana which did not exist in the

56. See : * 3 - 2. above.

57. "It may thus be seen that the aim of Kātyāyana (and even of Patañjali) in composing their works must have been not to correct Pāṇini (implying thereby that Pāṇini had failed to describe the language before him as accurately as he should have done), but to supplement him...and to effect such additions, omissions and alterations as might be found necessary in the view of the changes that the Sanskrit language had undergone during the period by which they were separated from him. In other words, this means that Kātyāyana wrote his vārttikas to describe the Sanskrit language together with the linguistic changes that had occurred and so to say formed a normal feature of it, since the days of Pāṇini." Devasthali (1963), pp. 57-58.

speech of Pāṇini.⁵⁸ Rosane Rocher, however, takes the opposite view, when she remarks: "In fact, all the three must have meant to express exactly the same rule; they only used different ways to do so. In any case, they do not describe three different stages but simply one and the same stage of the same Sanskrit language."⁵⁹ She further states explicitly, : "In our opinion, it is a most dangerous procedure, to introduce into ancient Hindu grammar, a concept which is a purely western creation of a very recent date. The diachronic aspect of the study of language was born in the 19th century; it would be vain to look for it in the ancient grammarians, be they western or Indian."⁶⁰ Recently S. D. Joshi has taken a position that lies somewhere in between. There might have been linguistic change, but, says Joshi: "Patañjali never states or gives the impression that the instances provided by him were unknown to Pāṇini. Nor does Patañjali say that in Pāṇini's time the rule was sufficient to take care of the examples, but that nowadays it has become necessary to introduce additions and deletions, because the rule cannot account anymore for the usage of Kātyāyana's or Patañjali's time. What counts for Patañjali is to make the system complete and perfect... Thus the examples themselves do not help us in deciding that a reinterpretation or the acceptance of a correction was prompted by the evolution of language, because we can never prove that the form to be covered by reinterpretation or by correction in the Pāṇinian rule was a post-Pāṇinian form only. It might be a case of oversight on the part of Pāṇini. Therefore, on purely theoretical grounds, the question, whether we can infer an evolution of Sanskrit from the examples must be answered in negative."⁶¹

4-5. Whether we can accept linguistic change in general or we cannot, it is not possible to hold that there were no dialectal variations in the days of Kātyāyana and Patañjali, which could have prompted their interpretations. Patañjali himself speaks of dialectal variation. If somebody argues that a particular form is not found in usage, then Patañjali replies that it may be in use in some other area, and an effort should be made to trace it.⁶² The proposition of the total extinction

58. "From these one of two conclusions only is possible; viz. either that Pāṇini was a very careless and ignorant grammarian, or that the forms did not exist in the language in his time. The first is, of course, inadmissible, wherefore the second must be accepted." Bhandarkar (1933), Vol. I. p. 159. Laddu in his thesis, submitted to Poona University, attempts to trace such a linguistic development from Pāṇini to Patañjali. Ref. Joshi (1969.) p. 8., Fn. 22.

59. Rosane Rocher (1962), p. 264.

60. Rosane Rocher (1962), p. 268.

61. Joshi (1969), p. 10.

62. *sarve'pyete śabdaḥ deśāntareṣu prayujyante/na caivopa-labhyante/upalabdḥau yatnaḥ kriyātām/Mbh.* Vol. I. Sec. I. p. 54.

falls apart against the testimony of Patañjali: "In this very wide sphere of usage, certain words are seen restricted to certain areas. For instance, the verb *śavati* is used only (*eva*) in the Kambojas in the meaning of moving; the Āryas use only the nominal form *śava*:- 'dead body.' The verb *hammati* is used in Surāṣṭras, *raṁhati* is used in the mid-eastern regions, while the Āryas use only the verb *gam*. The Easterners use the verb *dāti* 'to cut', while the Northerners use only (the nominal form) *dātra*- 'the cutter'."⁶³ If Patañjali himself speaks of these dialectal variations, then how is it that the same Patañjali considers all dialectal specifications in Pāṇini as honorifics and indications of general options? If the dialectal variation existed in Patañjali's time, then it must have existed in Kātyāyana's days. Why should Kātyāyana regard the dialectal variation in Pāṇini as identical with general optional variation? There are certainly no grounds to consider that the dialects which existed in Pāṇini's days had disappeared or merged in later centuries, while some new dialects had come up which did not exist in Pāṇini's days. Some stray forms must have come into existence after Pāṇini, or must have disappeared from usage after him, but we do not have any proof of such a phenomenon occurring with respect to Pāṇinian and post-Pāṇinian dialects.

4-6. Some important changes, however, did take place in the linguistic situation in the post-Pāṇinian era. V. N. Misra reports: "The divergence between Pāṇini and his successors is partly due to a gap, most probably caused by a political unrest in North Western India, in the centuries preceding Christ, and partly due to the rapid change in the linguistic situation, when the status of a prestige language was shifted to a predominantly eastern language of the non-priestly class."⁶⁴ Due to changes in political and religious influences, Sanskrit became more and more restricted to the academic and ritual quarters dominated by orthodox Brahmins. It no longer remained the speech of the common parlance of a major segment of the society. We have sufficient reason to believe that Sanskrit in Pāṇini's days was not restricted to Brahmins only or only to a certain province. The sphere of Sanskrit usage was relatively much wider. Kātyāyana uses the term *loka* to refer to the sphere of linguistic usage. He says that the words, meanings and their relations are established by the *loka*. The term *loka* basically means 'people, world, worldly customs' etc. and not specifically the Sanskrit-speaking community. Kātyāyana says that the words, meanings and relations are based on

63. *etasmīnścātīmāti śabdasya prayogaviṣaye te te śabdāḥ, tatra tatra niyataviṣayā dṛśyante|tadyathā śavatir gatikarmā kambojেষ্বেva bhānto bhavati, vikāra enam āryā bhānto śava iti|hammatih surāṣṭreṣu. raṁhatih prācyamadhyeṣu, gamim eva tvāryāḥ prayujate|datir lavaṇārthe prācyeṣu, dātram udīcyeṣu|Mbh. Vol. I. Sec. I. p. 54. This passage also occurs in Yāska's Nirukta.*

64. Misra (1966), p. 18.

the worldly usage, and grammar only limits the religious merit (*dharma*) to correct Sanskrit usages.⁶⁵ Only the usage of correct Sanskrit produces religious merit, while the use of Prakrits or Apabhraṃśas do not produce religious merit. Sanskrit and Prakrit or Apabhraṃśa forms are all equal as far as their value for communication is concerned. This shows that in Kātyāyana's days, more and more people had started using Prakrits. The concept innovated by Kātyāyana that the use of Sanskrit alone produces religious merit has several implications. From Kātyāyana onwards, the grammar seems to have started to operate as a prescriptive code, rather than remaining a simple description of language as intended by Pāṇini. This also shows that Sanskrit was getting more and more restricted to orthodox Vedic circles, which were trying to hold their ground against the changing political, religious and linguistic situation. They were attempting to show the necessity of studying and using Sanskrit, by establishing its excellence over Prakrits, in terms of its merit-producing capacity. This is an indication that the preservationist tendencies were emerging.

4-7. Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* gives ample evidence to believe that the sphere of usage had been further limited and the preservationist tendencies had sufficiently developed. Prakrits and Apabhraṃśas had almost outnumbered correct Sanskrit forms. Patañjali discusses the way a grammar should be composed. Should one teach only the correct words and leave the rest to be understood as Apabhraṃśas; or should one teach only the Apabhraṃśas and leave the rest to be understood as correct Sanskrit forms (*sādhu-śabdāḥ*)? Patañjali says that the shorter way is to teach the correct Sanskrit words, since corresponding to one Sanskrit word, there are numerous Apabhraṃśa words. For instance, corresponding to the Sanskrit word *gauḥ* 'cow', there are Apabhraṃśas: *gāvī*, *goṇī*, *gotā*, *gopotalikā* etc.⁶⁶ While Kātyāyana seems to be endorsing the general use of Sanskrit for accruing religious merit, Patañjali says that the restriction that only the correct Sanskrit

65. *siddhe śabdārthasambandhe lokato'rthaprayukte śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ*/Vārttika 1. *Mbh.* Vol. I. Sec. I. pp. 47-51. *samānāyām arthāvagatau śabdaḥ ca apaśabdaḥ ca śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ kriyate/śabdair eva artho 'bhidheyo nāpaśabdeneti/evam kriyamāṇam abhyudayakāri bhavati*/Mbh. I. Sec. I. p. 52. "According to V. S. Agrawal (India as Known to Pāṇini; p. 354) the term *loka* used by Kātyāyana refers to the ordinary language of the *śiṣyas*. It is also possible that what Kātyāyana calls *loka* '(Sanskrit-speaking) people' has become restricted in Patañjali's time to a particular community called *śiṣyas*." Joshi (1969), pp. 6-7, Fn. 19. Also: *śāstrapūrvake prayoge abhyudayaḥ tatulyam vedaśabdena*/Vārttika 9 on P. 1. 1. 1.

66. *laghuvāt śabdopadeśaḥ/laghvīyān śabdopadeśaḥ/garīyān apaśabdopadeśaḥ/ekaikasya śabdasya bahavo*'pabhraṃśaḥ/*tadyathā gaur ityasya śabdasya gāvī goṇī gota gopotalikā ityevamādayo bahavo*'pabhraṃśaḥ/Mbh. Vol. I. Sec. I. p. 42 and p. 55.

forms generate religious merit applies only to the use of language in the sacrificial performances and not elsewhere in daily communication, where Sanskrit and Apabhraṃśa forms are both equally good.⁶⁷ Patañjali tells us a story of the great sages named *Yarvāṇastarvāṇaḥ*. Instead of using the correct Sanskrit forms *yad vā naḥ* or *tad vā naḥ*, these sages used to say *yarvāṇaḥ* and *tarvāṇaḥ*. However, in the ritual performances they used correct Sanskrit forms.⁶⁸ Thus even the orthodox people belonging to the traditions of Vedic ritual and learning, seem to have been using Apabhraṃśas or Prakrits in their non-academic and non-ritual communications.

4-8. The definition of *śiṣṭa* 'the normative speaker of Sanskrit' in Patañjali offers the clearest picture of the domain of Sanskrit usage in his days. Thus follows Patañjali's discussion:⁶⁹

"Who are the *śiṣṭas*? (They are) the grammarians. How is it? Correct use of language presupposes the (knowledge of) grammar, and the grammarians are the ones who know grammar. But, if the correct use of language presupposes grammar, and if grammar, presupposes the correct use, then this is circular; the circular arguments do not stand valid. Then, (we define *śiṣṭas*) by (their) way of life and residence. That particular way of life is (found) only in the province of Āryāvartta. Which province is Āryāvartta? (It lies) to the east of Ādarśa, to the west of the Kalaka forest, to the south of Himālayas and to the north of the Pāriyātra mountains. Those Brahmins who live in this Āryāvartta, the abode of Aryas, who just have basketful of grains, who are selfless and born righteous, and who have attained the highest wisdom in some branch of learning for its own sake, they are the *śiṣṭas* 'the normative speakers of Sanskrit'".

Patañjali excludes the people of other castes, even Kṣatriyas from his definition. Thus the linguistic usage of the masses or even important social groups was not recognized to be the normal Sanskrit usage. Patañjali does not include even all the Brahmins, but includes only the learned Brahmins. It is also clear that the sphere of Sanskrit usage is

67. *yājñe karmaṇi sa niyamāḥ, anyatrānīyamāḥ*/Mbh. Vol. I. Sec. I. p. 56.

68. *yarvāṇastarvāṇo nāma ṛṣayo babhūvuh pratyakṣa-dharmāṇaḥ parāparajñāi viditaveditavya adhigatayāthārthiḥ* | *ite tatrabhavantāḥ* 'yad vā naḥ', 'tad vā naḥ' iti prayoktavye 'yarvāṇastarvāṇa' iti prayujjate yājñe | *punaḥ karmaṇaḥ nāpabhāṣante*/Mbh. Vol. I. Sec. I. p. 56.

69. *ke punaḥ śiṣṭāḥ? vaiyākaraṇāḥ* | *kuta ētat? śāśrapūrvikā hi śiṣṭiḥ śiṣṭipūrvakam ca śāstram tadetat itaretarāśrayam bhavati* | *itaretarāśrayāni ca kāryāni na prakalpante* | *evam tarhi nivāsatas ca ācārataḥ ca sa cācārāḥ āryāvartta eva* | *kaḥ punaḥ āryāvarttaḥ? prāg ādarsāt - pratyak kālakavanāt - dakṣiṇena himavan-ram - utareṇa pāriyātram* | *etasmin āryāvartte āryanivāse ye brāhmaṇāḥ kumbhīdhanyāḥ alolupāḥ aghyamāṇakāraṇāḥ kiñcid antareṇa kasyāśid vidyāyāḥ, pāramgatāḥ tatrabhavantāḥ śiṣṭāḥ*/Mbh. on P. 3. 3. 109. Vol. II. p. 884.

restricted geographically. The Ādarśa mountains are supposed to have been some mountains in Kurukṣetra, and Patañjali's Āryāvartta lies to the east of those mountains. Infact, Pāṇini himself must have belonged to the west of Ādarśa, and so many provinces mentioned by Pāṇini as Sanskrit-speaking communities are to the west of Kurukṣetra. These communities extended to Gāndhāra and Uśinara in the west. The advance of Greeks from the west might be a reason for the disappearance of Sanskrit from these western regions. In any case, the sphere of Sanskrit usage has been drastically reduced to a learned Brahmanic community living in a small geographical area. Thus S. D. Joshi rightly says that what Kātyāyana calls *loka* '(Sanskrit-speaking) people' has become restricted in Patañjali's time to a particular community called *śiṣṭas*.⁷⁰ This picture is strengthened by the inscriptions of Aśoka, of which there is one in Greek and one in Aramaic and the rest in local Prakrit dialects, but none in Sanskrit; and also by the religious movements of Buddhism and Jainism, which preferred the local Prakrits as the media to the exclusion of Sanskrit, in their early phases.

4-9. All this leads to show how the efforts of Patañjali and Kātyāyana must have been motivated by a sincere urge to preserve whatever Sanskrit was alive in their days. It was reduced to a status of a literary, academic and ritual language and was being used and preserved in the orthodox Vedic ritual and scholastic circles. This must have brought considerable uniformity in Sanskrit preserved in these circles. All these factors are bound to affect the importance of dialectal variations in the strict synchronic description of Sanskrit. Sanskrit was not a spoken language in Patañjali's times, in the same sense, as it was in Pāṇini's days. Thieme has pointed out that in Pāṇini, the accents were a living reality of everyday speech, but were lost already at a time prior to Patañjali.⁷¹ The nature of language being preserved by a small community was governed more by the traditions of learning, rather than by its daily usage in normal communication. For this purpose of preservation of Sanskrit, Kātyāyana had to invent the merit-producing capacity of correct usage. This activity of preservation resulted, perhaps, in the preservation of all the usages available in Pāṇini, irrespective of their dialectal limits. If a grammarian was supposed to preserve every usage, whether it be northern or eastern, and if every grammarian intends to do this, then there is no purpose in regarding these as dialectal usages. One important point to be noticed is that though in Patañjali's days Sanskrit was confined to Āryāvartta, still he regards all Pāṇinian usages

70. See: Fn. 65 above.

71. Thieme (1935), p. 121.

as correct usages though they had belonged to dialectal domains outside Āryavartta. This means that all these forms were preserved by the grammatical activity in Āryavartta, and were not important as dialectal usages. The historic situation seems to have compelled the grammarians to be more formal and more authoritarian. Kātyāyana and Patañjali became more and more interested in the forms themselves, rather than the dialectal associations of those forms which may or may not have continued up to their days. This forbids us to join Siddheshwar Varma in accusing Kātyāyana of being an insensitive formalist.⁷²

4-10. In becoming the classical language, Sanskrit became more and more fossilized. Kātyāyana and Patañjali mark the beginning of this process of fossilization, but thanks to them that Sanskrit has been preserved for us through the ages, when other speeches disappeared from the face of the earth. Rejection of the dialectal importance of forms tended to the preservation of most of them in the classical Sanskrit. As Emeneau says: "Classical Sanskrit is a literary language written according to the book, that is, Pāṇini's grammar, and following it more or less correctly. We find in it no dialects, no chronological developments, except loss and at times invasions from the vernaculars of the users, and no geographical divergences."⁷³ Pāṇinian tradition itself makes a sharp distinction between the way Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali operated, and the way all other later Pāṇinīyas operate. The first category is described as *lakṣyaikacakṣuṣāḥ* 'those whose eyes are fixed solely on the linguistic usage to be described.' This is the stage when grammar followed language. The second category is described as *lakṣaṇaikacakṣuṣāḥ* 'those whose eyes are fixed solely on the grammatical rules.' This is the stage when language followed grammar. In a preservation-oriented formal synchronic description of a language on the way to fossilization, the dialectal limits, if any, had little practical significance. This change in the outlook of synchronic description was forced by the changing linguistic situation, and its understanding contributes significantly to the understanding of some interesting diachronic facts concerning Sanskrit language.

72. See : Fn. 55 above.

73. Emeneau (1966), p. 123.

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“तदेतद्वाङ्मयं मूयः संस्कृतं प्राकृतं तथा ।
अपभ्रंशश्च मिश्रं चेत्याहुरार्याश्चतुर्विधम् ॥

संस्कृतं नाम दैवी वागन्वारुयाता महर्षिभिः ।
तद्भवस्तत्समो देशीत्यनेकः प्राकृतकमः ॥

महाराष्ट्राश्रयां भाषां प्रकुष्टं प्राकृतं विदुः ।
सागरः सूक्तिरत्नानां सेतुबन्धादि यन्मयम् ॥

शौरसेनी च गौडी च लाटी चान्या च तादृशी ।
याति प्राकृतमित्येव व्यवहारेषु सन्निधिम् ॥

आभीरादिगिरः कान्येष्वपभ्रंश इति स्मृताः ।
शास्त्रे तु संस्कृतादन्यद् अपभ्रंशतयोदितम् ॥”

—Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa* I. 32-6

“शब्दार्णवस्य यदि कश्चिदुपैति पारं
भीमाभसश्च जलधेरिति विस्मयोऽसौ ॥

विद्यानां सततसमाश्रयोऽपरासां
तासूक्तान्न च विरुणद्धि कांश्चिदर्थान् ।
श्रद्धेयं जगति मतं हि पाणिनीयं
माध्यस्थ्याद्भवति न कस्यचित्प्रमाणम् ॥”

—Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṅkāra* VI. 62-3

CONTRIBUTION OF BHOJA TO LEXICOGRAPHY

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Bhoja is generally supposed to have lived in the 11th century A.D. The inscriptions in this century dating upto 1062 A.D. unmistakably point out to Bhoja, who was the king of Dhārā and belonged to the Paramāra dynasty of Malwa.¹ Very little and sometimes controversial geneology of Bhoja could be gathered from the available material. Vākpati alias Muñja, the son of Sīyaka also known as Harṣadeva ruled remarkably between 974 A.D. and 997 A.D. He was also a patron of many learned persons like Dhanapāla, Dhanamjaya, Dhanika and Halāyudha, who were the recipients of his liberal grants. Sindhurāja, brother of Muñja and father of Bhoja, seems to have ruled for a very short period and shortly after that Bhoja seems to have come to the throne. T. R. Chintamani, in his edition of *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* states that the astronomical treatise titled as *Rājamṛgāṅka*, attributed to Bhoja was composed in 1042 A.D. He also quotes a few verses found in one of the Manuscripts of *Syāmalādaṇḍaka* in connection with the date of Bhoja. The date in these verses i.e. Śaka 923 records the date of the grant made by Bhoja to the author of *Syāmalādaṇḍaka*. From these two references T. R. Chintamani comes to the conclusion that the period of Bhoja's rule and activity coincided with the first half of 11th century A.D.

Bhoja's career is distinguished by his being a great warrior of undoubted prowess and by his fame which mainly rested upon literary achievements. He fully maintained the traditions of literary achievement started by Muñja, which earned for him a high rank among men of letters. Himself a great scholar well-versed in many branches of learning, he generously extended his liberality to other scholars for the advancement of learning and culture.²

King Bhoja is mentioned by Daśabala, by Allādanātha, by Raghunandana and by Śūlapāṇi in his *Prāyaścittaviveka* as a writer of Dharmaśāstra. He is quoted in *Bhāvaprakāśa* as a writer of medical branch. The quotations from his astronomical work have been cited by Keśavārka. He is noticed by Kṣīrasvāmin, Sāyaṇa and Mahīpa, as a grammarian and a lexicographer. He is praised by the poets Chittapa, Deveśvara, Vināyaka and others.³ The legitimate conclusion from all these facts is that king Bhoja was a scholar of

1. Cf. T. R. Chintamani: *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa*. Intro.

2. Cf. *Indian Antiquary* 107, pp. 170-72.

3. Cf. Bhojarāja - Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum: Bhoja's Śṅgāraprakāśa* (1963) V. Raghavan, pp. 6-7.

exceptional merit and seems to have done a valuable work in all branches of literature. As a royal patron he seems to have commanded the cooperation of scholars in various branches of Sanskrit literature and with their help he wrote himself or caused to be written a number of valuable treatises.

The topic of my present paper is the contribution of Bhoja to Lexicography. The study of this problem is two-fold. The first aspect of the study is to find out whether Bhoja has done any work in the field of Lexicography proper and the second aspect of the study is to note down the contribution of Bhoja, by taking into consideration the works composed or compiled by him and finding out the contribution of individual works to Lexicography.

Now regarding the first aspect, we state that Bhoja has compiled a lexicon titled as *Nāmamālikā* or *Samyamināmamālikā* as some describe it. This lexicon has been critically edited by us on the basis of three Manuscripts belonging to Sarasvatī Mahāl Library, Tanjore, Government Manuscripts collection, Mysore and India Office Manuscripts collection, London.

The other work which is reported to have been written by Bhoja in the field of lexicography proper, is the commentary on *Amarakośa*. Unfortunately we could not get any Manuscript in important Manuscripts collections. Aufrecht does not refer to this work by name in his *Catalogus Catalogorum*, nor do we find any reference to it in the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* edited by Dr. Raghavan.

Regarding the second aspect of this study, we have to state that the consideration of the contribution of individual works written by Bhoja is a vast undertaking. We have, therefore, selected a few works for the purpose of this present paper viz. *Nāmamālikā* (NM), *Rājamārtanḍa* (RM), *Rāmāyaṇacampū* (RC), *Śālihotra* (ŚM), *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* (ŚP), *Śṛṅgāramañjarīkathā* (ŚM) and *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* (SK)⁴ and noted the individual contribution of each work by recording only a few words at random from each text.

4. The following editions and modes of references are used :

- (a) *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* (= SK). Trivandrum Skt. Series. 1935. Mode of reference - Adhyāya, Pāda, sūtra.
- (b) *Rājamārtanḍa* (RM) Āyurvediyagranthamālā, Caturthapūṣpa. 1924. Mode of reference - Verse, number.
- (c) *Śṛṅgāramañjarīkathā* (ŚM). Singhi Jaina Granthamālā. 1959. Mode of Reference - Page and line.
- (d) *Śālihotra* (ŚH) edited by Dr. E. D. Kulkarni, Deccan College, Poona. 1953. Mode of reference - Line, number.
- (e) *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*. Part I (ŚP). edited by Josyer, Mysore, 1955. Mode of reference - Page and line.
- (f) *Rāmāyaṇacampū* (RC) N. S. Press, Bombay, 1939. Mode of reference - Kāṇḍa, verse and (line numbers between two verses).
- (g) *Nāmamālikā* (NM) edited by Dr. E. D. Kulkarni and Prof. V. D. Gokhale, Deccan College, Poona, 1955.

To note the contribution of these works, the following aspects are to be considered :—

(1) We may come across a word which has not been registered in any previously published dictionaries and so a new word which is being registered for the first time on the basis of the material utilised.

(2) We may come across a word which is not a new one but the significance it has in the particular context, has not previously been registered in the published dictionaries. In this case a new significance is contributed by the material collected.

(3) A third aspect arises when a vocable is registered as occurring in lexicons (L) and for which no citation from literature is available according to previous dictionaries. The discovery of a vocable from non-lexical literature pertains to this category.

(4) Fourthly we may have a contextual meaning of a word recorded only in lexical literature and for which no quotation is available from literature utilized for the previous dictionaries. The new contextual meaning is a contribution to lexicography.

(6) Similarly we may have a word which is recorded in previous dictionaries and whose meaning also is recorded in them but for which the sources are not recorded or if they are recorded, our source is not recorded. The addition of a new source is very valuable for the historical study of the word.

(6) Lastly we may come across a vocable and its significance, both of which are found in lexical literature only. Our lexicon may contribute a new word and also a new meaning to the previously published dictionaries.

We shall now record below a few specimen words from the above-named seven texts under each of the categories noted above.

I (a) *kṣaṇepāku* mfn. ripe or done in a moment. SK. 1. 3. 219.

dūrepāka mfn. *dūre pacyate svayam eva*. SK. 1. 3. 219.

dūrepāku mfn. *ibid*.

bāhughna mfn, *bāhughno mallāḥ*. SK. 1. 4. 83.

samaghnī f. *pakṣiviśeṣaḥ*. SK. 1. 4. 81.

(b) *akṣiruj* f. eye-disease. RM. 56

kaṇṇavyathā f. pain of the ear. RM 38

cikuracaya m. a mass of hair. RM 3

dāruṇaka m. N. of the disease of the roots of the hair, RM 11,

śakraluptā n. morbid baldness of the head. RM 6

śirovraṇa n. a wound on the head. RM 25

surādhipatilupta n. morbid baldness of the head. RM 8

- (c) *atanutuhina* mfn. having heavy flakes of snow. SM 67. 23
kukūlānala m. fire made of chaff. SM 67. 25
kṣurikānātya n. sword-dancing. SM 66. 26
dṛgvikṣepa m, the act of glancing. SM 68. 3-4
nartanopādhyāya m. a teacher in the art of dancing SM 68. 30.
pāṇḍimāna n. paleness, SM 67. 5
prekṣaṇakānūrūpa mfn. adequate for the performance, SM 68.22-23
vilāsavahni m. the fire of pleasures. SM. 67-14
- (d) *agarvatā* f. freedom from pride. SH. 132
anulomayāyin mfn. going in a proper direction. SH. 341
jayāvarta m. a curl foreboding or granting victory. SH. 26
bandhuparābhava m. defeat of the kinsmen. SH. 339
bhūpālamandira m. a palace of the king. SH. 40
yamarūpa m. a kind of horse foreboding death and who is all
coloured and has all his feet black. SH. 10
vājīśa m. the best among the horses, SH. 26
vijalikā f. a particular medicine for horses. SH. 354
sarvadoṣapraśānti f. removal of all diseases. SH. 266
- (e) *aśvakuñjara* m. *pūjito'svaḥ*. SP. 73. 20
kingo m. *yo na vahati*. SP. 75. 11
khañjakubja mfn. *khañjaś cāsau kubjaś ca*. SP. 73. 24
gogarbhīṇī f. *garbhīṇī gauḥ* SP. 73. 20
- (f) *akṣakriḍā* f. *akṣakumārasamharanakhelā*. a play of killing Akṣa,
the son of Rāvaṇa RC. 5. 38
agastyāyita n. *agastyenevācaritam*. behaved like Agastya. RC. 280
agrajānus m. *agrajanman*. an elder brother. RC. 6. 17
animiṣacāpa m. *devacāpa*. a divine bow. RC. 1. 109
amaramygdīś f. *surasundarī*. a celestial woman. RC. 6. 60
ambhojabhū m. *brahman*. N. of Brahmā. RC. 1. 7.
aravindasambhava. m. *brahman*. N. of Brahmā. RC. 3. 11 (2)
aviditaparaśu mfn. *ajñātani jāyudhaprabhāva*. RC. 1. 111
karalāghava n. *hastapātava*. skill of the hands. RC. 6. 79 (3)
kalaśabhāva m. *agastya*. N. of Agastya. RC. 4. 45
tapodhanavrata n. *jāṭavalkaladhāraṇa-kandamūlāsana-adhaśśayana-*
brahmacaryādi-tapasyācāra. a vow of an
ascetic. RC. 6. 102 (4)

II (a) *śamkarā* f. *śamkarā nāma parivrājikā* ŚK. 1. 4. 19

- (b) *ārohaṇa* n. riding. SH. 1. 18
uṣtrākṣa mfn. camel-eyed (horse). SH. 136
ṛtucaryā f. a seasonal proceeding. SH. 256
krūra n. *yasya vāmagalle bhṛamarāḥ sa krūro bhavati*. a kind of
inauspicious horse. SH. 34

jayavardhana mfn. granting victory. ŚH. 69

trikūṭa m. *trayo yasya lalāṭasthā āvartā adharottarā, trikūṭaḥ sa ca vijñeyah.* a kind of horse. ŚH. 22

bhramara m. a curl of hair. ŚH, 30

mātṛdoṣa m. deficiency in mother. ŚH. 128

śvetapāda mfn. (horse) having white feet. ŚH. 5

succhayā f. a good shade. ŚH. 308

(c) *adayam* ind. *dayārahitam yathā tathā*, mercilessly. RC. 2. 9.

animitta n. *pratikūlavātādiduḥśakuna*, a bad omen. RC. 6. 40 (3)

antarmukha m. *ātmaniṣṭho yogī*, a yogin possessed of self-knowledge. RC. 6. 28 (1).

amarī f. *surasundarī*, a nymph. RC. 6. 31

III (a) *phalegrahi* mfn. *phalāni grhṇāti phalegrahiḥ vrkṣaḥ* bearing fruits. SK. 1. 4. 35

dronampaca mfn. *dronampacā dāsī*, liberal in entertaining. SK. 1. 4. 44

pāṇigha m. *pāṇim hanti pānighaḥ śilpī*, a workman or handicraftsman. SK. 1. 4. 85.

māyu m. *māyuh pittam*, bilious humor. SK. 2. 1. 1.

śayu m. *śayur ajagaraḥ*, the boa snake. SK. 2. 1. 7

(b) *niśāhvā* f. turmeric, RM. 61

nīlī f. a kind of disease. RM. 58.

mārkava m. Eclipta Prostrata. RM. 26.

rubūka m. the castor-oil tree. RM. 34.

(c) *kukūla* m. fire made of chaff. SM. 67. 25

(d) *aṣṭamaṅgala* m. *yasya pādāḥ sitāḥ sarve puccham vakṣas tathaiva ca, mūrdhā bhālam sitam yasya taṁ vidyād aṣṭamaṅgalam*, a horse with white feet, tail, breast, mane and fore-head. ŚH. 12

stanin m *syātām stanau yasya tu kośadeśe sa rājyabhaṅgāya bhavet stanī tu*, a kind of horse having this particular deformity. ŚH. 81

(e) *kaṇṭhekālā* m. *kaṇṭhe sthitaḥ kālo yasya*, ŚP. 75. 26

(f) *aruṇasārathi* m. *sūryaḥ*, the Sun. RC. 2. 40 (1)

urvīdhara m. *acala*, a mountain. RC. 2. 50 (1)

kṣīra n, *kṣīram nīram*, water. RC. 1. 50

V (a) *aktu* m. *rātriḥ*, night (RV). ŚK. 2. 1. 63

ātmabhari mfn. *ātmānam eva bibharti*-self-nourishing, selfish (Pañcatantra, Hitopadeśa). ŚK. 1. 4. 37

kṣaṇadākara m. 'maker of night', the moon (Śiśupālavadha) ŚK. 1. 4. 31

- kṣaṇepāka* mfn. ripe or done in a moment (*Gaṇa*). ŚK. 1. 3. 219
dīpra mfn. *dīpyate dīpraḥ*. flaming, shining (*Kathāsaritsāgara*).
 ŚK. 1. 4. 242.
devayu mfn. *devayuh dhārmikaḥ*. pious (*RV*). ŚK. 2. 1. 37
doṣākara mfn. 'night-maker', the moon (*Śatrumjayamāhātmya*).
 ŚK. 1. 4. 31
rājagha mfn. *rājānam hanti rājaghaḥ* a slayer of (hostile) kings
 (*Naiṣadha*). ŚK. 1. 4. 86
- (b) *karṇaroga* m. a disease of the ear (*Suśruta*). RM. 36
khālitya m. morbid baldness (*Caraka, Suśruta*). RM. 12
- (c) *alakṣaṇa* n. an inauspicious sign. (*Manu*). ŚH. 119
utsedha m. height (*Śatapatha, Caraka*). ŚH. 100
dinamani m. 'day-jewel', the sun (*Gītagovinda, Bālarāmāyaṇa*).
 ŚH. 284
naṣyakarman n. the application of a sternutatory (*Suśruta*)
 ŚH. 280.
nilapīta mfn. dark-green (*Rāmāyaṇa*). ŚH. 207
biḍālākṣa mfn. cat-eyed (*Harṣacarita*). ŚH. 72
rājayogyā mfn. befitting a king (no reference). ŚH. 8
sarvavarṇa mfn. all-coloured (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*). ŚH. 9
- (d) *śaṣṭriśyāmā* mfn. *śaṣṭrivā śyāmā* (*Śiśupālavadha*). ŚP. 64. 4
- (e) *atibalā* f. *baleti atibaleti ca nāmṇā prasiddhe vidye mantrau*
 (N. of a particular charm; no reference). RC. 1. 37
himakara m. *candra*. the moon (*Harivamśa*). RC. 3. 3. (2)
- VI *agnidhunī*⁶ f. N. of Vaitaraṇī river. 40
agryāsana n. the part of the elephant's body where the driver
 sits. 461
acyuta n. the sky⁷. 85
adrśyatanu m. a good⁷ 6
anyavatsā f. a cow which suckles an adopted calf. 299
apsaromandira n. the abode of nymphs, the sky. 86.
amṛtabhojin m. a god. 6
ayovarman n. an armour made of iron. 508
avikkālā f. N. of the club of Viṣṇu. 75.
aṣṭhalocana m. eight-eyed, N. of Brahmā. 63
asitākṛti m. one having black figure, N. of Yama. 35
aharmukhasūcaka m. the charioteer of the sun. 114
ākāśakusuma n. a star. 89
ātmaja m. N. of the god of love.⁷ 81

6. This and the following words in this section are cited only from NM.

7. The meaning is not recorded in MW.

- indukānti* f. the moon-light. 101
indramrga m. a dog. 324
kaṅkatir m. a body-guard, an armour. 596
kaṭhoraka m. N. of Śiva. 53
kanakācalavāsin m. a god. 8
kamalin m. the moon.
karāgnimat m. a brāhmaṇa. 333.
kalāśābdhibhava m. the moon. 96
*kalādhara*⁸ f. N. of the wife of Śiva. 58
kaśādhara m. N. of Varuṇa 45
kirīṭin m. the sun.⁷ 111
kutkila m. a mountain. 178
kubarin m. N. of the chariot of the sun. 113
kumbhaputra m. N. of the sage Agastya. 399
kycchrakesara m. a cocoanut tree. 251
kelinī f. N. of the wife of the god of love. 82
koraka m. a star.⁷ 89
krūradyṣṭi m. N. of Yama.⁷ 35
khacara m. a god.⁷ 8
khapura n. heaven. 4.

7. See note 7 on p. 80.

8. Cf. *Kalādhara* = N. of Śiva (MW).

“ यदि वा नास्य वाक्यस्य

यः कश्चिद्वक्ता, किं तर्हि, पूर्वज्ञैः ।

क्रमागतविश्वपालने

नियुक्तो महामाहेश्वरः कोऽपि पुंविशेषः ॥ ”

—*Śṛṅgārāpraprakāśa* of Bhoja chap. 7

Ed. Dr. V. Raghavan, Harvard

Oriental Series. p. 405.

ŚĀSTRAIC REFERENCES IN THE JĀNAKĪHARAṆA

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It is said that the poets express themselves against Śāstraic learning¹ and the philosophers decry writing poetry.² One cannot make a name in the field of śāstras without poetic talents.³ Opinions like these are exaggerated and seem to have been expressed on account of one-sided and imperfect understanding of the aims of pursuing training in Śāstraic learning and in the art of writing poetry. The two fields serve different ends⁴ and as such are not antagonistic to each other. Eminent savants like Śaṅkara and Vedānta Deśika had the unique distinction of having attained eminence in both the fields. Poets like Kālidāsa,⁵ Aśvaghōṣa,⁶ Bhāravi⁷ and Māgha⁸ used the references to matters of Śāstraic importance for the successful and artistic finish of the matters in their poems. The *Naiṣadhīyacarita*⁹ of Śrīharṣa bears the reputation of Śāstra Kāvya.

1. Cf. the following statements of unknown authorship :

नमो व्युत्पात्तवादाय सत्कवित्वापहारिणे ।

नमः प्रामाण्यवादाय सत्साहित्यापहारिणे ।

2. Cf. the following statements of unknown authorship :

काव्येन हन्यते शास्त्रम् ।

शास्त्रेषु हीनाः कवयो भवन्ति ।

3. Cf. अकवेः शास्त्रवेदनम् । *Bhāmahālaṃkāra* 1. 3

4. For aims of writing poetry, see *Bhāmahālaṃkāra* 1. 2; *Kāvyaaprakāśa* 1. 2. The śāstra is intended to guide people in the proper path and provide them with the means of acquiring tattvajñāna.

5. For references to grammar, see *Raghuvamśa* 11. 56; 13. 58; 15. 9 and *Kumārasambhava* 2. 17; and see *Raghuvamśa* 13. 60 and *Kumārasambhava* 2. 13 for Śaṅkha references.

6. The *Buddhacarita* 12. 9 refers to grammar and canto 12 of the same work deals with the principles of Śaṅkha.

7. *Kirātārjunīya* 17. 43 refers to a Nyāya principle and 5. 22 to a theistic doctrine.

8. *Śiśupālavadha* 2. 112; 14. 24; 16. 80 refer to grammar, 2. 28. to Buddhism, 4. 55 to the Yoga system and 1. 33 for a theistic doctrine.

9. For information on this, see Ch. 10, *A Critical Study of Śrī Harṣa's Naiṣadhīyacarita* by A. N. Jani.

Kumāradāsa (C. 550 A.D.)¹⁰ reveals in his *Mahākāvya Jānaki-karāṇa* his familiarity with the tenets of the several schools of thought. While some of the references contained in this poem bear evidence to the successful employment of the Śāstraic materials for poetic embellishment, others are found admitted to form part of the narratives and descriptions in the poem. The noteworthy references of this kind are given below.¹¹

1. In the course of his hunting, Daśaratha is stated to have approached the penance-grove on the banks of the river Tamasā. The following description¹² occurs in this context.

व्याख्यानकाले रचिता मुनीन्द्रै-
निश्चय वाचो मधुरस्वभावाः ।
स्वतः प्रमाणं परतोऽश्वेति
शुकाङ्गना यत्र विसंवदन्ते ॥

1. 74.

“Where, having heard the expressions uttered at the time of exposition by eminent sages, the female parrots of sweet dispositions enter into a discussion regarding the validity of a *pramāṇa* being intrinsic or extrinsic.” The female parrots, with their innate capacity to produce the words which they listen to when uttered by others, arrange themselves into two groups, each one taking one of the positions for argument. The word ‘*aṅganā*’ appears to serve two purposes. Even the female species among the parrots evince interest in reproducing the expressions of matters which are intricate in their nature. Secondly, their voice must be more sweet than that of the male parrots. Mention of intrinsic validity before the extrinsic one in the third quarter suggests that the *siddhānta* of the sages, who were steeped in the Vedic lore and Vedic exegesis, must be in favour of intrinsic validity. A discussion on this must include extrinsic validity also.

10. This date is arrived at on the strength of a passage from the *Jānakīsharaṇa* cited in the *Jānāśraya* of Janaśraya who flourished in the latter half of the 6th century A.D. Cf. K. Gopalachari: *Early History of the Andhra Country* p. 208.

11. The references are taken from (1) the printed text of the *Jānakīsharaṇa* cantos I-X edited by G. R. Nandargikar at Bombay in 1907 and the Manuscript Copy of the *Jānakīsharaṇam* in 20 cantos preserved in the Sri Venkateswara University Oriental Research Institute Library, Tirupati Ms. Nos. 7532-A and 7532-B.

12. This sloka is found in the Ms. and is not found in the printed edition. [This is found in the London and Adyar Mss. of the *Kāvya* also. Dr. C. R. Swaminathan, in his ed. of *JH.* considers the verse as an interpolation—S. S. J.]

2. Complete destruction marked the city of Laṅkā, when the battle was over. The survivors bewailed the loss of the dear and near among the inhabitants of the city. Their painful utterances evoking sympathy among those who listened to them did not produce any change in the guardians of the quarters. When they did not respond, they were taken by the grief-stricken as having no existence in their physical forms. That is, the deities did not have physical existence. They existed only in the form of mantras while they are uttered by the priests during rituals. This is expressed in the following śloka :

तथातिदीनैः परिवेविताक्षरै-

र्न लोकपालेषु गतेषु विक्रियाम् ।

अतः प्रमाणेन च शब्दमात्रमि-

त्युदीरितं तत्र जनेन देवताः ॥

19. 31.

“As the guardians of the quarters did not change by expressions (lit. the syllables) of bewailings which were so very pitiable (or miserable), the deities were stated by the people there to be only in (the form of) the words on the strength of the authority.” The *pramāṇa* mentioned here refers to the *Mīmāṃsā tenet*¹³ that gods have no physical existence, their importance is subordinated to that of the mantras which alone yield (or grant) the results to the sacrifices.

3. The Manuscript copy of the *Jānakīharaṇa* contains a glorious description of the sacrifice performed by Viśvāmitra. Among the ślokas which describe the details of ritualistic importance, the following śloka¹⁴ brings out the exegetical importance of the ritual :

इहातिदेशागतमन्त्रगोचरं

दुरूहमूढं नयशास्त्रकोविदः ।

विनिश्चिकायार्थवशेन कुत्र वा

विनैव मीमांसकमर्थनिश्चयः ॥

5. 30.

“Here (in the sacrificial session), he (Viśvāmitra), who was proficient in the system of the principles of interpretation (*nayaśāstra*), determined (i.e., arrived at), as a result of the meaning, the most difficult modification (*ūha*) which falls within the scope of the mantra

13. Vide : *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* 9. 1. 9.

14. This śloka is found in the Ms. and is not found in the printed edition. (This is also considered as an interpolation)

which is to be applied on the strength of transference (atideśa). Where can the meaning (of a passage) be determined without the (help of the) Mīmāṃsaka?" The first six chapters in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* of Jaimini deal with the nature and performance of the sacred rites which are directly enjoined (vihita). They also deal with the interpretation of the rules regarding the performance of these rites which are called as prakṛti. The remaining six chapters deal with the rites which are not directly enjoined and the performance of which, called as vikṛti, depend upon the details of the rules of the prakṛti rites. The details of the rites dealt with in the first six chapters are required to be transferred to the rites mentioned in the next six chapters. This transference is called atideśa.¹⁵ The iṣu sacrifice may be cited to illustrate this transference. After describing the iṣu sacrifice a little, the Vedic texts declare that the remaining details regarding the performance of this sacrifice are to be ascertained from the śyena sacrifice.¹⁶ The śyena sacrifice becomes the prakṛti for the vikṛti sacrifice of iṣu. Sometimes, there may rise a difficulty in transferring the details from one sacrifice to another. The details of the prakṛti may not fit in with the vikṛti. They may require some change. This change which is to be effected is called modification (ūha)¹⁷ and it is of three kinds,¹⁸ namely, mantra, sāman and saṃskāra. The mantra aspect is referred to in the context. The mantra, which is enjoined to be used with reference to the prakṛti, will have to be modified and transferred to the vikṛti. For instance,¹⁹ while performing the Āgneya sacrifice, the substance to be used is vrihi and the mantras to be uttered are 'अग्नये जुष्टं निर्वपामि'। 'व्रीहीणां मेघ सुमनस्यमानः'। When the Saurya sacrifice is to be performed, the substance to be offered is nīvāra. The mantras which are enjoined for the prakṛti, i.e. Āgneya sacrifice are to be transferred to the vikṛti, i.e. Saurya sacrifice after making necessary modification. So, the mantras must be changed into 'सौर्याय जुष्टं निर्वपामि'। 'नीवाराणां मेघ सुमनस्यमानः'। Here it is stated that Viśvāmitra is an expert in the application of the principles of

15. This is dealt with in the Ch. VII by Jaimini. Vide :

अतिदेशो नाम ये परत्र विहितास्तमतीत्यान्यत्र तेषां देशः ।

प्रकृतात् कर्मणो यस्मात् तत्समानेषु कर्मसु ।

धर्मप्रदेशो येन स्यात् सोऽतिदेश इति स्थितिः ।

Sabara on 7. 1. 12

16. Vide : Sabara on 7. 1. 16

17. Vide : सिद्धेऽतिदेशेऽधुनातिदिष्टानां पदार्थानां मन्त्रसामसंस्काराणां द्वारान्तरसंबन्ध-
निमित्तोऽन्यथाभावात्मक ऊहः । *Śāstradīpikā* on 9. 1. 1.

18. Vide : Sabara on 9. 1. 1.

19. Vide : *Śāstradīpikā* on 9. 3. 1.

Mīmāṃsā such as atideśa and ūha. Therefore he was in a position to arrive at the correct but difficult modification. This instance together with the previous two illustrate Kumārādāsa's acquaintance with the principles of Mīmāṃsā.

4. A reference is made to the field of verbal knowledge in the following śloka :

पशुघातं ज्ञता शूरमङ्गदेन नरान्तकम् ।

योगाद्वलीयसी रुदिरिति स्पष्टीकृतः परम् ॥

18. 121.

"It was clearly shown by Aṅgada who killed the valorous Narāntaka as if he were a beast, that conventional import is more powerful than the etymological one." Narāntaka is stated in the Yuddhakāṇḍa,²⁰ as a demon with this name. He was of formidable strength and valour. Such a person was killed easily by Aṅgada. In this context, the author refers to an aspect of verbal knowledge. Etymological sense²¹ of a word is obtained through the meaning of its component parts. Conventional sense²² is got through the group of all the component parts without having to depend upon the imports of the component pairs. In the context, the word aṅgada means 'armlet' etymologically (which is tightly fitting the arm) and the word narāntaka has the etymological sense of the slayer (one who brings about the end) of men, that is the God of death. Conventionally, aṅgada and narāntaka mean respectively, the son of Vālin and the demon of that name who resided in Laṅkā. The etymological sense that the armlet killed the God of Death is absurd here. The conventional sense alone is appropriate here. The general concept among the scholars of the systems of thought²³ is that the conventional sense is more powerful than the etymological sense. The author makes use of this principle in recording the death of the valorous Narāntaka at the hands of Aṅgada.

5. The concept of the cause and effect which is hold by the Sāṃkhya school is referred to in the following śloka :²⁴

20. *Ramāyaṇa* - Yuddhakāṇḍa - 69 - 66 to 96.

21. Vide :

यत्रावयवार्थ एव बुध्यते तद्यौगिकम् ।

Siddhāntamuktavali (N. S. Press, Bombay) p. 381.

22. Vide : यत्रावयवशक्तिनिरपेक्षया समुदायशक्त्या गृह्यते तद्ब्रूम यथा गोमण्डपादिवद्म् ।

ibid. pp. 381-2.

23. Cf. *Pañcapāvidikāvaraṇa* pp. 132-3. Vijianagaram edition
Jaiminiya Nyāyamālā on 3. 5. 8.

24. This śloka is found in the Ms. and is not found in the printed edition.

सर्वस्य कारणं कार्योदमिन्नं परमार्थतः ।

अत एव तयोरेक्यं प्राहुः सत्कार्यवादिनः ॥

2. 9.

“The cause of every thing is really non-different from (its) effect. Hence those who advocate satkāryavāda say that they (cause and effect) are identical.” The gods, who were oppressed by Rāvaṇa, went to the milky ocean and sought protection under Viṣṇu. This śloka forms part of their prayer to the Lord. The Lord is the cause of everything and on the principle of satkāryavāda, He can produce any thing, since whatever is produced must have existed in Him prior to its production. Though formulated by the Sāṃkhya,²⁵ this doctrine of satkāryavāda is admitted in the Vedānta schools.²⁶

6. The Sāṃkhya concept of the three guṇas, namely, sattva, rajas and tamas is referred to by the author while describing the arrival of the forces at the sacrificial session of Viśvāmitra. The following śloka illustrates this.²⁷

पिशाचरक्षस्ततिभिर्निरन्तरं

कृतान्धकारं रथचक्रेणुभिः ।

असंख्यपक्षा अपि तत्र सैनिका

जगज्जगत्सत्त्वरजस्तमोमयम् ॥

5. 58.

“There (in the sky near the sacrificial spot), the soldiers, though they could not be counted, spoke (lit. sang) that the world is made up of the three qualities, sattva, rajas and tamas, by filling it (sky) closely (nirantaram) with the troops of fiends and demons and making it (the region) dark with the dust raised by the wheels of the chariot.” The words sattva, rajas and tamas stand respectively for the troops of fiends and demons, dust raised by the wheels of the chariot and darkness created by that dust. The word saṃkhyā²⁸ stands also for the Sāṃkhya system. With the word ‘api’ in the third quarter the soldiers are stated to be not the followers of the

25. Vide: *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* 9

26. Vide: *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6. 2. 1.

27. The printed edition reads the śloka (numbered as 27) as follows:

असंख्यगृह्णा अपि तत्र सैनिकाः

पिशाचरक्षस्ततिभिर्निरन्तरम् ।

कृतान्धकारं रथचक्रेणुभि-

जगज्जगत्सत्त्वरजस्तमोमयम् ।

28. Vide: Dr. Har Dutt Sharma: *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* with notes and Translation Introduction p. 2.

Sāṃkhya system but yet showed that the world is made up of the three qualities admitted by the Sāṃkhya system.

7. Nature of participating in a discussion is stated in the following śloka :

कृतमावरणं परेण बाणैः

पृथु दुर्भेदमशेषसैन्यनीडम् ।

अनुमानमसिद्धसाधनाद्यैः

प्रतिवादीव निराचकार रामः ॥

19. 23

“Rāma drove away (or kept aside) the huge, entire army (of the demons) which was difficult to divide and which was surrounded by the enemies' arrows and (thus) remained as a nest, just like an opponent would repudiate the inferential (argument) by (raising) the fallacies like 'siddhasādhana.' ”

Rāvaṇa kept his army impenetrable with his arrows but Rāma smashed it. In the simile that is given here, it is said that in discussions, when one of the participants puts forward his theory in the form of inferential propositions, the opponent who is the other participant, points out defects there and refutes them. The defects that could be pointed out in inferential propositions will be in the form of fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsa). Gautama,²⁹ the author of the *Nyāya Sūtras*, mentions, five fallacies headed by Savyabhicāra. Kumāradāsa refers to Siddhasādhana, which was brought by the later Nyāya writers³⁰ under asiddha-kind of fallacy, as being at the head of the defects. The purpose of mentioning it here may be to show that Ravaṇa's army was only weak and the measures taken by him to keep the army formidable were of no avail before Rāma. With his arrows, Rāma proved that Ravaṇa's army was only weak.

8. The following śloka refers to the theistic doctrines :

शकलीकृतैकवनबुद्धिरपा-

कृतचैत्यवन्दननरार्थमतिः ।

परपक्षदूषणमयात्मचयोऽ-

भवमीशवासिकपथप्रवरः ॥

13. 41

29. *Nyāya Sūtra* 1. 2. 45.

30. Vide : *Nyāyakusumāñjali* p. 366. Chowkhamba edition 1957.

“Having smashed the notion of the unitary nature of the garden, having driven away the understanding that men realise some purpose by bowing to the Caitya, I became the foremost among those who believe in God, myself having many a disposition to refute the opponents.”

Hanumān narrates to Sugrīva his experiences when he left for Laṅkā in search of Sītā. He destroyed the trees in the Aśokavana and in the absence of the trees, there was nothing like a garden which is a unit by itself. The Caitya³¹ there was destroyed by him, thus preventing the people to worship it. These two acts proved Hanumān to be the destroyer of the opponents. In this respect Hanumān tells that he became foremost among those who take to the path of (worshipping) God. Those who worship God cannot tolerate any thing that may come in the way of their act of worship. The word vāsika^{31a} is meaningless and may be read as vāsita.

9. Hanumān pulled down to the ground that Caitya which was worshipped, as it is shown to be respected in the scriptural texts of the wise Buddha. He fought with the disciple of the Buddha before doing so. Vide :

कृतबुद्धबुद्धमुनिशास्त्रपथ-

प्रतिपाद्यवन्दननरार्थतया ।

कृतवन्दनं सुगतशिष्यजनै-

रवरुध्य तं भुवि निपातितवान् ॥

13. 39.

This reference to the Buddha and his disciple in a work which is based on the contents of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is indeed anachronistic. Kumāradāsa is perhaps referring to the contemporary aspects of life which were then available to him in Laṅkā during the 6th century A.D.

10. A reference to the forces of Cupid attempting to disturb the penance of Gautama is contained in the śloka³² which depicts the slaying of the demons by Rāma during the sacrificial session of Viśvāmītra.

31. Caitya is the general name given to any place connected with the Buddha, though indirectly. It may contain a relic like the Buddha's tooth or bone or robe, or alms-bowl or any scriptural text. Here the word may be taken to mean an altar or tree which is worshipped. To take it in the Buddhist sense would lead to anachronism. Kumāradāsa refers to it in 13. 33 as caityagiri.

31a. The London ms. reads 'Vārttika.' This verse too is found only in some mss.—S. S. J.

32. This śloka occurs as 5. 89 in the Ms. and as 5-55 in the printed edition.

स्थित्वा गुणे महति तत्क्षणलब्धमोक्षाः
 सुश्लिष्टयुक्तिसफलाननसम्पदस्ते ।
 शाक्या इवास्य विशिखा रिपुसैनिकेभ्य-
 श्चक्रुस्त्रिविष्टपसभागमनोपदेशम् ॥

5. 89.

“Remaining in the (middle point of) long bowstring, getting released instantly, possessed of excellent sharp points (released) with intricate contrivance, those pointed arrows (of Rāma) gave instructions to the soldiers of the enemies to proceed to the assembly of gods, like the followers of the Buddha, who practise tranquillity (which is a good virtue), get instantly their individual existence destroyed, who get their faces brightened (lit. get the fruits of their faces) by practising intricate yoga, who had removed the tuft of hair and who advised the forces of Cupid (who was their enemy) to get back to the court of gods.”

Mahati guṇe must mean big or long bowstring with Rāma and the great quality which shall be śānti or tranquility; saphala means having a sharp edge.³³ The word śākya means the followers of the Buddha who belonged to the race of the śakyas. Viśikhā may mean the arrows which have a special kind (vi) of the edge.

जानकीहरणं कर्तुं रघुवंशे पुरः स्थिते ।
कविः कुमारदासो वा रावणो वा यदि क्षमः ॥

— सुभाषितरत्नकोशे १७०७ श्लोकः

* * * *

जानकीहरणं श्लक्ष्णं लक्ष्णैरुपलक्षितम् ।
रामायणमुघासारमास्वाद्य मुक्तिदायकम् ॥

—Phalaśruti in London ms.

* * * *

तस्याकुञ्चितजानुमद्रिसदृशं देहं ददौ दाहिना
सङ्ग्रामाभ्रमनल्पराक्षसजयश्रीरञ्जितं सर्वदा ।
कृत्वा रक्षितकीर्तिसाहसमपि प्राणं बलस्य कुघा

* * * * *

—Extra verse in canto XVIII found in Adyar and London mss. In this Śārdūlavikrīḍita verse, the 3rd, 6th, 14th and 17th letters are to arranged in a *Cakrabandha* that it incorporates the names of the poet and the work as—कुमारदासस्य जानकीहरणम्

UMVEKA BHATTA

Dr. K. KUNJUNNI RAJA

Umveka Bhaṭṭa is an ancient authority on Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, well known in the academic circles and popular in legends. His name is found mentioned in different ways: Umveka, Umbeka, U(m)-veyaka, Ombeka etc. Only two of his works are known: the commentary on Maṇḍanamiśra's *Bhāvanāviveka*, (edited by Gopinatha Kaviraj in the Sarasvati Bhavan Series, Banaras) and the commentary on the *Śloka-vārttika* (edited in the Madras University Sanskrit series).¹ A popular verse, quoted by Guṇaratna in his commentary on the *Śaḍdarśanasāṅgraha*, refers to Umveka's commentary on the *Śloka-vārttika*:

उंवेकः कारिकां वेति तन्त्रं वेति प्रभाकरः ।

मण्डनस्तुभयं वेति नोभयं वेति रेवणः ॥

The term *Kārikā* in this verse must obviously be referring to the *Śloka-vārttika*.

Umveka's popularity is attested by the traditions identifying him with Maṇḍana, Sureśvara, Viśvarūpa and Bhavabhūti. Many of these traditions are as old as Vidyāraṇya and Pratyakṣvarūpa Bhagavān. In his *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* (cantos VII and VIII) Vidyāraṇya identifies Umveka with Maṇḍana, Sureśvara and Viśvarūpa and makes him a younger contemporary of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Pratyakṣvarūpa Bhagavān, author of the *Nayanaprasādinī* commentary on Citsukha's *Tattvapradīpikā* identifies him with Bhavabhūti (*Bhavabhūtir Umvekaḥ*). The tradition identifying Viśvarūpa and Bhavabhūti is found in the *Vaṇanamālā* sub-commentary on Viśvarūpa's *Bālakrīḍā* commentary on *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* (See Kane, *Hist. of Dh. Sastra* I. p. 262).

Umveka Bhaṭṭa, who has commented on Maṇḍanamiśra's *Bhāvanāviveka*, discussing many a textual variant and alternative explanation, must definitely be later than Maṇḍana. Maṇḍana Miśra himself is later than Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Dharmakīrti, since in the *Sphoṭa-siddhi* he defends the Sphoṭa doctrine of Bhartṛhari against the attacks of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti; Maṇḍana actually quotes a line from Dharmakīrti's *Pramānavārttika* (I. 247) in his *Sphoṭasiddhi* (p. 210, Madras University edition); and according to the commentator Parameśvara, Maṇḍana is referring to the students of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa by terms like *durvidagdha* (verse 2, *Sphoṭasiddhi*). Since

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Dharmakīrti flourished in the first half of the seventh century A. D. Maṇḍana Miśra has to be assigned to a period not earlier than 650-700 A. D. Hence one limit to the date of Umveka Bhaṭṭa may be taken as 700 A. D.

The other limit to the date of Umveka is given by that of Kamalaśīla and Karṇakagomin who refer to him by name, quote his views and discuss them. In his *Pañjikā* commentary on Śāntara-kṣīta's *Tattvasaṅgraha* (pp. 812-13) Kamalaśīla quotes a long passage from Umveka :

उवेयकस्त्वाह - न बोधात्मकत्वं नाम ज्ञानानां प्रामाण्यम्, किं तर्हि ? अर्थावि-
संवादित्वम् ।

This passage is found with minor variations on pages 53-54 of Umveka's *Tātparyāṭīkā* commentary on *Śloka-vārttika*; Kamalaśīla quotes certain portions and explains the idea in other portions. Thus it is clear that Umveka Bhaṭṭa is earlier than Kamalaśīla who refers to him.

Kamalaśīla's date had been fixed as A. D. 713-63 on the basis of Chinese sources (See Intro. to GOS. edn. of *Tattvasaṅgraha*). But Damieville has shown (*Le Concile de Lhasa*, Paris 1952) that the most probable date for the foundation of Bsan yas and the official recognition of Buddhism as a State Religion in Tibet was A. D. 775. Kamalaśīla arrived in Tibet in A. D. 779; the great debate took place in Bsan yas between A. D. 792 and 794. Therefore Kamalaśīla's date may be taken as A. D. 740-795.

From these two limits Umveka Bhaṭṭa may be assigned to A. D. 700-750.

Besides Kamalaśīla Karṇakagomin, commentator on the *Pramāṇa-vārttika* of Dharmakīrti, has also quoted passages from Umveka's commentary on the *Śloka-vārttika*. Karṇakagomin says (on p. 21 of his commentary in R. Sankrtyayana's edition) :

उवेकस्त्वाह - स्वभावहेतोर्योगकत्वं दूरोत्सारितमेव । भेदाधिष्ठानत्वाद् गम्यगमक-
भावस्य ।

This is found on page 306 of Umveka's *Tātparyāṭīkā*. Another quotation from Umveka is found on p. 497 :

उम्बेकस्त्वाह - यदि स एवायमित्येकानुभवस्तथाप्ययमतीतज्ञानकर्मताऽपरोक्षते
एकाधिकरण्ये गृह्यन् संवेद्यते ।

This corresponds to the passage on 177-8 of Umveka's commentary

Karṇakagomin's commentary is substantially identical with that of Śākyamati preserved only in Tibetan translation, except for the fact that the former contains some discussions on language where a quotation from Maṇḍana also occurs. Śākyamati's date seems to be the second half of the seventh century, Hence Karṇakagomin who quotes Maṇḍana and Umveka must necessarily be later than Śākyamati. Prof. Gnoli's view that Karṇakagomin is earlier has to be revised.

UMVEKA AND BHAVABHŪTI

The identity of Umveka with Bhavabhūti was first suggested by S. P. Pandit on the basis of two colophons of a *Mālatīmādhava* manuscript, the one in Act III assigning the play to a pupil of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and the other in Act IV giving the name of the playwright as Umveka (Intro. to edn. of *Gauḍavaho*). This was conceded by R. G. Bhandarkar (Preface to his edition of the *Mālatīmādhava*), Ganganath Jha (Introduction to the *Bhāyanāviveka*), Kuppaswami Sastri (*Proceed. A. I. O. C. II. p. 411*) and P. V. Kane (Introduction to his edition of the *Uttararāmacarita*).

Undue weight cannot be attached to the testimony of a single manuscript to prove that Umveka is identical with Bhavabhūti. We have already shown that Umveka cannot be identical with Maṇḍana-miśra and that he could not have been a direct pupil of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Dr. Mirashi tried to show that the chronology is incompatible for such an identification; but as pointed out earlier the revised date for Kamalaśīla makes it probable that Umveka, who lived after Maṇḍanamiśra and before Kamalaśīla, flourished in the first half of the seventh century which is the date of Bhavabhūti also, since that dramatist was a court-poet of King Yaśovarman of Kanauj.

It is true that Pratyakṣavarūpa Bhagavān identifies them in his commentary on Citsukha's *Tattvapradīpikā* (p. 265, N. S. edn. *Bhavabhūtiṛ Umvekah*). But in the text Citsukha refers to Bhavabhūti and Umveka separately, and from the context where the references occur, it seems that according to him the two are different.

In the beginning of Umveka's commentary on the *Śloka-vārttika* the popular verse from *Mālatīmādhava* finds a place.

ये नाम केचिदिह नः प्रथयन्त्यवज्ञां
 जानन्ति ते किमपि तान् प्रति नैष यतनः ।
 उत्पत्स्यतेऽस्ति मम कोऽपि समानधर्मा
 कालो ह्ययं निरवधिर्विपुला च पृथ्वी ॥

Prof. Kunhan Raja has pointed out that this need not necessarily mean Umveka's identity with Bhavabhūti. Though that portion of the first leaf of the unique manuscript of the work had broken off even before the completion of the first edition in 1940, we can assume the existence of the verse on the authority of the editor S. K. Ramanatha Sastri. But we cannot be sure whether it is part of Umveka's commentary, or whether it is added by the scribe. And there is nothing impossible in Umveka quoting a popular and apt verse from Bhavabhūti.

Karṇakagomin, an early Buddhist writer who was influenced by Umveka and who quotes passages from him, has a verse at the beginning of his commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* which is very similar to Bhavabhūti's verse and seems to be based on it.

यो मामवज्जयति कोऽपि गुणाभिमानी
जानात्यसौ किमपि तं प्रति नैष यत्नः ।
कश्चिद्भविष्यति कदाचिदनेन चार्थी
नानाधियां जगति जन्मवतां हि नान्तः ॥

This lends support to the genuineness of the verse at the beginning of Umveka's commentary, since it is likely that Karṇakagomin got the verse from the beginning of the *Tātparyaṭīkā* of Umveka which he consulted, rather than from the *Mālatīmādhava* directly.

Bhavabhūti who speaks at length about his scholarship in the various branches of learning does not say much about his scholarship in Mīmāṃsā.

यद्वेदाध्ययनं तथोपनिषदां साङ्ख्यस्य योगस्य च
ज्ञानं तत्कथनेन किं ? न हि ततः कश्चिद्गुणो नाटके ।

But his familiarity with the Mīmāṃsā philosophy cannot be questioned. Nānyadeva in his commentary on the *Mālatīmādhava* refers to the tradition making Bhavabhūti a Mīmāṃsaka.

शबरस्वामिप्रीत्या प्रकरणरत्नाकरेऽत्र भवभूतेः ।
सारोद्धारं मन्दरमकृतं कृती व्याकृतिं नान्यः ॥

(p. 245, NS. edn.)

In the Prologue to the *Uttararāmacarita* Bhavabhūti calls himself *Padavākya-pramāṇajña* indicating his scholarship in Mīmāṃsā also.

Thus all that we can say at present regarding the problem is that we have no definite evidence to prove their identity, although there is nothing which stands in the way of such an identity.

JAGANNATHA DASA - A STUDY

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Jagannatha Dasa, one of the celebrities among Haridasas of Karnataka. is the author of a number of devotional compositions among which *Harikathāmṛtasāra* is hailed as a monumental work encompassing in it the philosophy of the god-head as expounded in Vedas, Upanishads, Pañcarātra, *Mahābhārata*, *Rāmāyaṇa*, *Bhāgavata* and *Bhagavadgītā*. The work is narrated in an inimitable way with the background of the famous Madhvācārya's exposition of Viṣṇu, the supreme God.

Jagannatha Dasa's former name was Srinivasa. He was the son of Narasappa, the Kulakarni (accountant) of Byagavatta village, Manvi Taluk in Raichur Dt. He was born in 1727 A. D. Srinivasa became a sound scholar in both the languages, Sanskrit and Kannada. He used to compose slokas in Kannada and Sanskrit, extempore. He came under the protection of His Holiness, Varadendra Teertha of Mantralaya. After the completion of his studies he settled in Manvi and was called as Srinivasacarya. He was well versed in both the Mimamsas. Through a strange event in his life the conceit of learning gave way to humility. He became the chosen disciple of Gopaladasa. The new name given to him was Jagannatha Dasa by which he became popular. Jagannatha Dasa was a self-realised soul like Purandara Dasa and Kanaka Dasa.

In his *Harikathāmṛtasāra*, the code of worship of the god's image is given beautifully.

Devotion, wisdom, and dispassion are seen in all the songs called Keerthanas of Jagannathadasa.

His wonderful scholarship is revealed in each of the innumerable Keertanas composed by him. He was a combination of erudition, devotion and intuition.

He has composed a number of Keertanas with the mudrike (signet), Jagannatha Vithala.

The other compositions of Jagannatha dasa are *Tantrasāra*, and the famous *Harikathāmṛtasāra*. Herein the subtleties of the Madhya philosophy are narrated in clear terms in popular and simple Kannada verse.

The Dasa's life-story and his transformation into a humble and devoted Haridasa from an orthodox and haughty scholar are seen in the Keerthanas composed by the great Dasa himself.

The Dasa lays the mode of worship in his songs. From the minute description of his lord Jagannatha and the rapture with which he has sung we can infer that the Dasa had the vision of his ishta devata (the lord Jagannatha).

The *Harikathāmr̥tasāra*, the work of Jagannatha Dasa is considered the greatest among the works of the Haridasas on account of its treasuring the essence of Madhva philosophy in pleasing Kannada. All the important tenets of Madhva philosophy are enshrined in this great work.

The Dasa says that the supreme god is in all beings like the fragrance in the flowers and the fire in the wood and his presence is more visible in great souls. Hence the necessity of serving the devotees of the Lord. His apostrophe to God is śrutitātigabhimānī (the presiding deity of all the Vedas and Sastras), the one who does not reveal himself even to his consort Lakshmi, the ocean of unlimited wealth, and the very asylum of all virtues, who praises him incessantly but gives himself to the praise of his genuine devotees. The Dasa says it is impossible to describe his infinite compassion. It is through him that all the actions are performed. His compassion is likened to that of the mother who rushes and consoles her crying baby.

Thus the value of devotion and the greatness of Hari are described.

Being cētānācētana-vilakṣaṇa (beyond the essential characteristics of the sentient and the insentient beings) the novelty among the new things, beautiful among the beautiful, the rasa of the rasas, He, our father of unparalleled greatness, thus plays with us in this world.

The greatness of Hari is further described elaborately.

Hari is in the things of enjoyment. He is the giver of enjoyment. He, being present in the mind, makes the Jeeva enjoy. He describes the mode of worship of Hari thus.

The body is to be considered as puja-aids of Hari. The five elements are Hari's *pūjā sāmāgrī*. Contact with the senses (*viśaya sambandha*) is the cot. The pleasure felt from it is the bed. Self-surrender is the sleep. The sinful acts are the dust sticking to His *Padukas* (wooden footwear). The virtuous acts are the flowers. Anger is the incense, acts of devotion are the ornaments. Good intellect is the umbrella. Knowledge is the lamp, reciting of his

qualities is the *ārati* (waving of the lamp). This mode of worship says, Jagannatha Dasa, is the greatest among the Hari pūjās. This is to be followed continuously. The entire description is a long beautiful metaphor. The mode of worshipping the god in one's heart, the meditation of *virāṭrūpa cintanākrama* and the *bimba-bhāva* are explained afterwards.

Hari has never-ending forms. This secret is to be had from the preceptor and to be meditated accordingly. When Lakshmi herself does not come to know the end of these never-ending forms, how can an ordinary *jeeva* know it, says Jagannatha Dasa.

Knowing about God (*iśa-vijñāna*), devotion to the devotees of Hari, non-desire for the material enjoyments (*viṣaya nirāsa*), service to all the living beings with the knowledge that Hari's presence is in them - this is the Mahāyajña and this is Hari Pūjā.

Hari is omnipresent. All the waters in the world are the sacred waters, the entire world including the trees and mountains is the kṣētra, the holy place. All the living beings are the idols of Sri Hari. The things eaten by them are the offering (*naivedya*). Their normal movements are dance in honour of the God. One who knows all this is a Yogi.

His contemplation should be incessant. The person who thinks of Krishna, the beloved son of Devaki, while fondling the children, talking lovingly to his wife, enjoying while riding horse, palanquin, elephant or other vehicles and while at leisure, will not be approached by the messengers of Yama, the god of Death. Thus in the various chapters of the work, the different divine aspects of Sri Hari are dealt with fully.

There are innumerable universes, innumerable forms, innumerable parts of body, infinite virtues. Even if one takes into account a single universe, in that a single form, in that a single part of body, and in that part, a single nail and in that a single quality, that itself cannot be described fully by Brahmā himself. He, feeling short of words, raises his hands folded and with horripilation and tears of joy trickling down his face, the words becoming indistinct, says that the greatness of Hari is subtle.

Thus this is a unique work among the many compositions of the famous Haridasas.

“For the milk-made delicacy of Rāma’s Name, the sugar is Krishna’s Name, and the Name of Lord Vitthala, the ghee; mix, put it into your mouth and see the taste! Take the wheat of Ego, put it into the mill of dispassion and pound it into soft flour and prepare it into fine vermicelli, boil it, put it into the vessel of your heart, fill it with water of feeling and cook it with your intellect; take it on a plate and eat; and when you get a belching, think of the Lord Purandara Vitthala, who is of the form of Joy.”

—‘Ramanāma-pāyasakke’ in raga Pantuvarali, by
Purandaradāsa (1480 - 1564 A.D.)

TWO UNTRACED CITATIONS IN BRAHMASŪTRABHĀṢYA OF ŚAṆKARĀCĀRYA

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Ujjain

The two citations in Śaṅkarācārya's *bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra*, which form the subject of this paper have both been fortuitous finds. The first citation containing a clear statement by Ācārya Śaṅkara that Indra is the presiding deity of strength, followed by an elucidation of what it means, occurs in the *Pratardanādhikaraṇa*. The passage runs as follows :—

बलस्य चेन्द्रो देवता प्रसिद्धा । या च काचिद् बलकृतिरिन्द्रकर्मैव तदिति हि
वदन्ति ।

Besides the affirmation that Indra is *baladevatā*, we have here a very lucid explanation of the basic implications underlying the concept of *adhiṣṭhānadevatā*. When we say that Indra is the presiding deity of strength, says the *bhāṣya*, what we mean thereby is that he provides the motive force for all activities on the earth involving strength. This is tantamount to saying that all activities involving strength are Indra's own deeds.

I felt that the *bhāṣyakāra* must have quoted here the opinion of some respected authority. Therefore, I applied myself to the task of tracing the original source of this opinion.

I found the sentence in the *Nirukta*, in the course of Yāska's detailed discussion about the view of the early *Nairuktas* that there are only three *devatās* in all (तिस्र एव देवता इति नेरुक्ताः). While explaining *Bhakti-sāhacarya* of each of these three *devatas*, Yāska says :

अथैतानि इन्द्रमत्कीनि । अथास्य कर्मै रसानुप्रदानं वृत्रवधः । या च
का च बलकृतिरिन्द्रकर्मैव तत् । अथास्य संस्तविका देवाः ।

I would like to draw attention to a few important facts about this citation by Ācārya Śaṅkara.

(1) Yāska's text forms one of the chief foundations of Vedic exegesis and no interpreter of Vedic texts could have ever afforded to ignore it. Also we have concrete evidence in the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* itself to conclude that the *bhāṣyakāra* should have assimilated Yāska's text. In the *bhāṣya* on *जन्मादिसूत्र*, he actually mentions Yāska by name and refers to the six *bhāvavikāras* referred to and

discussed by him in the opening section of his *Nirukta*. The following is the relevant extract from the *bhāṣya* :

अन्येषामपि भावविकाराणां त्रिष्वेवान्तर्भाव इति जन्मस्थितिनाशानामिह ग्रहणम् ।
यास्कपरिपठितानां तु ' जायतेऽस्ति ' इत्यादीनां ग्रंथे तेषां जगतः स्थितिकाले संभा-
व्यामानत्वात् मूलकारणादुत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशा जगतो न गृहीताः स्युरित्याशङ्क्येत, तन्मा
शङ्कीति योत्पत्तिर्ब्रह्मणस्तत्रैव स्थितिः प्रलयश्च त एव गृह्यन्ते ।

(2) The minor discrepancy between the citation in the *bhāṣya* and the extant *Nirukta* text also deserves a brief notice—Whereas the *bhāṣya* has या च काचिद् बलकृतिः, the *Nirukta* reads या च का च. It is well known that the form of the present *Nirukta* text has been fixed by the illustrious commentary of Durgācārya, which was written centuries after Śaṅkarācārya. Students of *Nirukta* are also aware that the text of *Nirukta*, which Durga got was already corrupt and even mutilated in places. I should think, therefore, that the form of the sentence preserved in the *bhāṣya* should be taken as the correct text. This is confirmed by three important considerations :

- (i) It is more in consonance with Sanskrit idiom and yields better sense. या च का च of Durga looks extremely odd. We have I believe, no warrant for such employment of च after यद् and किम्.
- (ii) It is supported by some independent Mss. of *Nirukta*. It may reasonably be presumed, therefore, that these Mss. represent the text uninfluenced by Durga's commentary.
- (iii) The most important proof is furnished by two other parallel sentences in the *Nirukta* itself, where Yāska makes identical observations about two other *devatās*, 'Agni' and 'Āditya.' The corresponding statements about Agni and Āditya run as follows :

अथास्य कर्म, वहनं च हविषामावाहनं च देवतानाम् ।

यच्च किञ्चिद् दार्ष्टिर्विषयकम् अग्निकर्मैव तत् ॥ (Agni)

अथास्य कर्म, रसादानं रश्मिश्च रसधारणम् ।

यच्च किञ्चित् प्रवह्निषु आदित्यकर्मैव तत् ॥ (Āditya)

(3) It is also significant to note that modern translators and annotators of Śaṅkarācārya's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* have all been put off the scent by the explanation of *Ratnaprabhā* that इति हि वदन्ति in the *bhāṣya* refers to popular opinion.

(4) There is another interesting fact about a sentence, immediately preceding the one, which I have now traced to the *Nirukta*. The sentence in the *bhāṣya* ‘प्राणो वै बलम्’ इति हि विज्ञायते has a typical ‘*Nirukta*’-ring about it. As far as I know, this is not the normal trend of the *bhāṣyakāra*’s style. But in this context when he was about to make a citation from the *Nirukta*, he appears to have been consciously or unconsciously influenced by Yāska’s manner of writing.

I am sure, there are more such passages in other places where the *bhāṣyakāra* with his encyclopaedic sweep has drawn support from Vedic and Vedāṅga literature. I am equally certain that whereas many concrete citations from *Śruti* have been marked off as untraced, there are others too, like the present one, which are citations, but are not recognised as such. To give a concrete instance, in this very context, we have another sentence coming closely on the heels of the present one and closely patterned after it, where we have the same phrase इति हि वदन्ति. This sentence अप्रतिहतज्ञाना देवता इति हि वदन्ति, is obviously one such citation. Another similar random case, also remotely related to the nature of *devatās*, from the *Kampanādhikaraṇa* has also come to my notice – ‘वायौ हि पर्जन्यमावेन विवर्तमाने विद्युत्स्तनयितुः वृष्टयश्च यो विवर्तन्त इत्याचक्षते।’ We have some obvious citations from Kāvya literature too which deserves to be pursued. I may also mention here what my *paramaguru*, the late T. V. Ramachandra Diksitar once told me in the course of a conversation in Benaras about the sentence in the *Adhyāsabhāṣya* तमेतदेवंलक्षणमव्यासं पण्डिता अविद्यति मन्यन्ते. He said that the *bhāṣyakāra*’s reference here by *Paṇḍitāḥ* is to Patañjali, who defines Avidyā as अनित्याशुचिदुःखानात्मसु नित्यशुचि-सुखात्मस्यातिरविद्या.

2. The second passage is a citation in the *bhāṣya* on the *sūtra* सहकार्यन्तरविधिः पक्षेण तृतीयं तद्वत्तु दर्शनात् which contains a reference to Vālmīki. The conclusion of the *bhāṣyakāra* in this *adhikaraṇa* is that ‘mauna’ meaning ज्ञानतिशय is specifically laid down as a third accessory in the Upaniṣad, besides *bālyā* and *pāṇḍityā*. Against this an objection is raised that *mauna* here may refer to *sannyāsa* as the word *muni* refers to *sannyāsins*. In support of this meaning of the word *muni*, Āpastamba’s usage “गार्हस्थ्यमाचार्यकुले मौने वानप्रस्थम्” is cited. This objection is then ruled out by the *bhāṣyakāra* saying that ‘*muni*’ is also used with reference to persons, who are not *sannyāsins* and in support of this, he cites the passage वारमीकिमुनिपुत्रवः. What the *bhāṣyakāra* means to say is that the word *muni* is here applied to Vālmīki and Vālmīki was not a *sannyāsin*. The *bhāṣya* runs thus :

ननु मुनिशब्द उत्तमाश्रमवचनोऽपि श्रूयते 'गार्हस्थ्यमाचार्यकुलं मौनं वानप्रस्थम्'
इत्यत्र । न, 'वाल्मीकिर्मुनिपुङ्गवः' इत्यादिषु व्यभिचारदर्शनात् ।

It is evident from the context that the bhāṣyakāra has quoted a शिष्टप्रयोग here to vindicate his stand that the word muni is applicable to non-sannyāsins also.

Now, the extract cited by the bhāṣyakāra here is certainly closely reminiscent of the opening verse of Vālmiki *Rāmāyaṇa*. But it could not be identified with the *Rāmāyaṇa-śloka* on account of a vital difference. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* text we have मुनिपुङ्गवम् and it refers to Nārada, but in the *bhāṣya* we have मुनिपुङ्गवः, which apparently refers to Vālmiki. On account of this difference, it had to be presumed that this verse is a citation from some text other than *Rāmāyaṇa* and the source remained unknown and untraced.

It was at this stage that I happened to come across the *Bālakāṇḍa* volume of a critical edition of *Rāmāyaṇa* by Ābāji Bapūji Cāndorkar (alias Śrī Rāmacaraṇedāsa) of Poona published in 1953. (This undertaking was later given up when the Baroda Oriental Institute took up the work of critically editing the *Rāmāyaṇa* on a mighty comprehensive scale). The editor had given a special notice of a Ms. used for the edition, which, he thought, he got by the grace of Rāma and which he had called "Śrī-māṭṛkā." The text as preserved in this Ms. was different in many respects from the universally current one and in the editor's opinion, it had greater claims to represent Vālmiki's authentic text. तस्मादियं मातृका वाल्मीकिगठनेदीयसी स्यादिति प्रतिभाति). It is on this account that he had designated it by the auspicious index "श्री" and given its exhaustive readings separately as an independent Appendix. The first śloka of the *Rāmāyaṇa* in this Ms. reads as follows :

तपःस्वाध्यायनिरतस्तपस्वी वाग्निदां वरः ।

नारदं परिपप्रच्छ वाल्मीकिर्मुनिपुङ्गवः ॥

With this form of *Rāmāyaṇa* verse preserved in this very old and authentic Ms, I felt it would be very legitimate to infer that this was probably the text of the *Rāmāyaṇa* verse known to Ācārya Saṅkara and that he had actually quoted *Rāmāyaṇa* here.

ON AUMKĀRA - MAṆḌANAMIŚRA AND ŚAṆKARĀCĀRYA

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The doctrine of Śabdabrahman or Śabdādvaitavāda systematised and expounded by the celebrated grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari was ruthlessly condemned by almost all the philosophers of the post-Bhartṛhari period save Ācārya Maṇḍana Miśra,¹ the author of the Advaita classic, *Brahmasiddhi*. Writers belonging to diverse philosophical disciplines were busily engaged in demolishing the Śabdādvaitavāda and Kumārila, the reputed author of the *Mīmāṃsā Vārtikas* and Jayanta, the author of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, who directed their energy in exploding the Sphoṭavāda from every possible angle deserve special mention in this connection. Even Śaṅkarācārya could not spare the doctrine of Sphoṭa.² Maṇḍana Miśra's attitude towards the doctrine of Śabdabrahman was not only favourable but vindictive also. Impelled by a missionary zeal he wrote the *Sphoṭasiddhi* with the sole purpose of freeing the sphoṭa doctrine from the onslaughts of Kumārila and placing it on a more secure foundation. That Maṇḍana was under the grip of an irresistible urge to champion the cause of the doctrine of Śabdabrahman is evidenced even in his *Brahmasiddhi* where he maintains the Śabdabrahmavāda by deriving support from the Upaniṣads.³

Of the many words the Upaniṣads employ to indicate Brahman Akṣaram is one.⁴ Akṣaram when traced to its grammatical source, means the Immutable or the Imperishable⁵ and it clearly unfolds the upaniṣadic concept of Brahman enshrined in words like Dhruva and Kūṭastha. As such Akṣara is a yaugika (derivative) word with reference to Brahman. Sometimes the Upaniṣads use the word Akṣaram in its

1. Vyāsa, the author of the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* also was favourably disposed towards the Sphoṭavāda. Vide his *bhāṣya* on Y.S. III. 17.

2. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, I. 3.28.

3. *Brahmasiddhi* I. 1.5. pp. 16-17, Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Series No. 4.

4. Cf. *Munḍ. Up.* I. 1.5. अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते
Bṛh. Up. III. 8.9. एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशंसने गार्गि

5. Cf. न क्षीयते न क्षरतीति वाक्षरम्, *Mahābhāṣya*, Ch. 1, Ahnika 2.
Cf. *Nir.* XIII 12; also Śaṅkara on *Bṛh. Up.* III. 8.8.

more widely understood sense, the syllable or speech-sound. With reference to syllable Akṣaram will hardly admit any grammatical analysis and therefore it has to be considered as a rūḍha (conventional) word.⁶

Akṣaram is one of the words by which Maṇḍana describes the nature of Brahman in the opening verse of the *Brahmasiddhi*. He elucidates Akṣara in both the senses referred to above. The amplification in the light of the conventional sense is based on the doctrine of Śabdabrahman and has been accomplished in an elaborate manner. Maṇḍana would take Akṣara as signifying the sacred syllable Aum or speech (vāk) in general. His exposition consists of two parts; in the first part he tries to establish that the Brahman of the Upaniṣads is of the nature of speech on the authority of certain Upaniṣadic passages and in the second part on purely rationalistic grounds.

It is well known that no writer on Advaita had ever tolerated the view that Brahman is of the nature of Śabda. It is a matter of great interest to know how Maṇḍana endeavours to accommodate within the fortress of Advaita a doctrine that has been discarded down the ages by all Advaitins alike. It also remains to see to what extent the Upaniṣadic passages referred to by Maṇḍana would lend support to the stand he has taken regarding the nature of Brahman and how far he succeeds in this venture. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Maṇḍana's interpretations of the Upaniṣadic passages in question and see how they compare with those of Śaṅkarācārya.

Maṇḍana observes : the word Akṣara⁷ indicates speech (in general) as the nature of Brahman, for the particular (the syllable Aum) implies the general. That Brahman is of speech could be clearly understood from the identity of Brahman with Aumkāra spoken of in the *Praśna Upaniṣad* परं चापरं च ब्रह्म यदौकारः⁸ meaning that Brahman higher as well as lower is Aumkāra. One should not take the identification of Brahman with Aumkāra as merely figurative on the ground that a real identification of the word (Aum) with its sense (Brahman) is inconceivable. According to grammar a word ending with the suffix-kāra signifies the stem⁹ and never the sense conveyed by the stem. Therefore Aumkāra stands for the syllable Aum and not for the sense expressed by it.

6. Cf. वर्णस्य अक्षरमिति संज्ञा क्रियते, *Mahabhāṣya*, Ch. 1, Ahnika 2.

7. *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 16.

8. *Pr. Up.* V. 2.

9. Kātyāyana's Vār. on Pāṇini III 3.108.

Under these circumstances one cannot take Aum in any sense (other than the syllable Aum) that might facilitate a figurative identity. The identification is real and it becomes intelligible only when Brahman would be of the nature of speech (Aum).

At this stage the pūrvapakṣin recalls the traditional interpretation of the above passage and points out that Aum has been recommended, to men of ordinary intellectual powers, only as an object (ālambana) in which Brahman is to be meditated upon for, Brahman, being devoid of any attribute whatsoever, can never become an object of meditation. Brahman is to be meditated upon in its symbol (pratīka) Aum, just as one's favourite deity is meditated upon in its symbol, the idol. Meditation upon Aum as Brahman is an indispensable means for the attainment of Brahman. On account of its importance in the attainment of Brahman Aum itself has been eulogised as Brahman. Hence only in a figurative sense it has been said that Aum is Brahman.

Or the identification can be substantiated in another way. Aum is the name (abhidhāna) of Brahman. It is to be meditated upon with its name Aum. Because of the invariable relation of the word to its sense Aum has been spoken of as Brahman itself. In any way the identification cannot be anything but figurative.

Maṇḍana accepts the pūrvapakṣin's statement but with an amendment. For, the pūrvapakṣin's interpretation does not hold good in all instances where the Upaniṣadiic texts identify Brahman with Aum. To drive this point Maṇḍana classifies the Upaniṣadic passages under two heads, viz, those wherein Aum is meant as an accessory to meditation and those wherein it is not so. In passages like ओमित्यात्मनं द्यायय¹⁰ and ओमिति युञ्जीत¹¹ where Aum is mentioned as an aid to meditation the identification is apparent and hence Aum is used in a secondary sense-symbol or pratīka. On the contrary the *Taittirīya* passages like ओमिति ब्रह्म¹² and ओमितीदं सर्वम्¹³ where no verb indicating the accessory character of Aum is to be met with the identification is real and there is no need to invest Aum with a secondary sense. It cannot be urged that even in such cases verbs like dhyāyata or upāsita are to be supplied in order to maintain consistency in interpretation. For, there is no valid authority that would support such an interpretation. On the other hand the interpretation would involve the serious

10. *Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 2.6.

11. *Mahānār. Up.* 24 2.

12. *Tait. Up.* I. 8.1.

13. *Tait. Up.* I. 8 1.

defect of what is known as disregarding the sense prevented by the words themselves and presuming the sense not warranted by the words (śrutahāni and aśrutakalpanā). Interpreted as they are the *Tattiriya* passages will not purport an identification other than real. Aum̐ therefore is absolutely identical with Brahman or All (Sarvam) as the case may be.

The *Chāndogya* passage beginning with तद्यथा शङ्कुना¹⁴ and closing with ओंकार एवेदं सर्वम् also purports real identity of All (Sarvam) with Aum̐. The passage means, "As all the parts of the leaf are permeated with the stalk so also the entire domain of speech is permeated with the syllable Aum̐. All this (universe) is verily Aum̐kāra." Here the śruti shows that Aum̐ is the truth underlying the world of speech on the ground that the entire domain of speech is permeated with Aum̐. It concludes that all this (Sarvam) is Aum̐ because of the invariable association of the world of forms (rūpa) with that of speech (nāma).

Although this *Chāndogya* passage speaks of the identity between All (Sarvam) and Aum̐, it is really an identity between Brahman and Aum̐ for All is none other than Brahman as may be seen from सर्व खल्विदं ब्रह्म,¹⁵ तस्मात् तत्सर्वमभवम्,¹⁶ अ त्मैवेदं सर्वम्¹⁷ and इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा.¹⁸ To Maṇḍana Sarvam and Brahman are convertible and it is evident from his interpretation of the following *Praśna* passage that he considers them as more or less synonyms.

Now it may easily be seen that the identity (of Brahman with Aum̐) that Maṇḍana has sought to establish on the authority of the *Praśna Upaniṣad* turns out to be apparent as the passage contains the verb abhidhyāyīta in the succeeding sentences.

The presence of abhidhyāyīta does not in any way affect Maṇḍana's contention. The sentence containing abhidhyāyīta,¹⁹ it is to be noted, only follows the sentence purporting the identity of Brahman with Aum̐ (sarvātmabhāva). i. e. The injunction on the meditation on Aum̐ and the identity of Brahman with Aum̐ are conveyed by two different sentences, each having a complete sense in

14. *Chānd. Up.* II. 23.3.

15. *Ib.* III. 14.1.

16. *Bṛh. Up.* I. 4.10.

17. *Chānd. Up.* VIII. 25.2.

18. *Bṛh. Up.* II. 4.6.

19. परं पुरुषमभिध्यायीत, *Pr. Up.* V. 5.

itself and having no syntactical connection with each other. Only in instances such as ओमित्येवं द्यायथ आत्मानम् where meditation and Brahman-Aum identity are conveyed by one and the same sentence the identity will have to be considered as apparent. Therefore there is nothing in the present instance to prevent the identity from being real.

It may be pressed that the sentence परं चापरं च etc. being an arthavāda cannot claim for itself an existence independent from that of परं पुरुषमभिध्यायीत with which it has to enter into a syntactical unit and constitute a single sentence. Injunction on meditation and identity being thus brought within the scope of one sentence, the identity will turn out to be only figurative. Sentences conveying such identifications do not have a purport of their own and are mere eulogies on what is expressed by the vidhivākya.

The arthavāda character is not potent enough to divert परं चापरं etc. of its purport - real Brahman-Aum identity. Eulogistic statements of the abhūtārthavāda type as यजमानः प्रस्तरः whose purport is not intelligible cannot have a purport of their own. But those of the bhūtārthavāda type as अग्निर्हिंसह्य मेषजम् are valid matter-of-fact statements and so do have a purport of their own.

Since the identity conveyed by it happens to be the true purport of several Upaniṣadic texts, परं चापरं च etc. belongs to the bhūtārthavāda type and hence is purportful of a real Brahman-Aum identity. Thus so long as Sarvam-Brahman identity does not come into conflict with any other pramāṇa it has to be taken as real and it is not proper to relegate it to the status of an apparent one.

This Sarvam-Aum identity cannot be ascertained by perception and other instruments of cognition. It is super-sensuous and belongs exclusively to the region of the Śāstra. There is little room therefore to question the identity on the ground that all the objects of the universe would have been perceived or inferred as the syllable Aum if the identity were to be real. A fact established by one pramāṇa can never be negated by another pramāṇa within whose range it never falls.

It is necessary to note at this stage that the identity of Brahman or Sarvam is not with the sound Aum; but as observed already with the universal principle (sāmānya) of speech which lies beyond the scope of perception and other pramāṇas.

Further the following sentence तस्मात् विद्वान्²⁰ etc. prescribes meditation upon Aum to the one who has known. i.e. the possession of the knowledge (of some thing) is the qualification for one who aspires after Brahman. What is that knowledge? According to the context the knowledge mentioned here will refer to only what has been spoken of in the immediately preceding sentence. Therefore it follows that परं चापरं च etc. speaks of the identity of Brahman with Aum the knowledge of which is a qualification (viśeṣaṇa) to the one bent on meditating upon Aum. Knowledge of something apparent becoming an essential qualification is unthinkable. In the light of what has been said it is but proper to consider the Brahman-Aum identity, real.

Śaṅkara's interpretations of the Upaniṣadic passages under consideration may be noted briefly as follows. Regarding the *Mundaka* passage ओमित्येवं द्यायथ आत्मानम् Śaṅkara observes that Aum is the focus of meditation (ālambana) and one should meditate upon the self in Aum. On the *Taittirīya* passage he observes that Aum is the symbol of Brahman and is comparable to the image of Viṣṇu and other Gods. One should think that the sound Aum is Brahman because Aum is this All. The identification is based on the common characteristic of pervasiveness. Brahman pervades the whole universe. Aum pervades the whole universe in that it pervades the entire domain of speech which in turn pervades the whole of objects.

On the *Chāndogya* passage तद्यथा शुक्लना etc. Śaṅkara observes that the world of speech is permeated with Aum, the symbol of Brahman. Since all the objects of the universe, being the manifestations of the Supreme Being, are not different from it and therefore are mere names, it easily follows that Aum is this all. Reference to the story of Prajāpati's brooding on the worlds etc. in the preceding sentence is to eulogise Aum. A eulogy is intelligible only in connection with a vidhi. The vidhi in the present instance is on the meditation upon Brahman in its symbol Aum.

On परं चापरं च etc. Śaṅkara says that Brahman, higher as well as lower, is but the syllable Aum since Aum is a symbol. Brahman higher, since it defies falling within the range of Śabda and other pramāṇas and is devoid of all distinctions caused by attributes, cannot be comprehended by the mind. Some concrete entity is necessary to enable the aspirant for meditation. It is only on this account that Aum is recommended as the focus of meditation and its status in this regard is similar to that of an image in the worship of deities.

So also is the case with Brahman lower. Therefore it is said in a secondary sense that Brahman is but Aum. Aum is the nearest symbol of Brahman. The one who knows that Aum is Brahman is sure to attain Brahman through meditation on Aum.

It is worth noting the differences in the interpretations of Maṇḍana and Śaṅkara on the Upaniṣadic passages in question.

1. Śaṅkara does not aim at classifying the Upaniṣadic passages as Maṇḍana has done. To him all passages that speak of an identity of Brahman with Aum prescribe Aum as a symbol (ālam-bana) to meditate upon Brahman irrespective of the presence or otherwise of a verb indicating the accessory character of Aum. It is only a pratika and therefore the identification is but apparent. All such passages contain an injunction on the meditation (Upāsana) upon Brahman. He holds the same view in his interpretations on the passages conveying Brahman-Aum identity in the *Kaṭha*²¹ and *Māṇḍūkya*²² Upaniṣads. He is consistent throughout.

2. By Aum Śaṅkara invariably understands the perceptible speech sound (śabdarūpam) whereas Maṇḍana understands the super-sensuous principle underlying speech.

3. According to Śaṅkara the first sentence of the *Taittirīya* passage contains an injunction on Brahman-Aum meditation and the second one establishes the Brahman-Aum identity by means of reasoning. Maṇḍana it appears finds in one and the same passage references to both Brahman-Aum and Brahman-Sarvam identifications spoken of in two different Upaniṣads—*Praśna* and *Chāndogya*.

We may now consider the Upaniṣadic passages one by one and try to understand the nature of Aum in the identification.

According to Maṇḍana the presence of the word dhyāyatha in the *Muṇḍaka* passage indicates that Aum is a symbol of Brahman. We may add here that the metaphor of the bow employed in the two preceding mantras²³ also establishes the accessory character of Aum in the act of meditation. The self (ātman) becoming one with Brahman (tanmaya) through meditation (upāsana) on Aum is spoken of as the arrow (śara) merging into the target (lakṣya) through the action (sandhāna) of the bow (dhanus or the great weapon) of the Upaniṣads. Evidently the identification in the passage is only figurative.

21. *Kaṭha Up.* I. 2. 15-17.

22. *Māṇḍ. Up.* 1,

23. *Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 2. 3-4.

The *Taittiriya* text ओमिति ब्रह्म etc. is immediately followed by a long passage eulogising Aum by referring to its invariable utterance in all religious acts. The eulogy indicates that the text purports an injunction on the meditation of Aum as otherwise it would become irrelevant.²⁴ Meditation on Brahman in the three vyāhrtis Bhūh, Bhuvaḥ and Suvaḥ is the subject of the three preceding anuvākas.²⁵ That Aum is invariably associated with the vyāhrtis is too well known to be mentioned. It is but natural that the Upaniṣad takes up Aum after the vyāhrtis.

The context as well as the subject matter of the three preceding sections establish beyond doubt that meditation on Brahman is ordained in the passage under consideration and Aum is recommended as the pratika on account of its pervasiveness (idam sarvam), a characteristic it shares with Brahman. Pervasiveness of Aum (viśvarūpaḥ) over the region of speech has been already alluded to in the anuvāka beginning with यः छन्दसामृषभो विश्वरूपः.²⁶ In the same anuvāka it is said that Aum is the sheath of Brahman (brahmaṇaḥ kośaḥ). The description of Aum as the sheath of Brahman clearly brings out the status of Aum in regard to Brahman. The sheath contains the sword. Aum containing Brahman would mean that Aum signifies Brahman. Aum is the signifier and Brahman is the signified. The foregoing consideration of the *Taittiriya* text reveals two things that Aum is (1) the signifier and (2) the symbol of Brahman. Therefore the identification of Brahman with Aum is but figurative.

Like the *Muṇḍaka* and *Taittiriya* texts the *Chāndogya* does not contain any clue that might throw some light on the nature of Aum. In the absence of any positive evidence the context is the infallible guide and the status of Aum has to be decided by a careful study of the context. The *Chāndogya* passage under consideration follows the sentence ब्रह्मसंस्थोऽमृतत्वमेति²⁷. In between the two passages is a short narration of Prajāpati's successive brooding on the worlds, the three Vedas and the three vyāhrtis and finally the discovery of Aum, the essence of the entire universe. The story has no connection with what has been said in the preceding and succeeding sentences and as such its introduction in this context serves no purpose

24. Cf. यद्विधीयते तत् स्तूयते

25. *Tait. Up.* I. 5-7.

26. *Ib.* 1.4.

27. *Chānd Up.* II. 23.1.

other than extolling the greatness of Aum. The passage तद्यथा शुक्नुना etc. has to be taken as a direct continuation of ब्रह्मसंस्थोऽमृतत्वमेति. The one who is established in Brahman attains immortality. Brahman alone is immortal. Immortality consists in getting firmly established in Brahman. It makes no sense therefore in saying that one established in Brahman attains Brahman. Attainment of Brahman thus becomes unintelligible if the word Brahman is taken in its most well known sense—the Absolute of the Upaniṣads. Unless it is taken in some other sense it is difficult to make out a sense from the passage. It therefore becomes imperative on the part of the śruti to make clear what it means by Brahman.

Attainment presupposes two things—the one who attains and the one that is attained. The attained no doubt is Brahman, the attainment of which is the centre of the teaching of all the Upaniṣads. The one who attains is qualified by brahmasamsthā. Brahmasamsthā is a bahuvrīhi compound and the sentence will have to be construed as यस्य ब्रह्मणि संस्था स अमृतत्वमेति. Brahmasamsthā is the qualification for the one who attains Brahman. Brahmasamsthā in the context would only mean the means through which one attains Brahman as in instances like धनवान् सुखमेति। Brahman therefore signifies that entity the establishment in which is the means to attain Brahman. What then is meant by Brahman? It is to this question the śruti furnishes reply ओंकार एवेदं सर्वम्.²⁸

Brahman therefore is Aumkāra. Samsthā, firm establishment (Samyak-sthitiḥ) in relation to the syllable Aum will signify the uninterrupted meditation on the syllable Aum. ब्रह्मसंस्थोऽमृतत्वमेति means that the one whose meditation is focussed on Aum attains Brahman. Aum therefore is the object of meditation (ālambana) and hence the symbol of Brahman. The identification of sarvam with Aum is not different from the identification of Brahman with Aum since Brahman is Sarvam. The identification of Brahman with Aum can be only figurative. Thus meditation being the purport as vouched by the context, one must understand an injunction on meditation.

As in the case of the *Chāndogya*, context will be our guiding principle in ascertaining the nature of the Brahman-Aum identification spoken of in the *Praśna* text. The sentence under consideration is immediately followed by तस्माद्ब्रह्मानेतन्नैवायतनैकतरमन्वेति.²⁹ The enlightened person attains either of the two through this only. The pronoun

28. *Chānd. Up.* II. 23. 3.

29. *Pr. Up.* V. 2.

ekatara either of the two) refers to Brahman, para and apara and etena therefore refers to Aumkāra. Etena with the instrumental termination qualifies the noun āyatana, another instrumental ending. Both the instrumental endings indicate the relation that Aum bears to the verb anveti. The word āyatana describes the nature of Aum and it means support. The sentence will therefore mean 'Through this support, Aum, the enlightened attains either of the two Brahman. Support of what? The verb abhidhyāyita is found in association with Aum in sentences preceding and succeeding the one under consideration. Abhidhyāna means intense meditation. Abhidhyāna in all its detail being the subject of the entire section the verb abhidhyāyita is to be supplied and the sentence will have to be construed as तस्मात् (यो) विद्वान् एतेनैवायतनेन (अभिध्यायीत स) एकरमन्वेति. It therefore easily follows that Aum is the support of intense meditation (abhidhyāna). In other words Aum is the focus at which Brahman is to be meditated upon. Aum is the pratika (symbol) of Brahman meditation. The juxtaposition of औंकारेण and āyatanena in the concluding verse of the section also points to the same conclusion.³⁰ The symbolic character of Aum being made explicit by the significant use of the pronoun etena and the word āyatana in the following sentence the identification cannot be anything but figurative.

The section opens with a question by Śaibya Satyakāma regarding the fruit of life-long meditation on Aum. The remaining portion of the entire section embodies Sage Pippalāda's answer to this question. His question makes it evident that Satyakāma knows meditation alone and nothing about the *modus operandi*. Therefore Pippalāda has to explain him the meditation in detail. As the passage is given in answer to the question on meditation it cannot contain anything having no bearing, direct or indirect, on meditation. As otherwise it would not be a consistent reply. If the identification were to be real it has no relevancy in the context. Nor has it any purpose to serve in the meditation upon Brahman in its symbol. Owing to its indispensability in the attainment of Brahman Aum is elevated to the level of Brahman. The sentence is a eulogy (arthavāda) on Aum and the identification of the means (Aum) with the end (Brahman) is only figurative.

As already noticed Maṇḍana holds that knowledge of the real identity of Brahman with Aum is a qualification for the candidate aspiring for Brahman-meditation. Maṇḍana forgets that it is the meditation on the symbol that is ordained in the passage. Symbol meditation (pratīkopāśana) is based on the difference of the symbol

and the object meditated upon. Knowledge of the real identity of Brahman with Aum is inimical to symbol-meditation and it will annihilate the notion that Aum is but a symbol. Aum will then cease to be a symbol of Brahman.³¹

A comparison of the passage under consideration with a passage in the *Kāthopaniṣad* having more or less an identical import throws much light on the issue on hand.

एतद्वेवाक्षरं ब्रह्म एतद्वेवाक्षरं परम् ।
 एतद्वेवाक्षरं ज्ञात्वा यो यदिच्छति तस्य तत् ॥
 एतदालम्बनं श्रेष्ठमेतदालम्बनं परम् ।
 एतदालम्बनं ज्ञात्वा ब्रह्मलोके महीयते ॥ ³²

Maṇḍana, it was seen, maintains that the knowledge indicated by the word vidvān in तस्माद्विद्वान् is the knowledge of the identity of Brahman with Aum spoken of in परं चापरं च etc. The *Kāṭha* text एतदालम्बनं ज्ञात्वा is the exact counterpart of विद्वान् and the object of the knowledge indicated by Vidvān. Vidvān as such means the one who knows Aum as the symbol (ālambana) of Brahman. The above comparison shows that the identification in the *Praśna Upaniṣad* is only figurative. Comparison of passages found in different texts and having identical import and interpreting the less clear text in accordance with the more clear ones is one of the principles adhered to by the author of the *Brahmasūtras* in the interpretation of Upaniṣadic texts.³³

Further the *Praśna* is said to be the Brāhmaṇa of the *Muṇḍaka*. The accessory character of Aum in Brahman-meditation is obvious in the *Muṇḍaka*. The *Praśna* being an amplification of the *Muṇḍaka* cannot hold a different view on the nature of Aum. If the identification in the *Muṇḍaka* is figurative there is no need to mention that it is so in the *Praśna* also.

It is worthwhile in this connection to notice what the author of the *Brahmasūtras* has to say on this issue. Maṇḍana, we have seen, contends that Brahman is of the nature of Aum (speech) on

31. Cf. *Br. Sū.* IV. 1. 4.

32. *Kāṭh. Up.* I. 2. 16-17.

33. Cf. अन्यार्थं तु जैमिनिः प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्यामपि चैवमेके *Br. Sū.* I. 4. 18.

and शरीरश्चोभयेऽपि हि भेदेनैनमधीयते *Br. Sū.* I. 2. 20.

the basis of the use of the word denoting syllable, Akṣaram, with reference to Brahman in texts dealing with Brahman and in support of his contention he cites Upaniṣadic texts which speak of the identity of Brahman with Aum̐. In the Akṣarādhikaraṇa (I. 3. 10-12) Bādarāyaṇa discusses the meaning of Akṣaram appearing in texts dealing with Brahman. Bādarāyaṇa concludes that the word Akṣaram should never be taken to mean the syllable Aum̐ since the description of Akṣaram is absolutely incompatible with the nature of Aum̐. In short Akṣaram is not Aum̐. Maṇḍana's contention that Akṣaram is Aum̐, is opposed to the views of the author of the *Brahmasūtras* and therefore a real identity of Brahman with Aum̐ cannot be maintained.

The foregone examination of Upaniṣadic passages show that they cannot be relied upon as positive evidences in establishing that Brahman is of the nature of speech since the identity they speak of is not real. Śaṅkara's interpretation of the passages are natural and are fully borne out by the context. Maṇḍana's interpretations are departures from the context and look rather odd. Maṇḍana has a soft corner in his heart for the Śabdabrahmavāda and he wants to show, somehow or other, that it has the authority of the Upaniṣads. It is his overflowing sympathy towards the Śabdabrahmavāda that has made him disregard the context in his Upaniṣadic interpretations and overlook the great authorities like Bādarāyaṇa.

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SUPLATION OF THE ILLUSION IN THE SAT-KHYĀTI-VĀDA

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The akhyātivādins, ātmakhyātivādins and the anyathākhyātivādins who hold the *sat-khyāti-vāda* (viz., the theory what is perceived in an illusory perception is existent), as against the *asaṅkhyātivāda* do not realize that they cannot possibly account for the sublation of the silver, for instance, that appears in the shell. While admitting unreality of that which appears in illusion, these theorists somehow want to retain the existence of silver. The akhyātivādins take shell-silver to be real as remembrance. The ātmakhyātivādins deem it to be real as cognition. The anyathākhyātivādins consider it to be existent elsewhere or in some other positive form. All these explanations take the presented silver away from the place where it appears and place it somewhere else. They are constrained to do so, of course, without recording any great success in offering a satisfactory explanation of error.

The difficulty arises for them because of their presuppositions. They are stubborn in holding that the illusory object, i.e., shell-silver is existent in some manner and is known as such by knowledge.

The sat-khyātivādins do make a distinction between valid and invalid knowledge. Invalid knowledge is incorrect knowledge. Whence is this incorrectness in knowledge? Is it the failure to grasp the object in entirety (*artha-nyūnatva*)? Or is it that something more than the entire object is grasped (*artha-adhikatva*)? If the first, no cognition can claim to have grasped the entire object in all its aspects. If it be the latter, it follows that knowledge has overreached itself and that there is an excess of this knowledge which has no corresponding object. A knowledge with no object for it is hardly worth the name of knowledge. The word *jñāna* means something through which an object is known.¹ Hence even though a knowledge does not reveal the whole object, yet to the extent it reveals, the object corresponding to that must be admitted to exist. But it is impossible that there is a knowledge without an object.² It follows then that there is no such thing as

1. Jñāyate 'rtho 'neneti hi jñānam; ato jñeyārthābhāve tajjñānamapi na syāt-
Iṣṭa-siddhi, p. 105.

2. Jñānam ca nārthaśūnyamasti - *ibid*.

incorrect knowledge for the satkhyātivādins. And since there is knowledge of shell-silver, shell-silver must exist. The very fact of its appearing in knowledge is its proof.³ Conversely, if silver is not there, its cognition, too will not be there.

To the argument that silver is admitted to exist but not in the form of shell, it only means that there is no such knowledge corresponding to the manner in which the silver is not. The satkhyātivādins do not accept even negative cognitions as devoid of objects. What are we to say about positive cognition? Thus, on the presuppositions of the satkhyātivādin there is no unreality for the so-called, illusory silver like the real silver itself. Otherwise real silver will become unreal, for the satkhyātivādin is not able to point out any difference between them.

But he may attempt to reinstate the existent quality of silver by saying that the first cognition "*this is silver*" testifies to the existence of silver though the second sublating cognition "*this is not silver*" negates it. If, on this account, there is silver both existent in the form of shell and does *not* exist so, it clearly must be said to have a dual nature of existence and non-existence at the same time because in whatever way the silver might be known-existent or non-existent, these knowledges must have contents corresponding to them. But this non-existent element cannot be admitted by the sat-khyātivādin into anything that is given in knowledge.

The judgment "*this is silver*" expresses the identity of silver and shell. By virtue of this judgment, the reality of silver appearing in the form of shell must be accepted, because of being so given in knowledge. Even granting unreality for the identity of silver with shell, the very usage of the illusoriness of the silver is dependent on the fact of the illusory object being presented and sublated where it was presented and thus, the satkhyātivādin will not be able to talk in judgments like "*the silver is unreal because of its non-existence,*" which is the only well-known form of sublation, because for him, the silver is real; and therefore, the unreality etc., will have to be attributed only to that *identity* of silver with shell.

If it is said that the identification of silver with shell is illusory because of the non-existence really of any such identity and that this illusoriness and non-existence that really belong only to the false identification, are transferred by a figurative usage to silver

also which is real and that the usage thus becomes "the silver is unreal", the reply is that such a figurative usage can as well be extended to the real shell also. For, like silver, it is one of the counter-correlates of a false identification. It is as much a partner in the falsity and as much culpable. What applies to silver applies equally to shell, and *vice versa*. If it is argued that shell is directly perceived in its own place as it is even after sublation of illusion has taken place, but not so silver, the fact of silver being perceived directly is also undeniable in some places for the sat-khyātivādin who accepts the reality of silver. Otherwise it cannot occur even as the content of memory. If it is said that the silver, though seen elsewhere, is not seen as identified with shell, the same can be said of shell also. It is not experienced as one with silver in that other place. If it were, it will be real and there will be no sublation of its identification with the silver as "this is not silver." In other words, there is no question of identification of real shell with real silver elsewhere.

If it is said that unlike silver the shell seen in the illusion is recognized as such even after the illusion has been sublated, it follows that because of the absence of recognition of silver as persisting after illusion unlike shell, it is unreal like the identity itself. And this is not sat-khyātivāda any more.

Hitherto, the discussion was proceeding granting the sublation of identity only and it was pointed out that the fact, universally admitted, of the sublation of silver remains a riddle for the sat-khyātivādin. Now it remains for us to show that the supposed sublation of identity too is unwarranted. Indeed, the sublating judgement is not of the form, "there is no identity" but only of the form "this is not silver." But then it has been seen that silver is real and thus remains unsublated. In a similar way, if identity is given in perception, then on the satkhyātivādin's presupposition, it should, *ipso facto* be real, in which case there is no question of its being subject to sublation. It boils down to this that there is nothing sublatabile under the sun since all cognitions were alike valid for the satkhyātivādin.

It may still be argued here that the identity is certainly sublated. It is true that the negating judgment is "this is not silver" and not "this is no identity." But this is because the illusion did not start as, "there is identity between these two," which implies the cognition of two things separately. How then can there be identity? Illusion, on the other hand, starts with a coordination, *sāmānādhikarānya* as "this is silver." As the illusion is "this is silver," so the sublation is of the form "this is not silver."

The sublation should be commensurate with the illusion. Thus it is only the identity that is sublated.

In the light of this attempted justification, one may like to know whether the sublating cognition "this is not silver" arises when difference between shell and silver is apprehended or when it is not apprehended. If the second, did the cognition of difference alone sublate the illusion? Or something else? Not the cognition of difference alone because this cognition is not of the nature of denial. It cannot be said that the cognition of difference sublates the knowledge of identity because they are opposed to each other; then, the knowledge of difference will not obtain in an object where there is knowledge of identity, because of the conflict itself. If it did, it means that there is no conflict, and thus the cognition of difference will not sublate that of identity. If the cognition of difference arising with reference to the object where knowledge of identity has already arisen, is the sublator of the latter, then, the knowledge of identity as "this is silver" arising subsequently with reference to that object will sublate the knowledge of difference. In other words, knowledge of identity and knowledge of difference are not the sublators of each other. Both have their own subject, being cognitions, and both are valid in their own way. But they are not related as sublator and sublated. One who has got the certainty of the knowledge of identity as "this is silver" will have no knowledge as "this is different from silver" and *vice versa*. Even if one has, it does not harm. Doing no harm, it is not an illusion. Otherwise there cannot be an object having many forms, having both identity and difference, because of their mutual conflict. Thus, it follows that the knowledge of difference by itself is not the sublator of identity.

To revert to the first two alternatives proposed, viz., does the sublating cognition arise when difference between shell and silver is apprehended or when it is not, the second of these alternatives has been answered. The first alternative is answered presently.

Difference between two things is their mutual non-existence. Shell is not silver and *vice versa*. If the cognition of this mutual non-existence is said to be the sublator of identity, this will mean that all cognitions of mutual non-existence will be sublators. This perhaps may not be the case when the mutual nature of the two objects, e.g., shell and silver, is first known and when the knowledge of mutual non-existence may act as sublator. But again the doubt is: does this sublating knowledge of mutual non-existence arise in the objects which are the objects of knowledge of mutual existence i.e. as existents in themselves or elsewhere?

If the second, the knowledge of mutual non-existence can operate only in the objects wherein the knowledge of mutual existence has not arisen. How can then this negation sublate another knowledge with which it has no connection or which is not its sphere? Surely, the knowledge of mutual non-existence of pot and cloth does not sublate the knowledge of pot and cloth.

If the first, i.e., if the cognition of mutual negation has the same objects cognized by positive knowledge as existent in themselves, it will result in the self-contradiction of the negative cognition having a positive content and thus becoming a positive cognition. And the positive cognition will only be strengthened by the support that the negative cognition lends to it by having the same existent content. Hence, the positive and the negative cognitions cannot have the same object. If the negative cognition has a different content, it will not be a sublator like a negative cognition (i.e., cognition having the non-existent as its content) which arises when there is the non-cognition of what is ordinarily perceptible. If it is said that cognition of negation which arises when there is the non-cognition of what is obtained reveals the non-existence of the object in different place and time, but that in the present context, the cognition of negation reveals the non-existence of the object in that place itself, even thus, if it has a different content, it does not sublate; if it has the same content, it only strengthens the verdict of the positive cognition.

Besides, two questions that arise here are (1) is the identity of shell and silver sublated in illusion? or (2) is the identity of 'this' aspect and silver? Not obviously the first because that identity has not been apprehended. Nor even the second, because that will involve the apprehension of mutual difference which does not happen at the time of the illusion. Indeed, one becoming the other is thinkable only when there are two entities; and not when there is only one. If it is suggested that one locus of the two aspects appears, that does no harm, for that is not their mutual nature or identity and the identity is not sublated. Surely the sublation is not of the form: "There is no locus of the aspects." If the locus it is that is sublated, by its sublation both shell and silver are sublated because of being its aspects. This is undesirable for the satkhyātivādin. Nor is it observed in experience.

It may be urged that if the locus is the aggregate of the two aspects, then when there is the sublation of the aspects there will be the sublation of the locus. But it is not so. It is a different one coming into being by the mutual identity of shell and silver at the time of illusion. That too, is sublated by the sublation of

mutual identity as "This is not silver," just as the cloth is destroyed by the disintegration of the texture of threads. Hence, the absence of sublation as of the form "This is no locus" is not a fault.

This argument will be right only when the negation of mutual identity is the sublation. But that is not the case. This negation will not be the sublator. It was stated earlier that identity between silver and shell is impossible both when difference between them is either known or unknown. Consequently denial will be denial of what is not obtained.

Earlier, the *pūrvapakṣa* was that the knowledge of mutual non-existence arising from the knowledge of difference is the sublator. Mutual non-existence can be known only after difference is known. When the difference between shell and silver is known, the mutual non-existence is not known *at that time*; nor is it known prior to the knowledge of difference, because difference then is not known. What will this knowledge of mutual non-existence sublate? When knowledge of difference, supposed to sublate the knowledge of identity arises (if it could arise at all, for it has been shown earlier in these pages how it cannot arise annulling the knowledge of identity), it will not be opposed to the knowledge of identity and the knowledge of mutual non-existence will be only in accordance with this. Thus, when the knowledge of difference "this is not silver" has arisen, the cognition "this is silver" is doubly strengthened.

Of course, this was said only granting that knowledge of difference is possible. But that too is not possible. Knowledge of difference requires the counter-correlate which is different from the correlate. One cannot be one's own counter-correlate. What is the counter-correlate here? It cannot be the '*this*'-element, (*idamamśa*) in "this is silver". The reason is that the '*this*'-element is not at all perceived. It is not possible to say that the '*this*'-element, though not perceived *as different* from silver, is yet perceived in some general way and as such it can be the counter-correlate. It is not correct to assume, for example, that when ten objects are simultaneously apprehended, each of these ten objects is apprehended as different from the other nine simultaneously. It does not happen that way. Hence, that which is *merely* apprehended cannot be a counter-correlate. It is all the more so when it is positively cognized as identical. Thus the '*this*'-aspect and the silver cannot be the counter-correlate of each other.

If it is said that which is *known as different* is the counter-correlate, then, to be known as different, the counter-correlate must be known, and this counter-correlate in its turn will require the knowledge that is different and so on. There will thus be infinite regress.

The cognition that reveals 'silver' reveals only its identity with 'this' - aspect, and not difference. And this identity can never be sublated on the presuppositions of the satkhyātivādin. Both the knowledge of difference and of non-existence are not useful in sublating the error of identity. We have three possible alternatives here.

(1) Does the knowledge of difference etc., directly remove the error? Or (2) indirectly, through the removal of its cause? or (3) through revealing the non-existence of the object?

Not the first two alternatives. For, to the satkhyātivādin, the object appearing in the so-called illusion and the cause of illusion are real. And knowledge will never remove that which is real.

It cannot be the third: for, the non-existence of anything is revealed only by the *pramāṇa* of non-cognition. In order that it may be so revealed, the non-existence must be that of something that exists or could have existed really. Thus, the identity between shell and silver also must have to be treated as real. And it is not possible to establish the non-existence of the identity between silver and shell.

Again: what is this that is called the negation of identity? If it means that there is no identity at all, then two alternatives arise. (1) Is identity the form of that for which there is non-existence by its very nature? or (2) is merest non-existence the nature of the identity? The first is not possible for the sat-khyātivādin particularly the Prābhākara. For, he holds that non-existence, is only *another* positive entity and this is not the positive entity that is the counter-correlate of non-existence. Hence identity cannot be the form (*rūpa*) of its own negation.

Not the second alternative too; because the identity has no form of non-existence, since it is the content of the positive cognition, "this is silver" and because it is not the content of the negative judgment, "this is not silver"

If it were said to be non-existence, it will be revealed by the knowledge of non-existence and not sublated. But the opponent's claim is that identity should be sublated. Otherwise, there is no error at all.

Even granting that it is non-existence it is non-existence of what? Of shell and silver? Again what kind of non-existence is it? If it were

prior and posterior non-existence of shell and silver, these can never be known at the time of the illusion, because of being prior and posterior to it. If it were mutual non-existence, this should be known in the form, "this is not silver", and not as "this is silver" (a form in which identity is indeed manifested). So identity cannot be the non-existence of shell and silver. Thus, it transpires that it is only existent and real, apprehended as such. If the non-existence of this identity were to be revealed at all, it would be revealed elsewhere, but certainly not at the place where it is apprehended.

For this same reason, there is no sublation of the knowledge of identity by that of mutual non-existence revealing the non-existence of identity. Both in the case of identity having non-existence as its very nature and non-existence having identity as its very nature, the knowledge of mutual non-existence has only the knowledge of identity as its content because of the nature of non-existence for identity. If anything, the knowledge of identity is further strengthened and not sublated, by the knowledge of the mutual non-existence of shell and silver.

If it is said that the knowledge of mutual non-existence reveals the same identity otherwise (as "this is not silver") than what it was before (viz., "this is silver") and that as such there could be the nature of sublation for this knowledge, there are two questions here: (1) Is the non-existence of identity revealed by the knowledge of non-existence as another form of it (ie., identity) like existence? or (2) is it revealed as different from identity? In either case there is no harm for the identity cognized earlier. For if there is no form of identity at all, nothing that is its form or related to it can be known. As such, there is no damage to the existent aspect of identity. If, moreover, something different from identity is revealed by the knowledge of mutual non-existence, then identity ceases to be the object of that knowledge. This means that identity exists. Therefore, nothing that is known in the form of an existent can be cancelled by the knowledge of non-existence (*abhāva-jñāna*). Hence it is not useful in illusion. Even difference does not sublata, having difference as its subject-matter. Thus there is no sublation for the knowledge "this is silver". This is what will happen to the theory of *sat-khyāti* which avers that anything exists as it is known.

BHARTṚPRAPAÑCA ; A VEDĀNTIN OF PRE-ŚĀṆKARA ERA

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Bhartṛprapañca occupies a very important place among the vedantins who flourished before Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, the great exponent of Advaita Vedānta. He is known to be the first expounder of the Vedānta school, namely *Bhedābheda* or 'Identity-in-Difference.' He might have reached the summit of his fame around the 8th century because Śaṅkara's disciple, Sureśvarācārya has spent about one-fifth of his voluminous classic, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārttika* in review of his philosophy. No work of this Vedāntin is surviving to the present day, but from the references to him in the writings of Śaṅkarācārya and his successors, we come to know that he was the author of a number of works. It is almost certain that Bhartṛprapañca wrote a commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* which was more voluminous than that of Śaṅkara's.¹ Prof. M. Hiriyanna in his illuminating article on Bhartṛprapañca has furnished an evidence about his gloss on the *Īsopaniṣad*.² Gopāla Yatīndra, a commentator on the *Śaṅkara-bhāṣya* of *Kāthopaniṣad* has clearly stated that this *Upaniṣad* also had an exhaustive commentary from the pen of Bhartṛprapañca.³ Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, an eminent Advaitin of the 16th century refers in no uncertain terms to his exposition of the *Vedānta-sūtra*.⁴ From a *kārikā*⁵ (couplet) of Bhartṛprapañca recorded in Nṛsimhāśrama's *Vedānta-tattva-viveka*, we can possibly ascribe the authorship of at least one metrical work to him. Since none of these works is now available, his philosophy may not be known in full, yet from the copious references to it in Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, Sureśvara's *Bṛhadāraṇyaka vārtika*, and Ānandagiri's

1. 'इयमल्पग्रन्था वृत्तिरारभ्यते' Śaṅkara's commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, p. 2) (Vani Vilas Edition) and 'भर्तृप्रपञ्चभाष्याद्विशेषान्तरमाह-अल्पग्रन्थेति' (Ānandagiri's Commentary on the same).
2. See, *Indian Philosophical Studies*. pp. 79-80.
3. 'ननु भर्तृप्रपञ्चादिभिरेव व्याख्यातत्वाच्चाऽऽरम्भणीया वृत्तिरित्यत आह-अल्पग्रन्थेति । 'अन्येषां शब्दतो बहुत्वादर्थतश्च न्यूनत्वात्तैरवगतार्थ भाष्यम्' (p. 3.)
4. 'कैश्चित्तत्सुत्रव्याचक्षाणैर्भर्तृप्रपञ्चादिभिर्भेदादेरवेदार्थस्य वेदार्थत्ववर्णनात्' (*Śaṅkṣepa-sūtraka-vyākhyā*, *Sāra-saṅgraha* p. 14) (Chow. Edn.)
5. 'इयमन्तरालावस्था—'निवृत्तकामकर्मपि द्वैतोपासनतः पुमान् । अद्वैतोपास्तिविरहादज्ञो नैति परं पदम् ॥' इति या भर्तृप्रपञ्चैरुत्प्रेक्षिता । (*Vedāntatattvaviveka* Ch. I, p. 409. Mysore Uni. edn.)

commentary on the said *vārttika*, his philosophy of *dvaitādvaita* can be reconstructed in the form of an independent treatise. The task of reconstruction cannot be undertaken in a paper of limited scope. This paper, therefore, aims at only outlining the philosophy of *Bhārṭṛprapañca* with the help of some data gathered from the afore-said works.

I

THE NATURE OF REALITY

Like other Vedantins, *Bhārṭṛprapañca* also maintains that Brahman is the Supreme Reality. But *Brahman*, in his system, is not indivisible, undifferentiated, impartite and attributeless. It is rather 'Concrete Universal' because both the duality and non-duality form its essential nature. It is as real in its *apara* (lower) form as in the *para* (supreme).⁶ *Bhārṭṛprapañca* sees no contradictions in admitting *Brahman* - one in its supreme or transcendental nature and many in relation to the diversities of the world. The Supreme Reality is, therefore, 'Identity-in-Difference' or *bhinnābhinna*. How a thing can both be different and non-different can be explained on the analogy of the 'snake' and its 'coil'.⁷ Or the 'sun' and its 'rays'.⁸ Just as the coil, a particular state of snake, is different from the snake because of its coilness, and non-different from the same due to snakehood inherent in it, even so the *jīva* is different from *Brahman* because of its individualness, and identical with the same owing to its essential form of *brahmatva*.⁹ The relation between *Brahman* and the *jīva* is also that of identity-in-difference.

Having thus logically established the *bhedābheda* doctrine, *Bhārṭṛprapañca* proceeds to substantiate it through the different means of valid knowledge.¹⁰ The perceptual support for this lies in the fact that we experience *bhedābheda* among worldly objects. The inferential evidence can be furnished as follows: Since all worldly

6. 'द्वैतद्वैतयोरन्यतरस्य मृषात्वप्रयुक्तो दोषो यथा न भवति तथा द्वयोरवस्थयोर्वस्तुत्वम्' (Ānandagiri's commentary) on *Br. Vārttika* 46. p. 1955 (Ānandāśrama Edition) Cf. also *ibid.* on *Vārttika* 48, p. 1957.

7. See *Brahma-sūtra*, 3. 2. 27.

8. *Ibid.* 3. 2. 28.

9. 'यथाऽऽहित्वेनाभेदः । कुण्डलाख्यस्य सर्पावस्थाविशेषस्य कुण्डलत्वेन भेदः । तथा जीवस्य ब्रह्मत्वेनाभेदो जीवत्वेन भेदः' (*Bhāṣya-ratna-prabhā*, p. 658, I Nirṇaya Sagar Edition, 1934)

10. See *Br. Vārttika*, 4. 3. 1639-45.

entities are cognised as *bhinnābhinna*, *Brahman*, which is also an entity, should be accepted so. The *ekatva* and *anekatva* in a worldly thing can be illustrated by the well-known example of the Universal 'cowness' and particulars of a cow, such as the 'dew-lap', 'head' etc. The head and the dew-lap may differ from each one, but they are one because of their common characteristics, cowness.¹¹ Nor is there any inconsistency in admitting these two as different and non-different from each other. Similarly, all other objects are also *bhinnābhinna*. And when visible objects can be of this nature, even *Brahman* and the other things, which are beyond the reach of sense-organs may be inferred so.¹² All causes and effects are of the nature of *dvaitādvaita* and they remain so even during the periods of origination, sustenance and dissolution.¹³ *Bhedābheda* is the natural (*svābhāvika*) form of the self and other things.¹⁴ The Upaniṣadic text: 'When there is duality' (*yatra hi dvaitenaiva bhavati*, *Br. Up.* 2.4.14. and 4.5.15.) also speaks of the *dvaitādvaita* nature of *Brahman*.¹⁵ Those Upaniṣadic passages, which deal with *karmas* (actions) would be purposeful only if the duality is also admitted real. Nor are these passages without meaning for, they are also means to *anantapuruṣārtha*, the supreme human-end. In case of the duality being unreal and the non-duality alone real, not only the purpose of *karmakāṇḍa* will be defeated but also the authoritativeness will be put to question. And, thus the whole series of empirical and scriptural injunctions will be disturbed.¹⁶ In order to avoid this unwelcome contingency, it is necessary that both of them should be treated equally authoritative and real. Once the oneness and the

11. 'यथा खण्डादिषु गोत्वमनुवृत्तं ते च मिथो व्यावृत्ता न च तत एव तेषां गोत्वादपि व्यावृत्तिः खण्डो गौरित्याद्यभेदबुद्धेः सर्वे भावा ह्येकत्वानेकत्वव्यवस्थयाऽवस्थिता गृह्यन्त इत्युक्तेरित्यर्थः' (Ānandagiri's commentary on *Br. Vārttika*, 1.6.49, p. 877).
12. 'नानात्वैकत्ववत्स्थूलं दृष्टे वस्तु यथा तथा । आत्माद्यतीन्द्रियं वस्तु वस्तुत्वादिति गम्यताम् ॥ इत्येवं पण्डितम्मन्या अनुमानबलादिह । मित्राभिजातमकं वस्तु स्थापयन्त्यविशेषतः ॥' (*Br. Vārttika*, 4. 3. 1644-45).
13. 'जन्मस्थितिलयेष्वेवं त्रिषु कालेषु पूर्णता । कार्यकारणयोर्ज्ञेया द्वैताद्वैतस्वभावयोः ॥' (*Ibid*, 5. 1. 55. p. 1958).
14. 'भेदाभेदात्मकं रूपं स्वामाविकम्' (Ānandagiri's commentary on *Br. Vārttika*, 4. 3. 1639, p. 1669).
15. 'द्वैताद्वैतात्मकं ब्रह्म मैत्रेये वर्णितं किल । यत्र हि द्वैतमित्युक्त्वा यत्र त्वस्येति चादरात्' (*Br. Vārttika*, 5. 1. 30).
16. 'एवं द्वैतस्य सत्यत्वे कर्मकाण्डस्य मानता । अनन्तपुरुषार्थाप्तिरिष्यते कर्मकाण्डतः । यदा तु कल्पितं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः । उच्छिन्नं कर्मकाण्डस्य प्रामाण्यं विषयादते । एकदेशस्य चामात्वे वेदस्याप्यग्रमाणता । सर्वनाशो भवेदेवं सर्वप्रामाण्यहेतुतः' (*Ibid*, 5. 1. 58-60).

duality are both-admitted real, all contradictions between the *jñānakāṇḍa* and *karma-kāṇḍa* will disappear.¹⁷

II

WAYS OF ESTABLISHING BHEDĀBHEDA

In the *Bhedābheḍa* philosophy, the following four ways have been adopted to establish the relation of identity-in-difference between various things¹⁸:

1. *Kāraṇa* and *kārya*: i.e., the cause and the effect, as for instance, 'clay' and 'pot'. The *apara-brahman*, like pots from clay, with all its diversities, comes into existence from the *para*, and ultimately merges in it so that both of them are neither totally different nor entirely one.

2. *Avasthāvat* and *avasthāḥ*: i.e., substance and its modes, as for instance 'ocean' and its modes in forms of bubble and wave etc. The *apara-brahman* along with all worldly objects is transformation of the homogenous *para-brahman*. This view differs from the former one as the cosmological theory of evolution from that of creation.

3. *Bhāgin* and *bhāga*: i.e., 'whole' and 'part', as for instance, 'nave' and 'spokes' of a wheel. The *para-brahman* would be thus a whole of which the parts are diversities constituting the *apara-brahman*.

4. *Sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*: i.e., the 'universal' and the corresponding 'particulars', as for instance 'cowness' and the various individual 'cows'. The *para-brahman*, according to this view would be the inmost principle of all existent entities and the *apara-brahman*, 'an embodiment of these things. Ānandagiri remarks that the universal,

17. 'तत्रैकांशत्वेन ज्ञानान्मोक्षव्यवहारः सेत्स्यति । नानांशत्वेन तु कर्मकाण्डाश्रयो लौकिक-वैदिकव्यवहारः सेत्स्यति ।' (S'aṅkara's commentary on *Brahma-sūtra*, 2.1.14 p. 375.)

18. 'सामान्येन समस्तं तद्विशेषैर्व्यस्तमेव च कृत्स्नमेव परब्रह्म सदोपासीत यत्नतः । अवस्थावदवस्थाभिः क्वचित्कात्स्न्यं प्रचक्ष्यते । कार्यकारणरूपेण क्वचिद्व्याचक्षते तथा । भागभागविभागेन नाभिनेम्यरवत्तथा । व्याचक्षते महात्मानः संप्रदायबलात्किञ्च ।' (Br. Vārtika 1. 4. 948-50.)

in this system, is not only a collection of unrelated particulars, but also a collected whole!¹⁹

Of these four views, 'the second view' as Prof. M. Hiriyanna puts it, 'is most commonly associated with Bhartṛprapaṇca'.²⁰ But Ānandagiri mentions that all the four views were maintained by Bhartṛprapaṇca.²¹

III

MODES OF REALITY

According to the second view stated above, there are the following eight possible *avasthās* or modes of Brahman²²:

1. *Antaryāmin*: This is that immortal principle which controls everything from within as described in *Bṛ. up.* 3. 7. It is also sometimes called *Īśvara*.²³ This, however is not *Brahman*, because it originates from the latter.²⁴

2. *Sākṣin*: This is individual, which is considered as another heterogeneous modification of *Brahman*. This is also known as *kṣetrajña* i.e., the conscious principle dwelling in the body. *Sākṣins* are of two kinds: (i) cosmic and (ii) individual. *Hiraṇyagarbha* and the deities like *āditya* are known as cosmic *sākṣī*²⁵, and the rest individual ones.²⁶

3. *Avyākṛta*: This represents the whole of the physical universe in its subtle or causal form. All elemental effects having names and forms are therefore modifications of the *avyākṛta*.²⁷ It is viewed as the adjunct of *antaryāmin*.

19. भेदाविशेषाः सर्वेषां विशेषाणां सामान्यानां चैकवस्त्वात्मनामात्मतादात्यमेव'

(Ānandagiri's commentary on *Bṛ. vārtika*, 1. 4. 655)

20. See Indian Philosophical Studies, p. 82.

21. See Ānandagiri's commentary on *Bṛ. Vārtika*, 4. 4. 949-50 and

समुद्रतस्मिन्पिण्डदृष्टान्तैः परमात्मनः । व्याचक्षते बलात्केचित्समस्तव्यस्तदंशम् ॥'
(*Bṛ. Vārtika*, 1. 4. 693).

22. 'पिण्डो जातिर्विराट्सूत्रं दैवमव्याकृतमन्तर्यामी साक्षीत्यष्टावस्थानां न बाह्यभ्यन्तरभावः
...तथा सामान्यमात्मतत्त्वम्' (Ānandagiri's Commentary on *Bṛ. Vārtika*, 1.4.1043)

23. Cf. *ibid* on 1:4. 487. and Śaṅkara's Commentary on *Bṛ. Up.* 3. 7. 3 p. 532.

24. 'तथाऽऽष्टावस्था ब्रह्मणी भवन्तीति वदन्ति' (Śaṅkara's Commentary on *Bṛ. Up.* p. 447)

25. See *Bṛ. Vārtika*, 91, p. 1007 and also Ānandagiri's Commentary on *Bṛ. Vārtika*, 121., p. 451 and 416 p. 956.

26. *Ibid. Vārtika* 100, p. 1009.

27. Cf. Ānandagiri's Commentatry on *Bṛ. Vārtika* 2. 2. 91-92.

4. *Sūtra*: This evolves from the *avyākṛta*, and is the adjunct of *Hiranyagarbha*

5-6. *Virāj* and *Devatā*: *Virāj* is the highest cosmic soul which proceeds from the *sūtra*. It is also the gross material that constitutes the world of perception.²⁸ Various *devatās* are the sense-organs of *Virāj* through which it comes into action. These *devatās* which correspond to our sense-organs are the sixth modification of *Brahman*.

7-8. *Jāti* and *Piṇḍa*: What *Bhartṛprapañca* means by the term, *jāti* is not very clear. It may be taken for *ākṛti* which denotes types as distinguished from individuals. The last modification is the *piṇḍa* which means the individual bodies, such as the human²⁹, and from which no subsequent effects arise. The *piṇḍa*, says *Ānandagiri*, implies the four types of individual bodies.³⁰

All these modifications are absolutely real³¹, with the difference that the first two are spiritual and the rest material.

These eight modes together with *Brahman* have been classified into three *rāśis* or categories.³² They are:

1. *Paramātma-rāśi*: This is, the absolute principle, *Brahman*. *Bhartṛprapañca* might have included *antaryāmin* also in this *rāśi*, because it could not be grouped under the two remaining categories, otherwise named as *madhyama* and *adhama rāśis* respectively. The *paramātma-rāśi* is also called *Uttama* or supreme *rāśi*.³³

2. *Mūrtāmūrta-rāśi*: The six material modes beginning with the *avyākṛta* fall under this category. The name of this *rāśi* is derived from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* 2, 3. wherein *mūrta* and *amūrta* are depicted as the two forms of *Brahman*. According to *Bhartṛprapañca*, the term, *amūrta* means *avyakta*, the source of the material world, and the *mūrta* denotes *pṛthivi*, the last of the *bhūtas* or elements.³⁴

28. 'महाभूतसंस्थानभेदेन' (Śaṅkara's Commentary on *Br. Up.* 3. 8. 12, p. 447).

29. 'पिण्डशब्देन मन्वादिदेहो गृह्यते' (Ānandagiri's Commentary on *Br. Vārtika* 1. 4. 98.)

30. 'पिण्डभावश्चतुर्विधभूतग्रामत्वम्' (*Ibid.* on *Vārtika* 5. 1. 54)

31. 'केचित्तु द्वैतस्य नाज्ञानजत्वं पिण्डो जातिर्विराट् सूत्रं देवमव्याकृतमन्तर्यामी साक्षीत्यष्टावस्थस्य तस्य वस्तुत्वादित्याहुः' (*ibid.* on *Vārtika* 1. 3. 314) and 'ईश्वराद्यष्टावस्थं जगत्पारमार्थिकं कैश्चिदिष्टत्वात्' (*ibid.* on *Vārtika*, 1. 4. 487)

32. Cf. Rāmānuja's Commentary on *Vedānta-sūtra* 2. 3. 17.

33. 'परमात्मराशिस्तमः' (Śaṅkara's Commentary on *Br. Up.* 2. 3. 5. p. 289.)

34. Cf. *Br. Vārtika* 2. 3. 72-80

3. *Jīva-rāśi*: The *jīva*, which is a real transformation of *Brahman* is included in this *rāśi*. Beginningless *vāsanās* i.e., the traces of previous *vidyā* and *karma* of the *jīva* are its determining factors.³⁵ The *vāsanā* or *āśaṅga* is, in fact, the characteristics of the *antaḥkaraṇa* (internal organ), but it is transmitted to the *jīva* because of the latter's association with the internal organ. Due to this transmission, the *jīva* appears as the knower, enjoyer and doer.³⁶ Bhartṛprapaṇca also accepts *avidyā* or nescience but 'it accounts only for the lapse of *Brahman* into *jīva*-condition and not also for its worldly life or *samsāra*.'³⁷ It is true that *avidyā* emanates from *Brahman*, but it affects only that part of its cause which has brought it into existence. As a barren spot affects not the whole field but a part of it, even so *avidyā* covers *Brahman* only partly and not fully.³⁸ In other words, *avidyā* is located in the *jīva*-part of *Brahman*.

IV

RELATION BETWEEN THE REAL AND METAPHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE

Unlike Śāṅkarites, Bhartṛprapaṇca maintains that the empirical and revealed knowledge are equally real. The perception, to him, is not only a means of knowing duality but also a determining factor of its validity. Whatever is in cognition through the means of valid knowledge is real, be it *dvaita* or *advaita*.³⁹ If the reality were not granted to *dvaita*, all Upaniṣadic texts which preach creation etc., would be deprived of their meaning, and the expressions, origination, maintenance and dissolution, would turn into false tales.⁴⁰ Since Bhartṛprapaṇca reconciles and establishes the validity of both types of knowledge recognised at empirical and scriptural levels his view is rightly called *pramāṇa-samuccaya-vāda*.⁴¹

35. *Ibid* 4. 4. 2.

36. 'गन्धः पुष्पाश्रयो यद्वत्पुटमाश्रित्य तिष्ठति । कुसु ।।पगमेऽप्येवं लिङ्गस्था वासनात्मनि ।। वासना कामकर्माणि लिङ्गस्थान्येव नाऽऽत्मनि । लिङ्गादात्मानमायान्ति गन्धो गन्धपुटे यथा ।।' (*ibid*, 2. 3. 117-18)

37. M. Hiriyanna : Indian Philosophical Studies, p. 85

38. 'यथोषरात्मको दोषः पृथिव्या एव जश्निवान् । क्षेमकदेशं विकृत्याऽऽस्तेऽविद्या तद्वत् परात्मनः' (*Br. Vārtika* 2. 3. 23).

39. स्वानुभवोद्वेगस्याद्वैतस्य च श्रुतिवशादिष्टत्वात् प्रामाण्यम् ।'
(Ānandagiri's Commentary on *Br. Vārtika*, 5. 1. 36).

40. 'मृषात्वाद्वैदजातस्य सर्गस्थित्याद्यसम्भवात् । सर्गस्थितिरुपानां स्यादन्वाख्यानं मृषैव तु ।।' (*Br. Vārtika*, 5. 1. 32) Cf. also Ānandagiri's Commentary thereupon.

41. See Ānandagiri's Commentary on *Sambandha Vārtika*, 9 1 3.

MOKṢA

Bhartṛprapañca advocates the combination of *jñāna* and *karman* for the attainment of *mokṣa*, while interpreting the Upaniṣadic passage : *ātmānameva upāsita* (*Bṛ. Up.* 1. 4. 45).⁴² This is a *samuccaya* wherein *karman* and *jñāna* are equally predominant. This *samuccaya* is again of two types.

All Vedantins are of the view that *virakti* or detachment is a prerequisite of one who is desirous of *mokṣa*. But while *Śaṅkara* and his followers hold that detachment results from *doṣa-darśana* in the worldly objects, Bhartṛprapañca maintains that it can be possible only through *bhoga* or enjoyment. One cannot be able to develop the sense of detachment until he attains the state of *sūtra-hood*.⁴³ Therefore, a person, who longs for liberation must try to attain this state by identifying himself with the *Hiranyagarbha* or *Sūtra* through the *upāsana* combined with the *nitya-karmas* ordained in the scriptures. This constitutes the first type of *samuccaya*. It helps the aspirant to attain the state of *apavarga* or escape from the *samsāra*. But it should be borne in mind that this is different from the *mokṣa*. It is *antarālāvasthā*, i.e., a state intermediate between the *samsāra* and *mokṣa*. Having reached this state, the *Jīva* is got rid of all attachments causing its births, but this is not all it wants. It has to move a step further to remove the *avidyā*, which is the main cause of its limitation and separation from Brahman.⁴⁴ In other words, it has to recognise its identity with Brahman. Since the knowledge alone is not capable of removing *avidyā*, it should be combined with the *upāsana* of *sūtra*.⁴⁵ The *samuccaya* of *jñāna* with the *upāsana* of Advaita may possibly be another alternative for the attainment of the supreme state of salvation resulting from the realisation of identity with Brahman.⁴⁶ It follows from this

[42. 'वीक्ष्यापन्नस्य तस्यैवं सामर्थ्यं ज्ञानकर्मणोः । उद्विभावयिषुः साक्षात्तद्वृत्तेषां परा श्रुतिः । लोकमात्मानमेवेमुपासीताऽऽत्मविद्यया । इति स्यादर्थवत्त्वाय समाधिर्ज्ञानकर्मणोः ॥' (*Bṛ. Vārtika*, 1. 4. 17(0-1)).

43. 'हिरण्यगर्भपदे सद्योऽयं ततोऽपि दोषदर्शनाद्विरक्तः' (Ānandagiri's Commentary on *Bṛ. Bhāṣya* 1. 4. 9).

44. 'केवलाज्ञानमात्रेण व्यवधानं परात्मनः । अप्राप्य परमात्मानमन्तराले व्यवस्थितिः ॥' *Bṛ. Vārtika* 1. 4. 17(13) and 'नाममात्रावरोधोऽसावन्तरालेऽवतिष्ठते । परात्मनः परिच्छिन्नोऽविद्ययोषरूपय ॥' (*ibid.* 2. 4. 42).

45. 'समुच्चयस्ततोऽन्योऽयमन्यक्तब्रह्मविद्यया । व्यक्तज्ञात्मविद्यायाः परोऽप्येष समुच्चयः' ॥ (*ibid.* 1. 4. 17(9)).

that Bhartṛprapañca recognises two kinds of *mokṣa* : (i) *apara-mokṣa* or *apavarga* and (ii) *parā mukti* or supreme liberation.⁴⁷ The first kind of *mokṣa* consists in realising identity with the *Hiranyagarbha* through the first *samuccaya* while living in the body. The second is acquired through the second *samuccaya*. This state of *mukti* is possible after death. It is also known as the *brahmabhāvāpatti* or union with *Brahman*.

Summing up, Bhartṛprapañca, as a philosopher, made a very remarkable contribution to the development of Vedantic thought. On the one hand, he laid the foundation of the *Bhedābheda* school, which was developed later by Bhāskara, and on the other, he provided the nucleus to all dualistic schools of Vedānta which emerged in the long history of Vedāntic tradition.

46. See Foot-Note, No. 5.

47. 'यदि वा द्विविधो मोक्षो जीवत्येव शरीरके । एकः साक्षात्कृतब्रह्मा मृतेरुर्ध्वं च तल्लयः' (Br. Vārtika, 4. 2. 102) Cf. also Dr. Gopinatha Kaviraja's introduction to the *Bhāṣya-ratna-prabhā*, p. 10.

सर्वव्यापिनमात्मानं क्षीरे सर्पिरिवार्पितम् ।

आत्मविद्यातपोमूलं तद्ब्रह्मोपनिषत्परम् ॥

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वेदाहमेतं पुरुषं महान्तमादित्यवर्णं तमसः परस्तात् ।

तमेव विदित्वा तिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय ॥

श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषद् १, १६, ३, ८

THE CONCEPT OF BRAHMAN IN BHARTṚHARI'S PHILOSOPHY

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SECTION : 1. *Brahman* in the true sense

In Bhartṛhari's philosophy also the absolute is *Brahman*. The common Indian philosophical terms used to elucidate this absolute are *dravya* or *vastu*¹ (Substance, noumena). In other words, it is that which is *nitya*² (constant) despite changes in the phenomenal world.

The fact that Bhartṛhari interpreted *dravya* as *Brahman* is of momentous significance for the history of Indian linguistic philosophy. Although *dravya* was the term commonly used throughout Indian philosophy to express the notion of noumenon or substance there were various interpretations of just what this substance was and these divergent interpretations gave rise to the different philosophical positions of the various schools. Even within the same school there were quite often several different interpretations, for example, in the school of grammarians there was a long tradition of interpreting *dravya* as 'individual. Thus, according to the older grammarians such as Patañjali 'substance' was the 'individual' in opposition to *akriya* (form) or *jāti* (genus).³ By introducing Vedanta philosophy into grammar, however, Bhartṛhari caused a change in the grammarians' view of substance. According to him, particular things are what are real or substantial in the everyday world but they are not real or substantial in the ultimate sense. Substance is the supreme genus, the limit of a quest for an ever higher genus in particular things; it is nothing other than *Brahman* as existence. Thus the concept of substance is radically altered; it changes from particulars to *Brahman*.

Brahman as noumenon is also called '*Tattva*' (truth).⁴ '*Tattva*' has the sense of actual fact or things⁵ just as they are in the

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1. Vākyap. III. 2, 1; 2. Vākyap. III. 2 is called *Dravyasamuddesa* and it is here that the nature of *Brahman* is discussed in greatest detail.
 2. Vākyap. III. 2, 1.
 3. *dravyam hi nityam akṛtir anitya*.—(*Mahābhāṣya* p. 7, ll. 11-12, ed. by Kielhorn)
 4. Vākyap. III. 2, 1; 6; 7; 10.
 5. Vākyap. III. 3, 3.

ordinary world but it had also been used as a technical philosophical term from quite ancient times. The Vedānta school took it to refer to Brahman while Bhartṛhari called it 'para'⁶ (the highest one) which was also a term in general use throughout Vedānta philosophy.⁷

Brahman as the absolute is characterized in the early part of the Vākyapadīya as 'anādinidhana' (without beginning or end).⁸ This adjectival phrase was originally used in the Mahābhārata to apply to Viṣṇu and Brahmadeva as well as to vāk (the word) as the world principle.⁹ Since Bhartṛhari assumed Brahman to be the absolutely highest principle, he applies the phrase to Brahman rather than to vāk and thus it becomes a term reserved for Brahman alone. Then, since 'anādinidhana' means having no *utpāda* (origination) and no *nāśa*¹⁰ (destruction) it follows that Brahman is both *akṣara*¹¹ (indestructible) and *amṛta* (eternal).¹²

However, since the phenomena of production and destruction are possible only in time, the denial of production and destruction implies that Brahman is not bound by the conditions of time. Elsewhere Bhartṛhari says that absolute truth is "*paurvāpyavivarjita*" (free from the relation of before and after). If one can interpret this spatially then it becomes "*pūrvāpara-deśavibhāga-rahita*"¹⁴ (free from the spatial distinction of before-after). Thus Brahman transcends the conditions of both space and time. This characteristic of Brahman is in direct opposition to the nature of particular things. Particular things exist only when they are conditioned spatially and temporally. "Jars and the like are perceived as things, the production and destruction of which is experienced and as being limited spatially."¹⁵

This claim, made at the very beginning of the Vākyapadīya, is a direct conscious attack on the common sense view of the man in the street

6. Vākyap. III, 1, 20.

7. In the Brahma Sūtra also the absolute is generally referred to with the term 'para'.

8. Vākyap. I, 1, Concerning this verse see page 69 of this volume. The expression 'anādinidhanamādhyā' also appears in See *Jisshū Bongogaku* by Professor Unrai Ogihara, p. 156.

9. cf. Sorensen's Index. For an actual example concerning the word 'vac' see Mahābhārata XII. 233. 24 (quoted by Śaṅkara on BS. 1, 3, 28.)

10. Tattvasaṃgraha, v. 128. Refer to Chapter one section one of this work for an explanation of the interpretation in Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa. In Vākyap. III, 2, 18, tattva is said to be 'ajanman' (not originated).

11. Vākyap. I, 1.

12. Vākyap. I, 133.

13. Vākyap. III, 2, 18.

14. Tattvasaṃgrahapañjika ad v. 128.

15. *ibid.* ad vi 135.

He speaks of the vulgar philosophic view of the common man as follows : "It is judged in the world that the world¹⁶ is [quantitatively] limited since jars and the like are seen to be quantitatively limited. It is said¹⁷ that, because the various things are formed, Brahman also has its beginning even though it be eternal"¹⁷ (*Vākyap.* II, 239).

The common man tries to apply the principles which are appropriate in the phenomenal world of his daily experiences to the unlimited which absolutely transcends this phenomenal world and even to trans-experiential reality. He maintains that such naive speculation is a grave mistake.

Since Brahman is in no way the recipient of either special or temporal limitations its essence is absolutely undifferentiable. It is impossible to attach to it any particular characterizing stipulation. Thus there can be no term which could be predicated of it; it is above conceptual stipulations. Even if one tries to express it in order to convey it to another person one can do nothing but rely on negative expressions. Concerning 'tattva' he says "It neither is nor is not; it is neither one nor differentiated; neither combined nor separated; neither changing nor unchanging."¹⁸ All of the linguistic expressions (*vyavahāra*, *prapañca*) referring to Brahman are nothing other than *upādhi* applied to the absolute.

"'To be different' is limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) of the highest one and the same is true of 'not being different.'" (*Vākyap.* III, 1, 20).

Thus it naturally follows that the distinction of subject does not exist in Brahman. That in which there is no distinction to be made among the seer, the seen, and the act of seeing is truth. This is related by those who know the secrets of the three Vedas"¹⁹ (*Vākyap.* III, 3, 70). Brahman in the true sense is really absolute negation.

16. *Ayam viśvaprañcarūpaḥ lokah* (Puṇyārāja).

17. This sort of vulgar philosophic view already made its appearance among the sixty-two views of Buddha's time. See *Dīgha-nikāya-Brahmajālasuttanta*.

18. *Vākyap.* III, 2, 12. See section three of this chapter.

19. Cited according to the quotation in *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* XIII. lines. 254-6 In the Benares edition of the *Vākyapadīya cāvikalpitaṃ* is written as *va vikalpitaṃ*, which is wrong (see Helārāja's commentary). Also in this edition 'āhus' is 'śritas'.

Section 2 : The Argumentation to prove the Unlimitedness of Brahman

If Brahman in the true sense is this sort of thing then why is it that the absolute can only be transmitted to men by way of negative expressions? Why is it that Brahman cannot have positive conceptual determinations? He gives a detailed account of the reasons for this in Chapter three of the *Vākyapadiya*.

As we have already noted, he maintains that the absolute Brahman transcends all spatial and temporal determinations. Now the simplest and most basic form of spatial determination which makes it possible for things to be in opposition to each other is the opposition of identity and difference. The Law of Identity and Law of Non-Contradiction are fundamental principles which must be conformed to when projecting temporal change, or when representing objects spatially, or when thinking. Thus the identity-difference relation is fundamentally preserved. Furthermore, if one considers the question of whether A is identical to or different from B from an ontological point of view it becomes a question of whether A exists as B or not. The logical relation of identity-difference can be ontologically transformed to a relation of being-non-being. Thus it is that Bhartṛhari took the modes of identity, difference, existence, and non-existence to be the fundamental forms of spatial determination. In contrast, the most fundamental form of temporal determination can be said to be 'change.' Thus, in order to clarify the character of the absolute, Bhartṛhari examined the oppositional relation obtaining between the most fundamental of spatial forms, Identity (Law of Identity), difference (Law of Non-contradiction), existence, and non-existence, and concluded that the Law of Identity and the Law of Non-contradiction were not applicable to the absolute. Taking up the question of change, the most fundamental form which makes temporal discrimination possible, he maintained that there is no change in the ultimate sense and thus that the true absolute transcends change.

Section 2—1 : The negation of identity-difference, being-non-being.

Bhartṛhari first examined the problem of the identity-difference dichotomy and pointed out that the structure of these concepts was such that neither could be established by itself but only in the negation of the neither could be established by itself but only in a relation of mutual dependence.

"Without *nānātva* (difference) there is no *ekatva* (identity) and without *ekatva* there is no *nānātva*. In the highest truth the

distinction between these concepts does not exist at all." (*Vākyap.* III, 6, 26, p. 172).

According to Helārāja the two concepts, identity and difference, are *anyonyāśraya* (interdependent). "It would follow that one cannot be established without the other being established." (*ekāsiddhāv itarāsiddhiprasaṅgaḥ*).

Bhartṛhari further expands on the above comment in the following fashion: "If one does not conceive of difference it is impossible for identity to exist: if identity is not supposed then difference must also be discarded." (*Vākyap.* III, 6, 28). According to Helārāja, this is because they have *parasparāpekṣā* (mutual dependence).

Being and non-being are also, like identity and divergence, mutually dependent. For non-being to be established as non-being the negation of being is indispensable. Non-being is the negation of being (*bhāva*) or deficiency (*abhāva*). Moreover, for being to be established as being there must be the covert negation of non-being. In short, being and non-being do not exist separately but both arise out of *ātman*.

"On the basis of the unique *ātman*, being and non-being, which are not different are imagined." (*Vākyap.* III, 3, 60). Their foundation is *ātman*. The two are not unrelated and independent; on the contrary, it is only when they are established in a tense relation as the mutually opposing concepts of being and non-being that they are able to function as expressions (*vyavahāra*) of the essential elements of daily life.

"Being and non-being follow the ordinary expressions as non-different I, as mutually dependent (*Vākyap.* III, 3, 59)."

The point which must be most carefully attended to here is the attack on the philosophical view which takes non-being to be substantial.²⁰ "Non-being cannot be established either as being in

20. Helārāja (on III, 3, 72) interprets this as a discussion of the seventh category, i.e. the 'non-being' expounded by the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. It is well known that Udayana wrote a short work, *Lakṣaṇāvalī* in 984 in which seven categories are set up. But the doctrine of the seven categories had existed before Udayana. Before that some of the *Mīmāṃsakas* adopted the theory of non-category. Also Maticandra (550-650) sets up "non-declaration of categories" in his *sheng-sung-shih-eh-i-lun*. It is not clear which doctrine Bhartṛhari is attacking specifically, but it is clear that he rejects a philosophy which tends to substantialize non-being.

contradiction [to being] or as not being in contradiction [to it] either as actually existing or as not being ordered" (*Vākyap.* III, 3, 66). Furthermore, no matter whether non-being really exists or not, true being is neither produced nor annihilated. "Even if non-being were to be existent the nature of being would not be discarded. Or even though non-being were non-existent the nature of being would not [thereby] be created." (*Vākyap.* III, 3, 72).

With this ontological view as a foundation, Bhartṛhari rejected the four types of non-being propounded by the Vaiśeṣika.²¹ According to Helārāja the four types, i.e. *prāgabdhāva* (non-existence of anything which may yet be), *pradhvaṃsābhāva* (non-existence in consequence of annihilation), *atyantābhāva* (absolute non-existence), and *itaretarābhāva* (mutual non-existence), are all '*kālpānika*' (based on imagination). In other words, these four types do not have objective existence but are nothing more than subjective phantasms. Bhartṛhari claimed that, in the same fashion, the opposition of being and non-being and all the dualistic oppositions based on this are established only as the result of pure subjective imagination.

"Just as four distinct states could be discriminated with respect to what is called *nirūpa* (the non-substantial), so is the duality based on being and non-being." (*Vākyāp.* III, 3, 65).

This is clearly a doctrine advocated by the Mādhyamikas. The Mādhyamikas expended every effort to show that all things and concepts are established in a relation of mutual dependency (*parasparāpekṣatva*).²² There is also widely assumed in Mādhyamika works the general principle that two things which are established in a relation of mutual dependency are such that if one does not exist neither can the other (*itaretarāśrayaṇād ekābhāvād anyatarābhāvaḥ syād iti*).²³ The rejection, on the basis of this principle, of the separate and independent existence of the objects or concepts which stand in this relation of mutual dependency is expounded in the Mādhyamika Śāstra and many other works of the Mādhyamika school. Some examples are the following :

"Impurity does not exist without being dependent on purity. We explain purity with reference to impurity. Thus purity is

21. See *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* 9, 1. 5.

22. hetuphalayor anyonyāpekṣatva (Mvṛ., p. 55, 1. 1); tāni ca paraspara-apekṣayā sidhyanti (Mvṛ. P. 75, 1. 10); parasparāpekṣā siddhiḥ (Mvṛ., pp. 67, 1. 11; 200, 1. 3); parasparāpekṣiki siddhiḥ (Mvṛ., pp. 189, 11. 8, 9; 190, 1. 8; 213, 1. 11; 345, 1. 2); anyonyāpekṣiki siddhiḥ (Mvṛ., p. 190, 1. 130; parasparāpekṣā (adj. Mvṛ., p. 189, 1. 15).

23. *Bodhicaryāvatāraṇāṭhikā*, p. 538, 1. 5.

inconceivable" (Mādhyamika-Śāstra, Chap. 23, verse 10). "Purity does not exist without being dependent on impurity. We explain impurity with reference to purity. Thus, impurity does not exist." (Mādhyamika-Śāstra, Chap. 2, verse 11).

Arguments of this sort are so numerous throughout Mādhyamika literature that it would be simply impossible to enumerate them here. With this evidence, however, I think it can be safely concluded that the previously noted quotations from the *Vākyapadiya* related to the opposition of being and non-being as well as identity and difference were most probably the result of the influence of Mādhyamika thought.

Thus, since he saw that it was essential to identity and difference, being and non-being to be established in a relation of mutual dependency, Bhartṛhari contended that these concepts were not applicable to the absolute. There is no oneness nor diversity, no existence nor non-existence (nāsītā) in that *Ātman*-principles of things which are not connected [with the limiting adjunct]." (*Vākyap.* III, 1, 21).

In Buddhism these concepts of identity, difference, being and non-being are said to be the basis for the Lotus Sūtra,²⁴ for example, it is said that the common man is led to embrace sixty two different views by adhering to these four concepts. Since Bhartṛhari thoroughly rejects their fundamental opposition he can, to this extent, be said to be following Buddhist doctrine. This position is often given expression in Nāgarjuna's Mādhyamika Śāstra but the following line from the Awakening of Faith Sūtra is the one that most closely resembles Bhartṛhari's words. "The truly self-born has no aspect of being, no aspect of non-being, no aspect of not being, no aspect of not non-being. It has no identity, no differentiation, non-identity, no non-differentiation, and no identity-differentiation."

Thus if the states of identity, difference, being, and non-being cannot be attributed to the absolute then all differentiations based on these cannot exist in Brahman either. For these reasons Bhartṛhari concluded that diversity and multiplicity could not really be part of the essence of Brahman.

24. vilagna dṛṣṭi-gaṇaneṣu nityam astiti nastiti tathāsti nāsti dvāṣaṣṭidṛṣṭi-kṛtanisrayitvā asantabhāvaṃ parigrhya te sthitaḥ (Saddhp. II, gāthā 65). One can by the way trace this view back to early Buddhism. For example, in the Pali Texts *Samyutta-Nikāya* XII, Nidāna-samyutta. 48. vol. II, p. 77, Buddha rejects the extreme views that all is being or that all is nothingness and explains the Law of Karma by means of the middle path.

Section 2-2 The negation of change

Bhartr̥hari, along with rejecting multiplicity, also claimed that change in any ultimate sense was impossible. Change can be said to be the replacement of one aspect of a thing by another but if we express this in terms of the most abstract and general form of the modalities of individual objects then what we have is ens becoming non-ens or non-ens becoming ens. (ens becoming ens or non-ens becoming non-ens do not represent change but simply continuations of the same state). However, it is just these two forms which he most clearly and emphatically rejects.

"No non-being is produced and then becomes being. Being does not go to non-substantiality."²⁵ (*Vākyap.* III, 3, 60). He follows this with the explanation: "Since non-being is substanceless, there is no cause which produces it. What cause will be made that could affect being with substance." (*Vākyap.* III, 3, 61). In other words, since non-being is substanceless it is impossible to bring it into existence and since being has substance it is impossible to destroy it. "If the acquisition of the nature is called 'birth' and the existence which is to be obtained is attained, then from what is being produced and how is non-being produced?" (*Vākyap.* III, 3, 43, vol. II, p. 118). These arguments were often propounded by the Mādhyamika School and an argument quite similar to it can be found in the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās*.²⁶ Bhartr̥hari takes a position similar to that of these arguments in that he denied the production of both being and non-being

He thus concludes that the arguments of various philosophers who attempt to make either being or nothingness the ultimate world principle are grossly mistaken and that only the absolute Brahman is real.

"For this reason, there are some who say 'All is non-being.' But there exists no other state than the one reality." (*Vākyap.* III, 3, 62). Here again we have an instance of the confluence of the thought of Bhartr̥hari and the Buddhists. In fact, the claims that

25. anupākhyatā. anupākhyā is 'that which cannot be perceived' but this comes to 'that which has no substance'. (cf. Śaṅkara on BS. II, 1, 14, vol. 1., 459, 1. 11)

26. See *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā* IV, 4; 38; 4; and the annotations for these verses in '*Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā Bhāṣya*' Hajime Nakamura: (*Development of Vedānta Philosophy*, pp. 447, 448).

'All is being' or 'All is non-being' were already rejected in the scriptures of primitive Buddhism²⁷ as being two opposing but equally heretical doctrines. Not only is this argument preserved and repeated in the Mahāyāna Sūtras²⁸ but also Nāgārjuna²⁹ later followed out this position, rejected both of these heresies, and attempted to clarify the true meaning of 'the middle path' which was different from either of these extremes. It can thus be concluded that here is another instance of Bhartṛhari inheriting some of the central concepts of Buddhist thought.

According to Bhartṛhari the proponents of the metaphysics of being and the proponents of the metaphysics of non-being were continually preoccupied with attacking each other and this fact indicated that neither of these philosophies was truly philosophy at all.

"Thus those who assert that [all is] being (*bhāvavādin*) do not acknowledge non-being and those who assert that [all is] non-being (*abhāvavādin*) do not recognize being as a character of reality³⁰ (*tattvalakṣaṇa*)" (*Vākyap.* III, 3, 63). This is clearly identical with the view expressed in the fourth chapter of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*: "There are actually some disputants who assert the origination of a thing which is already existent; there are other wise men who admit the origination of a thing which is non-existent. They dispute

27. *sabbaṃ atthiti. kho Kaccāyana, ayaṃ eko anto. sabbaṃ nāttithi ayaṃ dutiyo anto. ete te, Kaccāyana, ubho ante anupagamma majjhena tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti Samyutta-Nikāya, XII, 15 (vol. 17)* "Oh Kaccāyana, the doctrine that 'All is being' is one extreme view. The doctrine that 'All is non-being' is the second extreme view. But, Kaccāyana, the Buddha accepts neither of these views and expounds the Law by means of the middle path." Also see vol. 12 of the Chinese translation of the Samyuktāgama the section relating to Kātyāyana (*Taisho Daizo Kyo* vol. 2, p. 85). Further all metaphysical positions are said to be based on the two views 'the ens position' and the 'non-ens position' (See; *Mādhyamāgamas* 26 *Taisho Daizo Ryo*, vol. 1, p. 591a; *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣa-sāstra* vol. 200, *Taisho Daizo Kyo* vol. 27, p. 1002C, etc.)
28. *Astiti, Kāśyapa, ayam eko'ntaḥ, nāstity ayam dvitiyo'ntaḥ. Yad anayor dvayor antayor madhyam iyaṃ ucyaṭe, Kāśyapa, Madhyamaṃ prat pad bhūta-pratyavekṣā. Kāśyapaparivarta*, ed. Staël-Holstein, 60, cf. 52-59. Further, the same argument also appears in *Samādhirājasūtra* (ed. Calcutta, p. 30'. (cf. Mv., p. 135). Here, being apart from the views of ens and non-ens is called 'avivāda' and is thus in accord with the *Māṇḍūkya-kārika*, chapter 4. Also see *Saddh P.* II, gāthā 65, *Laṅkāvatāra* III, 22 (p 152).
29. "Again, Buddha, who knew being both ens and non-ens prohibited both the doctrines; 'all is being' and the 'all is non-being' in (the sūtra which is) the instruction to Kātyāyana. (*Mādhyamika-Sāstra*, 15. 7). See *Mādhyamika-Sāstra* 5. 8.
30. The expression 'tattvasya lakṣaṇam' is used in the *Mādhyamika-Sāstra* (18. 9) but Kumārajīva translates this as 'true form'.

with each other." (*Gauḍapādīya-Kārikā* IV. 3). 'That which is already existent does not come into being' "That which is not non-existent does not come into being" while contending [with each other] in this fashion the dualists actually clarify non-origination (GK. IV. 4.)

As a result of our investigations, there is no room for doubt that Bhartṛhari's argument which denies the reality of change in the phenomenal world as well as the creation of the world is the same as the arguments of the Mādhyamika school and the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, but there is not sufficient evidence available to determine whether he inherited this mode of thought directly from the Mādhyamikas or indirectly through the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*. Both Gijo's description and the content of the *Vākyapadīya* clearly show that he was quite well versed in Buddhist philosophy and it is quite probable that Bhartṛhari came to this position after reading and studying both the works of the Mādhyamika school and the Vedānta scholars. (Just because his presentation resembles that of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikās* one cannot jump to the conclusion that he was directly influenced by that work. One reason for this is that it is now generally believed that there were at the time a large number of other works which were similar to the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*.)

In any case, I think it is clear from the above investigation that the view of Brahman in the absolute sense and the theoretical foundation for this view were both derived, directly, from Mahāyāna Buddhism and particularly the Mādhyamika school. Moreover, the introduction of this theory wrought a marked qualitative change in the thought of the Vedānta schools.

Section 2.3 Comparison with the traditional definitions of *Brahman*.

As I have already remarked the use of negative expressions and adjectives is encountered quite frequently even in the Upaniṣads and there is nothing strange about an orthodox Brahman scholar adopting such a mode of explanation. However, if one accepts his definition at face value then there would seem to be three points at which it contradicts the definition of Brahman given most generally in the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta Schools. First, Bhartṛhari time and again insists that Brahman is 'not one and not diverse' while the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta schools in general regarded Brahman as 'the One (eka)' Not only this but Bhartṛhari himself actually refers to the Brahman as 'eka'.³¹ Thus while it may be permissible

to apply 'not divergent' to Brahman does it not seem that to apply 'not one' would be in direct contradiction to the fundamental teachings of Vedānta? Second, he interprets Brahman as 'not being and not non-being' but in Vedānta Thought in general Brahman is defined as being. For this reason he should not be able to say 'not being and not non-being'. Third, he says Brahman 'neither changes nor is unchanging' but this seems to contradict his own claims that Brahman is above the forms of production and destruction.

These are quite legitimate doubts but I think they can be resolved satisfactorily. First, with reference to the argument for 'not one and not diverse,' Bhartṛhari's ground for making this claim is this argument³²: "Without diversity there is not identity and without identity diversity does not exist. Both are mutually dependent on the other and it is inconceivable that either could exist separately. Each is established only on the assumption of another which stands opposed to it as its negation. Thus both are in reality empty. Ultimately neither identity nor diversity can exist". This summarizes the foundation for his position and as I indicated previously we can see in this the adoption of the ontology of Mahāyāna Buddhism, especially that of the Mādhyamikas. The doctrine of karma, according to which all things are established in a relation of mutual dependency (*parasparāpekṣā*), is quite strongly emphasized in Mahāyāna Buddhism but is not found in other Indian schools. Bhartṛhari incorporated this doctrine into his own thought and used it to provide the foundation for the doctrine of the Upaniṣads that no contemplative determinations whatever were applicable to the absolute Brahman. In other words, he borrowed from Buddhist philosophy to demonstrate the validity of the doctrine propounded in the verses of the holy scriptures, the Upaniṣads. If we stop to think of what reasons he could have had for adopting these expressions and this mode of proof, it seems clear that he wanted to say that Brahman was completely above and apart from the multiplicity and diversity of all things. He expounded the doctrine of 'not identical and not diverse' by examining unity and diversity as the most fundamental logical relations existing between any two things in opposition.

However, the 'eka' expounded in the Upaniṣads is something which transcends all relations of opposition and sometimes the world cause prior to the development of the multifarious phenomenal world is referred to by this term. Its true meaning is something which is apart from all forms of discrimination. In other words,

32. *Vakyap.* III, 6, 26; 28 previously given translation and *Vakyap.* III, 1. 21; III. 7. a. 39.

'eka' is not a positive, determining numeral but is rather a negative term by virtue of its meaning. This term has a character which negates its own primary meaning. Interpreted this way, 'non identity and non-diversity' and 'eka' are synonymous and thus Bhartṛhari felt no contradiction in applying both to the Brahman. There is, however, quite a difference in nuance between these expressions and while 'eka' was a term which had been used among Brahman thought from times past the expression 'not identical and not different' was borrowed from Buddhism.

Reasoning along these lines the second and third problems are easily resolved. To think of Brahman itself as 'being' or 'unchanging' is in accord with the ancient orthodox Brahman thought while the expressions 'not being and not non-being' and 'not changing and not unchanging' were borrowed from Buddhism but it is clear that he thought of both modes of expression as indicating the freedom of Brahman from all forms of discrimination. This being the case, it follows that, in his works, 'one' and 'being' are not used in their literal sense (*mukhya artha*) but in a secondary sense (*gauna artha*), in particular, a metaphysical sense to show absolute negation. He most clearly states that Brahman absolutely transcends the forms of the phenomenal world.

"In the same way the various forms of changes can in no way be established in true reality (*tattva-brahman*). Moreover, this reality seems to have these forms as its essence but [in the highest truth] it is something whose nature is not at all comprised of these forms." (*Vākyap.* III, 2, 10).

Well then, if the absolute Brahman is something which admits of no conceptual restriction and repudiates all attempts to express it, then there arises the question that perhaps the whole enterprise of philosophical inquiry into the nature of Brahman is meaningless from the start. In order to form a philosophical doctrine and convey it to others one must resort to the medium of language. Bhartṛhari himself was faced with this doubt and thus subjected himself to severe self-criticism. As a result, he declared that even though the absolute itself rejected any sort of conceptual limitation yet a philosophy which used language to investigate the absolute was both possible and necessary.

"Real substance (*vastu-Brahman*) is known through its untrue form. The truth itself can be expressed by words which are untrue limiting adjuncts." (*Vākyap.* III, 2, 2).³³ For the absolute words are no more

33. SDS. XIII. lines 230-1 also quote this.

than upādhi, they are not real,³⁴ but by using them it is possible to express what sort of thing Brahman is. He explains the ground of this possibility by a metaphor- 'Just as 'Devadatta's pure house' which is grasped by the term 'house' is expressed by means of a unstable mark.'³⁵ (*Vākyap.* III, 2, 3). According to Helārāja this passage has the following meaning. In order to tell someone which house is 'Devadatta's' house one can use an expression like 'the house on which the crow has alighted'. The crow may, of course, leave immediately, for it is after all an unstable representation which is not part of the nature of the house but it is possible to refer to it for convenience's sake. In just the same way it is possible to refer to and teach someone about Brahman by means of language. In this instance, 'Devadatta's house' corresponds to Brahman and the 'crow' corresponds to 'vac'. This explanation along with Śaṅkara's metaphor of the Arundhatī³⁶ star, which it resembles, are ingenious devices to evoke consent and a measure of understanding, but they are, after all, merely metaphors and, as such, are insufficient to explain how the absolute which transcends language can be discussed linguistically in Vedānta philosophy.

It is probable that for Bhartṛhari this was not the sort of question which could be answered by giving a straightforward proof but rather a question which evoked the whole course of his philosophical development as an answer. He regarded philosophy as the self-development of the absolute. At this point all we want to show is that he was engaged in self-criticism in response to these various methodological doubts and that he was thoroughly confident of validity of his position as a whole.

Section 3: Brahman as the Basis of Differentiated Aspects.

Although Brahman itself, as it has been stated, cannot be conceptually defined and expressed only negatively, we must understand the differentiated aspects of the phenomenal world which we experience as based upon Brahman. An absolute which fails to form the

34. The principle of upādhi was generally recognized throughout Indian philosophy but one group which opposed Śaṅkara maintained that upādhi was real (SDS. XVI, lines 800 f, 865 f.). Since Bhartṛhari regarded upādhi as unreal he is on this point quite close to Śaṅkara.

35. SDS. XIII, lines 232-3 also cite this.

36. In order to teach someone which star is Arundhati it is first necessary to locate a nearby large star and from this indicate which star is Arundhati. Śaṅkara on *Brahmasūtra*, I, 1, 8; 1, 12. Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī on *Vedāntasāra* 20 P. 28.

differentiated aspects of our world lacks the significance of being an absolute. When we consider this matter, we must admit that Brahman has some form of connection with the differentiated aspects. Thus, Bhartṛhari, as previously mentioned, states:

“That (truth, *tattva*)” is neither existent nor non-existent, that is neither one nor different, that is neither united nor separate, that is neither changing nor not different from it (i.e. changeless).” (*Vākyap.* III, 2. 12)

and immediately afterwards he states the opposite,

“That does not exist and yet exists, that is one and yet different, that unites and separates, that changes and is different from it (i.e., does not change).” (*Vākyap.* III, 2. 13)

The commentator Helārāja states in a later verse that “*ātman* within ignorance” (*ātmaivāvidyāyām*) is here being taught. Such a concept reminds us of the Tathāgata-garbha or Ālaya-vijnāna theory in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Therefore, truth or Brahman was thought to possess two aspects: an aspect which transcends all words and is expressed only through negation, and the other aspect which establishes words and is manifested positively. Bhartṛhari compares both aspects and further states:

“(In the highest truth) the truth itself which is not discriminated receives the forms of discrimination. And differentiation in time does not exist in that truth, yet differentiation in time is perceived.” (*Vākyap.* III, 2. 8)

Judging from these quotations, there is no doubt that Bhartṛhari believed that the self-same Brahman possessed two aspects which were completely opposite to each other. One was Brahman in the sense of highest truth, and the other was the aspect which formed the differentiated aspects of the phenomenal world. Both are mutually contradictory, but because of the contradiction the two are united in an absolute. For the very reason that the Brahman from the ultimate standpoint is absolute negation, it is believed that the differentiated aspects can be formed.

That Bhartṛhari conceived of these two contradictory aspects of Brahman is worthy of our attention. In later ages these contradictory and opposing aspects were grasped as two completely separate principles, and they eventually became formed into the two concepts of “highest Brahman” (*param brahma*) and “lower Brahman” (*aparam*

brahma). Bhartṛhari, however, merely saw that there were two aspects to Brahman and did not call them by special technical names. His belief was that the "highest brahman" (*param brahma*) itself separated into multi-varied forms and unfolded the phenomenal world.

Now, the problem that arises is how the Brahman which can be expressed only negatively can become the basis of the differentiated world. Brahman itself is permanent, singular, and undifferentiated, pristine wisdom, but how can this manifest the phenomenal world which is complex, many-sided, and impermanent? Since the Brahman is of only one form, the effect which it unfolds can also be thought of as having only one form, one place, one time, one appearance, one function, and one situation. And since the Brahman is also permanent, the effect which it unfolds must also be permanent. If the source which unfolds the differentiated aspects of the phenomenal world is in Brahman itself, the essence of the Brahman in the ultimate sense must also be plural, because the potentiality of differentiation resides within Brahman. If such is the case, the idea that the highest Brahman is an absolute one is contradicted. Such was the criticism directed against the theory of world-emanation in the Vedānta philosophy of the age.

In order to solve this difficulty the central concern of the Vedānta scholars turned towards explaining the relationship between Brahman and the phenomenal world. All of them faced problems in attempting the explanation, and Bhartṛhari tried to solve the theoretical impasse by positing that the Brahman as world-cause "consists of words."

That Brahman is independent of all differentiated aspects and that it is the basis of all existence are views expressed by the Vedānta school in general, and they cannot be considered as original with Bhartṛhari. His method of expression and proof, however, were under the influence of Buddhism, and this alone accounts for the variation in his thought. In contrast to the other philosophers, Bhartṛhari especially emphasized the fact that Brahman as the basis of differentiated aspects "consists of words" (*śabdāmaya*), that is, it has "words as the essence" (*śabdātattva*). According to him, words are no different from Brahman, and words form the essence of all things. This idea is generally regarded by the scholars of India as the greatest characteristic of Bhartṛhari's philosophy and has frequently been subjected to criticism. He has, therefore, been called *śabdābrahmayādin* or *śabdādvaitayādin*.

अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।
विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥

एकमेकं यदाज्ञातं भिन्नं शक्तिव्यपाश्रयात् ।
अपृथक्त्वेऽपि शक्तिभ्यः पृथक्त्वेनेव वर्तते ॥

अध्याहितकलां यस्य कालशक्तिमुपाश्रिताः ।
जन्मादयो विकाराः षड् भावभेदस्य योनयः ॥

एकस्य सर्वबीजस्य यस्य चैयमनेकधा ।
भोक्तृभोक्तव्यरूपेण भोगकार्येण च स्थितिः ॥

—वाक्यपदीयम् - ब्रह्मकाण्डम् १ - ४

ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA, TRANSMIGRATION AND ABSOLUTION*

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I. Introduction: 'pudgala':

The Brahminical idea of 'self' or 'soul' was rejected by the Buddha. This aspect of his teachings is too pronounced to be missed. But even at a very early stage of Buddhism, there arose within the tradition much controversy over the idea of a 'person' (*pudgala*). The *Kathāvatthu* supplies ample evidence of this fact. The 'Bhāra' dialogue of the *Samyutta-nikāya*¹, where the 'burden' (*bhāra*) is represented as *samsāra* and the carrier as the 'person', is often referred to as the Buddha's concession for some persisting entity through the cycles of transmigration. Of the early Buddhist schools, the Vātsīputriyas and the Sāmmitiyas maintained the notion of a persisting entity called 'pudgala'. This 'pudgala' comes very close to the doctrine of 'soul', which would naturally be regarded as a heresy in Buddhism. In fact, the Vātsīputriyas and the Sāmmitiyas were accused of such a heresy. But the Sāmmitiya's defence of 'pudgala', as K. Venkataramanam informs us, need not be regarded as a heresy. The pudgala here is not exactly the *ātman* of the Brahmanas. The argument is rather for an entity persisting through the ever fluctuating states of transmigration.²

* This is a revised and modified version of an earlier paper entitled "Ālayavijñāna and Transmigration," which was presented at a symposium *Ālayavijñāna* at the annual meeting of the American Oriental Society in Cambridge, Mass., in April 1971.

1. This *sūtra* is alternatively referred to as *Bhārahāra-sutta* or *Bhāra-sutta*. See *Samyutta-nikāya*, Part III,² p. 25-26. Cf. the following lines:

Bhārā have pañcakkandhā
bhārahāro ca puggalo
bhārādānaṃ dukkhaṃ loke
bhāranikkepanaṃ sukhaṃ 1 p. 26.

2. The word "transmigration" is, perhaps, an unfortunate translation to express the Buddhist sense of *samsāra*. Prof. A. K. Narayan drew our attention to this point at the symposium. I have, however, retained this translation in the absence of a better word that might be acceptable to most of us.

The Buddha accepted a highly complex notion of transmigration without a transmigrating soul.³ The analogy is that of a river or stream where there is a continuum but no persisting entity. Although transmigration can conceivably be explained without resorting to a persisting soul, the idea of an underlying 'link' running through the fluctuating states arose quite naturally in many systems which tried to explain the Buddhist notion of transmigration. The *pudgala* of the Sāṃmitīyas was no doubt posited as this 'link'. The Yogācāra's concept of *ālayavijñāna* was another, and perhaps a more sophisticated, approach to explain away this 'link' problem.

It is somewhat paradoxical to see that there was an important trend in Buddhism which recognized an absolute spiritual principle. This trend must have created an internal conflict in Buddhism because the 'no-soul' doctrine, the predominant trend in Buddhism, could not be easily reconciled to it. In Mahāyāna, this principle is usually called the *Tathāgatagarbha*. In Yogācāra system, this principle was attributed to *ālayavijñāna*.

II. *Vijñāna* in the 'five personality-aggregates':

The group of five personality aggregates' (*pañca skandhāḥ*) is usually substituted for 'self' or 'person' in Buddhist literature. In interpreting them I shall mainly follow Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*. The 'aggregate of matter' refers to the visible forms of the material world. The 'aggregate of feeling' (*vedanā-skandha*) stands for the experiences of pleasure, pain and neutral feelings. The 'aggregate of knowings' (*saṃjñā-skandha*) is to be explained as the awareness (or the conceptual construction) of the 'specific' characters of objects (cf. *Abhidharmakośa* I/14). The 'aggregate of *saṃskāra*' includes all other mental acts (*citta-dharma*) as well as other acts and 'forces' which are not attendant upon an act of consciousness (*citta-viprayukta-dharma*).⁴

The 'aggregate of consciousness' is usually divided into seven items. They are: consciousness of five senses, 'mental' consciousness (*manovijñāna*) and mind. But in the Sārvāstivāda, although 'mind'

3. For the Sāṃmitīya explanation of *pudgala* see K. Venkataramanam's translation of the *Sāṃmitīyanikaya-sāstra*, *Visva-Bhārati Annals*, Vol. V, 1953, pp. 153-242.

4. For a good discussion of this item, see P. S. Jaini, pp. 88 - 98.

(*mano-dhātu*) is mentioned, it is not considered an additional entity.⁵ It is just any one of the six types of consciousness. The consciousness in the immediately preceding moment acts as the 'locus' (*āśraya*) of the consciousness in the next moment and is designated as 'mind'. This explanation is related to the Abhidharma concept of *samanantara-pratyaya*.⁶

In the Sthaviravāda school, however, 'mind' is distinguished from the six *viññānas* (which include *mano-viññāna*). In *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho*, three peculiar functions (*pañcadvārāvajjana*, or adverting of mind toward any of the five 'doors', i.e., senses, and two classes of *sampañicchana*, or mental 'acceptance' of impressions - S. Z. Aung's translation) are ascribed to *manodhātu* 'mind'.⁷ Some other functions like *santīraṇa* (investigating) and *voṭṭhāpana* (determining) are ascribed to *mano-viññāna* 'mental consciousness'. Another entity, viz., *hadaya-vatthu* 'the heart essence', is sometimes posited by the Sthaviras as the seat or locus of consciousness, and as the locus it is distinct from consciousness.⁸ But the 'heart essence' is described as a *subtle* material form (*sūkṣma-rūpa*) and as such it is different from *citta-dharma* 'mental form'. The *Dhammsaṅgaṇi* omitted this 'heart-essence' from its list, so did the Sarvāstivādins as well as the later Yogācārins. But the Yogācārins speak of the 'mind' or the 'ego-shrunk mind' (*kliṣṭa-manas*) as different from the six *viññānas*. And thus, surprisingly, the Yogācārins agree with the Sthaviras in this respect. Another 'subtle material form' in the list of the Sthaviras was *jīvitendriya* 'life' or 'life function'. In Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra, it was included in the *citta-viprayukta*

5. The usual trend in the Āgamas as well as in the Abhidharma is to analyse dharma into *skandha*, *āyatana* and *dhātu* ('aggregates', 'bases' and 'basic elements'). Thus, 'mind' is included in the *viññāna-skandha*. Among the *āyatanas*, there is one called *mana-āyatana*, and among the *dhātus*, there is one called *mano-dhātu* or *manoviññāna-dhātu*. But *mana-āyatana* and *mano-dhātu* are considered to be the same. And the Sarvāstivādins consider the *mano-viññāna* and *mano-dhātu* to be the same. Cf. *Abhidharma-kośa*, I/16.
6. Cf. *Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya*, I/16, 17; *Abhidharma-dīpa*, I/6, 7.
7. For the position of the Sthaviras, see S. Z. Aung's note on *dhātu* and *āyatana* in *Compendium of Philosophy*, pp. 254-259. See also Aung's note on pp. 108-109. 3.
8. See Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārtha* under *Abhidharma-kośa*, I/17. See also *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho*, Chap. III, p. 82:
vatthusaṅgahe vatthuni nāma - cakku - sota - ghāṇa - jihvā - kāya - hadaya - vatthu ceti chabbidhani bhavanti |

For the Sthaviras' position on the connection between the *mano-dhātu* (as well as the *viññānas*) and the *hadaya-vatthu*, see, *ibid.*, p. 83.

samskāra 'non-material, abstract elements not concomitant with any consciousness'.⁹

More interesting is the concept of *bhavāṅga vijñāna* in the Sthaviravāda. It has been explained as the passive state or 'current' (*srota*) of consciousness linking the fluctuating and transmigrating stages. It is contrasted with the active stream of consciousness (cf. *vīthi-citta* in Sthaviravāda, and *pravṛtti-vijñāna* or *viśaya-vijñapti* in the Yogācāra). As S. Z. Aung has aptly put it, "it is, as it were, the background on which thought-pictures are drawn" (p. 11). This current is said to be bounded by birth (*pratisandhi*) and death (*cyuti*), but as death is but a prelude to another birth, according to the Indian theory of *samsāra*, this current flows from life to life, from existence to existence. It is also said to create the false notion of 'personal identity'.¹⁰

Consciousness moments or the flow of active thoughts are usually classified in Buddhism into 'good' (*kuśala*) and 'bad' or 'evil' (*a-kuśala*) types. Since good cannot spring from evil or *vice versa*, there arose a problem in the Buddhist explanation of the causal continuum of the flow of consciousness moments: How can a good *citta* 'thought' arise out of a bad one? The Sthaviras explained the causal process taking recourse to the notion of *bhavāṅga-vijñāna*, which is *a-vyākṛta* 'indeterminate' (i.e., neither good nor bad) and, therefore can very well intervene between the emergence of a good thought and a bad one.¹¹

The Vaibhāṣikas posit two additional entities called *prāpti* and *a-prāpti* (two *citta-viprayukta-samskāras*), which are merely two 'forces'—one controlling the collection of particular causal conditions and the other preventing such a collection. Thus, emergence of a bad *citta* can be succeeded by that of a good one through the operation of these two 'forces'—one preventing the bad while the other causing the good to arise and *vice versa*.¹²

9. See note 4. For the Yogācāra notion of *Jīvitendriya*, see Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya: jīvitendriyaṃ katamat|nikāyasabhāge pūrvakarmāviddhe sūtrikālaniame āyur iti prajñapti|* p. 11.

10. The process of active thoughts arising out of the 'passive' mind is described in detail in the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, Chap. IV. See also Aung's Introductory Essay, pp. 27-30.

11. See P. S. Jaini, *Introduction*, pp. 101-110.

12. For Vasubandhu's critique of *prāpti*, see *Abhidharma-kosa-bhāṣya* under verses II/35-36. Yaśomitra, explains in *Sphuṭārtha* why this notion is not exactly the same as the *saṃyoga* 'conjunction' of the Vaiśeṣikas.

The Sautrāntikas criticize both these views and posit their theory of 'seed' and 'maturity'. Seeds of evil are said to co-exist with seeds of good side by side, in the form of 'subtle' seeds. Only one of them operates at a given time--the one that has reached its *vipāka* i.e., 'maturity'.¹³

Now we can take a close look at the Yogācāra classification of *viññāna*. Asaṅga, in his *Yogācārabhūmi*, studied the 'plane of mind' (*manobhūmi*) in its five aspects: its 'own nature' (*svabhāva*), its locus, its intentional reference, its accessories, and its action. Its 'own nature' has three forms: *citta*, *manas* and *viññāna*. *Citta* is *ālaya-viññāna*, *manas* is the 'ego-shrunk' or 'ego-centered' mind, and *viññāna* is the 'consciousness of six senses'.¹⁴

The locus of consciousness can be of three types: a causal concomitant (cf. *sahabhū*), or a causal precedent (cf. *samanantara*), or a causal seed (cf. *bhījāśraya*). The causal concomitance of the five types of sensory consciousness are respectively the five senses themselves. The causal precedent is the 'mind', which is interpreted, following the Sarvāstivāda principle, as the immediately preceding consciousness moment.¹⁵ But the locus which is causal precedent to the 'mental' consciousness is distinguished as the 'ego-shrunk' mind (*kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ*), which is attendant (*samprayukta*) with ego-sense, pride etc. (*asmimāna* etc.). The causal seed, however, for all types of consciousness is *ālayaviññāna*. Thus, it is clear that the idea of a causal seed of the Sautrāntikas and the idea of a subterranean current of consciousness continuum, which was vaguely present in the Sthaviras' talk about the *bhavāṅga-viññāna*, contributed to the development of the notion of *ālayaviññāna* in the Yogācāra system.¹⁶

13. For the Sautrāntika position, see Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya* under verse II/36, p. 64, and verse V/2a, p. 278 (see also Yaśomitra's comment on this section). For the Vaibhāṣika critique of the 'seed' theory, see *Abhidharma-dīpa*, and the commentary, pp. 220-225.

14. See *Yogācārabhūmi*, p. 11. *Citta*, *manas*, and *viññāna* are usually taken to be synonymous in the Sarvāstivāda school. Compare Ghoṣaka's comment in *Abhidharmamūlā*: *Cittaṃ mano viññānam ity anarhāntaram | niruktāṃ evāntaram* | p. 55.

15. See *Yogācārabhūmi*: *Manaḥ katamat | yat saṃjñam api vijñānakāyānam anantaniruddhaṃ kliṣṭaṃ ca mano yaṃ nityam avidyātmadr̥ṣṭyasmimāna-tṛṣṇālakṣaṇaḥ caturbhīḥ kleṣaiḥ samprayuktaṃ* || p. 11.

16. Cf. Vasubandhu's *Trimsikā*: *Tatrālayākhyam viññānam vipākaṃ sarvabijakam* | verse 2cd.

III. The Sautrāntika school: *bīja* (seed) and *vipāka* (maturity)

A few historical comments on the origin of the Sautrāntika school and its relation to the Yogācāra school will be pertinent here. The Sautrāntika school could have originated some time in the second half of the first century A.D. (with Dharmatrāta). It was definitely an established school in the third century A.D. with such exponents as Śrīlata. Both the Pāli and the Sanskrit accounts agree that this school branched from the old Sarvāstivāda school and it was the last of the eighteen Nikāyas.¹⁷ The very name 'Sautrāntika' indicates that this school emphasized the authority of the Sūtras over the Abhidharma.¹⁸ Vasumitra noted the other name of this school as *saṃkrāntivāda*. And this name is explained with recourse to its special doctrine of transmigration. This doctrine holds that the *skandhas* transmigrate (i.e., are transferred) from one existence to the other.¹⁹ This special 'transmigration' doctrine was further developed into the doctrine of 'seed' *bīja*, and a discussion of this *bīja* doctrine is to be found in Vasubandhu's work and Yaśomitra's commentary.²⁰ It has been suggested (e.g., by J. Masuda, p. 66) that the above Sautrāntika doctrine was probably the outcome of the criticism of the *pudgala* doctrine (of the Vātsīputriyas) by the Sarvāstivādins and the early Mahīśāsakas. The Sarvāstivādins and the early Mahīśāsakas maintained the theory of perpetual flux of all *saṃskāras*. The Vātsīputriyas, on the other hand, held that some *saṃskāras* are momentary while others can persist for some time.²¹ And they also held that *dharma*s can transmigrate (cf. *saṃkānti*) from one existence to the other only along with the *pudgala*, not by themselves.

The Sarvāstivādins and the early Mahīśāsakas protested and claimed that no *dharma*s can, in fact, transmigrate since they are momentary. And, in this context, I think, the Sautrāntikas argued that the *skandhas* transmigrate. J. Masuda has conjectured that the 'skandha' here probably meant, as the Chinese commentator once interpreted, the 'seed' *bīja*, or perhaps, it meant what the Sautrāntikas called *ekarasa-skandha*. The Sautrāntika idea of the *ekarasa-skandha* was interpreted in the Chinese commentary as the "subtle

17. The Sanskrit source is supplied chiefly by Vasumitra's treatises. The Pāli sources are *Kathāvatthu*, *Dīpavaṃsa* etc. See J. Masuda, p. 66.

18. Cf. Yaśomitra's comment in *Sphuṭārtha: kaṣ Sautrāntikārthaḥ | ye sūtra-prāmāṇikā na sāstraprāmāṇikāḥ te Sautrāntikāḥ ||* p. 11.

19. See J. Masuda, p. 66.

20. See Vasubandhu and Yaśomitra under *Abhidharmakośa*, verses II/36 and V/2a.

21. See J. Masuda, p. 54.

consciousness," and Masuda thinks that this might be due to an influence of the Mahāsamghikas.²² In any case, the idea of 'subtle consciousness' must have found its way in the Yogācāra idea of *ālayavijñāna*, as did the idea of 'seed' *bīja*.

The 'seed' theory, in plain language, means that the past passions leave behind their seeds in subtle forms which possess the power to produce new passions. In this way the causal chain is to be maintained. This theory was severely criticized by the Vaibhāṣikas.²³ But there were undoubtedly several 'unconscious' in *santāna* or consciousness series where the Buddhist faced the problem of explaining the causal continuity between the immediately preceding *vijñāna* 'consciousness moment' and the new 'waking' *vijñāna* following such a state. For example, there may be a (i) seizure or swoon (*mūrecha*) or (ii) a state of extreme inaction (*middha*); or, there may be (iii) meditational cessation of the 'ego-shrunk' mind-stream or (iv) some other 'higher order' meditational cessation (cf., *nirodha-samāpatti* etc.).

The Vaibhāṣikas explain that the causal precedent of the 'waking' *vijñāna* is the *vijñāna* immediately preceding such an 'unconscious' state. But this called for some modification in the usual definition of the 'causal precedent' (cf. *samanantara*). Ordinarily there should not be intervention of any moment between the causal precedent and its resultant *vijñāna*. But the Vaibhāṣikas interpreted 'non-intervention' in this context as the 'non-intervention by a *sajātīya* (similar) moment'. Since the 'unconscious' states described above do not involve any consciousness moment, the said problem is thus avoided.

In the Yogācāra system, however, with the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* it was easy to explain the causal sequence satisfactorily. The flow of *ālayavijñāna* continues in all the above-mentioned states. All *vijñānas* leave behind their residual 'seeds', which await their respective 'maturities' (*vipāka*) to generate further *vijñānas*. Thus, in the immediately preceding moment of any one of the 'unconscious' states described above, all *vijñānas* dissolve into *manovijñāna*, which in its turn dissolves into *ālayavijñāna* retaining the results (*phala*) in the form of 'seeds'. The 'waking' consciousness arises out of one of these maturing 'seeds'. Thus, the *ālayavijñāna* is called the locus of the 'seeds' of all *vijñānas*.²⁴

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 66-69.

23. See note 13 above.

24. Cf. *Yogācārabhūmi: Sarvabījakaṃ āsrayopādātṛ-vipākasaṃgrhitam ālayavijñānam bhīṣāśrayah* | p. 4.

IV. The causal continuum in *samsāra* 'transmigration'

In Asaṅga's Yogācāra system, *ālayavijñāna* became almost the central concept. Thus, Sthiramati asserted that because of the presence of *ālayavijñāna* transmigration (*samsāra*) and its cessation (*nirvāṇa*) could become possible.²⁵ The implication is that without resorting to the notion of *ālayavijñāna* it would be difficult to explain the causal chain in birth and re-birth as well as the causal sequence in the attainment of *nirvāṇa*. In this way, *ālayavijñāna* rose to a unique prominence, which we will see in the next section.

The perpetuation of existence is usually explained in Buddhism by the causal chain with twelve members, which is known as the *dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda*. In this causal chain each succeeding member arises with the preceding member as its 'condition' (*pratyaya*). *Vijñāna* is the third member (in this chain) which comes 'after *samskāra*, i.e., 'traces' of action in the former birth, which in its turn depends upon *avidyā* (often wrongly translated as ignorance), i.e., wrong beliefs or wrong tendencies. After *vijñāna*, comes *nāmarūpa*, the formation of the mind-body complex, i.e., the five 'personality' aggregates, at the time of the conception in the womb. The *nāmarūpa* gives way to the six sense organs and so on until rebirth and old age and death in the next birth.²⁶

Sthiramati claims that the third member in this causal chain, *vijñāna*, is nothing but *ālayavijñāna*. The Vaibhāṣikas explain it as the *pratisandhi-vijñāna*, which is interpreted as the five 'personality' aggregates just at the moment of conception.²⁷ It is called *vijñāna* 'consciousness' only in a metaphorical sense. Even if we ignore the metaphorical sense and consider it simply as the 'consciousness aggregate' (*vijñāna-skandha*) at the moment of conception, it will be difficult to explain how 'traces' of the former birth (cf. *samskāra*) can give rise to such a consciousness aggregate at the time of conception. The 'traces' from a former birth are not stable and hence will cease long before the time of conception. And something which has ceased to exist becomes non-existent and hence cannot be a *pratyaya*, 'causal condition'.

25. See Sthiramati under *Triṃśikā* pp. 37-39.

26. The twelve members in the causal chain of transmigration are the following: *avidyā*, *samskāra* | *vijñāna*, *nāmarūpa*, *ṣaḍāyatana*, *sparsa*, *vedanā*, *trṣṇā*, *bhava* | *jāti*, *jarāmaraṇa*. For the Sarvāstivāda explanation of this chain, see Vasubandhu under *Abhidharmakośa* verses III/19-28, pp. 129-140.

27. Cf. Vasubandhu's remark: *mātuḥ kukṣau pratisandhikṣaṇe pañcaskandhā vijñānam* | p. 131 (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*).

Besides, at the moment of conception the mind-body complex is also to appear. If the 'traces' give rise to 'consciousness' *viññāna* (at the time of conception) they should likewise give rise to the 'mind-body' complex at that time. If *nāmarūpa* is interpreted as the 'mind-body' complex of the succeeding stage arising after the *pratisandhi-viññāna* (*viññāna* belonging to the conception 'time'), how does this stage differ from its previous stage (i.e., the conception 'time') when the 'consciousness aggregate' is there along with the 'mind-body' complex (*pañca-skandhah*-five aggregates)? In fact, if the initial 'mind-body' complex including the 'consciousness aggregate' arises depending upon the 'traces' we do not need to posit *viññāna*, the third member in the causal chain, as intervening between *samskāra* 'traces' and the *nāmarūpa*. Thus, Sthiramati argues that to maintain consistency and retain the 'twelve-fold' causal chain of Buddhism, we need to assume *ālayaviññāna* as that subterranean stream of consciousness where the 'traces' or 'forces' leave their 'seeds'. The causal chain can now be explained as follows: 'Wrong belief' (*avidyā*) conditions the appearance of 'traces' or 'forces', and the 'traces' condition the stream of the 'seeded' *ālayaviññāna*, and when the 'seeds' reach maturity (*vipāka*) the 'mind-body' complex arises. The same flow of the seeded *ālayaviññāna* starts other continuous activities in a similar manner at the end of such 'unconscious' states as *nirodha-samāpatti* (described above).²⁸

Sthiramati further argues that without resorting to the *ālaya-viññāna* doctrine it would be difficult to explain the process of cessation in *nirvāṇa*. His arguments can be briefly stated as follows. Perpetuation of existence (or *samsāra*) is due mainly to what is known as *kleśa* 'mental blemishes' or 'passions' such as attachment (*rāga*) and ego-sense, and secondarily to *karma* (action). Since action by itself cannot condition the future existence unless it is engineered by *kleśas*, we have to consider *kleśa* to be the root (*mūla*) of *samsāra*. Thus, only with the cessation of *kleśa* 'mental blemishes', the 'forces' leading to the future existence will cease to operate. Now, a *kleśa* may be in the process of taking its course, or it may exist in the form of a 'seed'. Only the 'seed' form of a *kleśa* can be destroyed by an opposite mental state (*pratipakṣa-citta*), other *kleśas* must take their courses in order to generate further *kleśas* and action. Now, the seed of a *kleśa* must be located in consciousness, and this locus must be the *ālayaviññāna*, the subter-

28. See Sthiramati under *Triṃśikā* verse 16. Cf. *Evam āsaṃjñikādiṣu mano-viññāne niruddhe tadapagame punaḥ kuta utpadyate yat tasya kālakriyā na bhavati | tat punar ālayaviññānād evotpadyate | tad hi sarvaviññānabhījakam-iti* // p. 35.

anean consciousness. Otherwise, to make the destruction of the seed possible, we have to admit the impossible situation that the same 'mental' state or the state of consciousness (i.e., the *prati-pakṣa-citta*) acts as the locus of the seed and at the same time brings about its destruction. Thus, the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine solves the problem of the locus and explains the causal process in obtaining *nirvāṇa*. Sthiramati informs that a detailed discussion of transmigration and its cessation with the help of the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine can be found in the *Pañcaskandhaka*.²⁹

V. *Ālayavijñāna*, *Tathāgatagarbha* and *āśrayaparāvṛtti*

Apart from the *pudgala* controversy, there was another stream in early Buddhism which recognized an Absolute spiritual principle existing in every being. In Mahāyāna, this was usually called the *garbha* theory which we find expounded in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*. An unidentified prakṛt verse³⁰ sums up the *garbha* as follows:

*Yathā pattharacūṇṇamhi jātarūpaṃ na dissati |
parikammeṇa tad diṭṭhaṃ evaṃ loke tathāgata ||*

This means that the *Tathāgata* lives invisible in living beings like pure gold in stones and sands and by purification it becomes visible. Such numerous comparisons of the *Tathāgata* with pure gold, with an impenetrable diamond, and with the immutable gem, point to the positive aspect of this spiritual principle. In the Yogācāra school, the *Tathāgatagarbha* doctrine became connected with the *ālayavijñāna* doctrine in a very interesting manner, which we will presently see.

As a critique of the *niḥsvabhāvatā* doctrine of the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra* established the *tri-svabhāvatā* doctrine and the *ālayavijñāna*.³¹ The *Ratnagotravibhāga* expounded the *garbha* theory also as a criticism of the *śūnyatā* or *niḥsvabhāvatā* 'emptiness' doctrine. Thus, comparison between the *garbha* doctrine and the *ālayavijñāna* was obvious and natural. Besides, there was undoubtedly mutual influence in the development of both doctrines. J. Takasaki

29. *Ibid.* p. 39. This was probably a work of Vasubandhu translated by Hueng Tsang into Chinese, and Sthiramati probably summarized the book under the same title (Sylvain Levi).

30. E. H. Johnston described it as Prakṛt verse. J. Takasaki mentions it as in Pāli verse.

31. *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra*, Chap. VI, 4-6 (E. Lamotte's translation) pp. 60-65.

has collected important references to the confusion and the later amalgamation of these two doctrines.³² Special mention may be made of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, chap. VI, where the *Tathāgatagarbha* has been identified with the *ālayavijñāna*. I think that these two doctrines were connected even in their origin. Thus, in the *Mahāyānasūtrā-lāṅkāra*, chap. IX, we find an early fusion of the two. And this must have influenced the later Yogācārins like Vasubandhu and Sthiramati. The following verse from the (Mahāyāna) *Abhidharma-sūtra* is quoted in both places : in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* to justify the *garbha* doctrine and in the *Triṃśikā-bhāṣya* to justify the *ālayavijñāna* :

*Anādikāliko dhātuḥ sarvadharmasamāśrayaḥ |
tasmin sati gatiḥ sarvā nirvāṇādhigamo'pi vā ||*

"It is the beginningless *dhātu* and the locus of all dharmas, all causal sequence results from it, even realisation of *nirvāṇa* is due to it."³²

It should also be noted that the Sautrāntika 'seed' theory might have played some part in connecting the *ālaya* doctrine with the *garbha* doctrine. Some element of the 'good' is said to persist through the series of existence. This Sautrāntika idea of a subtle and incorruptible *kuśala-mūla* 'root of good action' is strikingly similar to the Mahāyāna *garbha* theory. The incorruptible element of the good to be found in every being corresponds, as P. Jaini rightly conjectures, to the 'seed of salvation', *mokṣa-bīja* which we find in later writings. Yaśomitra quotes the following significant verse where the Buddha compares the 'seed of freedom' with a seam of gold hidden in a mineral rock :³³

*Mokṣa-bījaṃ ahaṃ hy asya susūkṣmaṃ upalakṣaye |
dhātupāṣāṇavivare nilīnam iva kāñcanam ||*

"I notice the extremely subtle seed of freedom of this man hidden (in him) like gold in the vein of a mineral rock."

This saying is associated with one of the ten powers of the Buddha (for which he was called *daśabala*) viz., the power to realize the pure and indestructible element, the *dhātu* or the *gotra* or the *bīja*, of every being. Thus, in many contexts '*gotra*', '*dhātu*' and '*bīja*' were interchangeably used. In Yogācāra, this pure ele-

32. See 'J. Takasaki, pp. 40-45.

33. Yaśomitra quotes the whole episode along with this verse. For P. S. Jaini's comment, see his *Introduction*, pp. 115-116.

ment was called the *prakṛti-prabhāsvara-citta* 'mind which is essentially pure and translucent'. And this was further identified with the *tathatā*.³⁴

The flow of *ālayavijñāna* continues until *nirvāṇa*.³⁵ But, if the *ālaya* doctrine is to be brought closer to the Absolutism of the *tathatā*, we have to investigate the state of *ālayavijñāna* at the realization of *nirvāṇa*. The *Triṃśikā* says that in *nirvāṇa* this subterranean base (the *ālaya*) 'returns to itself', resulting in a transcendental (*lokottara*), non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*) - *jñāna*. And this 'returning to itself' happens at the removal of the two types of *dauṣṭhulya* 'blemishes' ('turbulence' — S. Levi; 'Verderbtheit' — E. Frauwallner) or two types of coverings (cf. *vṛti* in *Mahāyānasūtrā-lankāra*, p. 35)³⁶

The key terms to be investigated in this connection are *āśraya-parāvṛtti* and *āśraya-parivṛtti* (see Takasaki for references, pp. 40-45). In the *Mahāyānasūtrā-lankāra*, they are often used interchangeably. E. H. Johnston noted (p. xii) a difference between the *garbha* and the *ālaya* doctrines reflected in this difference in terms: In the latter, the *āśraya* or *ālayavijñāna* returns to itself in *nirvāṇa*, while in the former, as the pure *tathatā* is freed from the sheaths of *kleśas* in *nirvāṇa* (compare Sthiramati's explanation of the process of *nirvāṇa* given above), a metamorphosis of the *āśraya* takes place. I would note that this kind of distinction was not always maintained in the literature. There is, indeed, an obvious and essential similarity between the two doctrines. Thus, in Sthiramati's explanation of *ālayavijñāna*, the notion *parivṛtti* 'metamorphosis' seems to have been assimilated with *parāvṛtti* 'returning to itself'. Thus, in short, at *nirvāṇa* the *vijñāna* becomes *jñāna*, and it is called the *anāśraya dhātu* 'incorruptible element' (cf. *Triṃśikā*, verse 30), and the *āśraya-kṣaya* or *vimalāśraya* (cf. *Ratnagotravibhāga*, I, 44).

It should also be noted that the above view is also consistent with the 'triple nature' doctrine of reality (cf. *tri-svabhāvatā*) of the Asaṅga school. The *Sandhinirmocana* speaks of the triple aspect of the reality as opposed to its emptiness: the dependent (*paratantra*) aspect, the imagined (*parikalpita*) aspect and the perfected aspect (*pariṇiṣpanna*). This doctrine is explained with the help of an illustration of a crystal ball appearing red due to its proximity to a red object. The red appearance is called the imagined aspect, and the red crystal ball is the dependent aspect. The perfected aspect

34. Cf. *Triṃśikā*, verses 29, 30.

35. *ibid.* verse 5a: *tasya vyāvṛttir arhatve*.

36. See Sthiramati under *Triṃśika* verse 29.

is the crystal ball itself when considered independently of its red appearance, the imagined aspect. Thus, the doctrine says that the 'dependent' nature is empty of the imagined nature and it is the 'dependent' nature which turns into the 'perfected' nature when the 'imagined' nature wipes itself out.³⁷ Thus, the *ālayavijñāna* turns into the 'perfected' *jñāna* when the 'blemishes' wipe out themselves.

The *garbha* theory, despite obvious dissimilarities, was no doubt, influenced by the Upaniṣadic Absolutism, and it might have influenced in its turn the *ajātivāda* 'the doctrine of non-origination' of Gaudapāda. The significant term '*ajāti*' occurs at least twice in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*.³⁸ Now, if the *ālaya* doctrine is identified with the *garbha* doctrine, it will be easy to confuse the *ālaya* with the 'soul' of the Brāhmaṇas. This might have been the reason why the Dīnāga school of Yogācāra ignored the *ālaya* doctrine.

In the Upaniṣads, the 'soul' is to be finally realized as the Brahman, the non-dual reality, the Absolute. The *Triṃśikā* says that when the *ālaya* returns to itself it becomes the *dharmakāya* of the Buddha, the 'non-dual' (*advaya*) principle, the Absolute.³⁹ But the important difference between the two principles (although both are called Absolute) should not be overlooked. The 'soul' is the static, unchanging and all-pervading substance; it is called *nitya* 'eternal'. The *ālaya*, on the other hand, is the ever-changing, dynamic 'link' like the subterranean current of water in the ocean; the *Triṃśikā* calls it *dhruva* 'an ever-changing constant' (verse 30). It is the ever-changing ever-lastingness. (Compare *kūṭasthanityatā* and *pariṇāmīnityatā* of the later philosophical literature). Thus, the warning comes from the *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra*:⁴⁰ (The Buddha says:)

*ādānavijñānagabhīrasūkṣmo ogho yathā vartati sarvabījo /
bālā eṣāṃ api na prakāśīte mohaiva ātmā parikalpayeyuh ||*

"the 'receptacle' consciousness is the locus of all seeds, deep and subtle like the ocean. I have not revealed this notion lest fools construe this as the 'soul' out of confusion."

37. See *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra*, Chap. IV. Cf. *Tatra guṇākara nimittasambādhanāmani nīrītya parikalpītalakṣaṇaṃ prajñāyate | paratantralakṣaṇe parikalpītalakṣaṇābhīnivesaṃ nīrītya paratantralakṣaṇaṃ prajñāyate || paratantralakṣaṇe parikalpītalakṣaṇābhīnivesābhāvaṃ nīrītya pariniṣpannalakṣaṇaṃ prajñāyate ||* p. 63 (E. Lamotte's translation).

38. See pp. 12, 47.

39. The sense of 'Absolute' that I have in mind here is usually expressed in Sanskrit by such expressions as '*advaya-tattva*', '*anapekṣatva*', '*svatantratva*' and '*tathatā*'.

40. This verse is quoted in the commentary of Sthiramati on *Triṃśika*; see p. 34.

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attānaṃ ce tathā kayirā yath' aññaṃ anusāsati
 sudanto vata dametha attā hi kira duddamo

If a man so shapes his life as he directs others, then, subduing himself well, he might indeed subdue (others), since the self is indeed difficult to subdue.

attā hi attano nātho ko hi nātho paro siyā
 attanā hi sudantena nātham labhati dullabham

The self is the lord of self; who else could be the lord? With self well subdued a man finds a lord who is difficult to obtain.

Verses 159-60, ATTAVAGGO—THE DHAMMAPADA.

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THE CONCEPT OF PURUṢA IN THE SĀMKNHYA SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

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I. The Demonstration for the Existence of Puruṣa

The *puruṣa* (spirit, soul) under consideration in this paper is the *puruṣa* of classical Sāmkhya (hereafter simply, Sāmkhya). In Sāmkhya, together with *vyakta* (the manifested) and *avyakta* (the unmanifested), *puruṣa* is systematically demonstrated and postulated as one of its three fundamental principles. It has been generally held in the past that the demonstration of *puruṣa* is not of prime importance. However, the demonstration makes clear the characteristics of the *puruṣa* concept in the Sāmkhya school of philosophy. It is believed that the purpose of the demonstration was to distinguish the *puruṣa* of Sāmkhya from the *puruṣa* of the other system.

The Kārikās that require special attention for the demonstration of *puruṣa* are Kārikās 17, 18, and 19. These three are crucial for the formation of the *puruṣa* concept and they succinctly define the unique features of what may be called the "Sāmkhyapuruṣa"¹. They are not only self-contained explanations in themselves, but they are also important for the understanding of the adjacent kārīkās.

Kārikā 17 demonstrates the existence of *puruṣa* in close connection with the antecedent kārīkās.² This is evident when we note that the ground for the demonstration is the fact of *triguṇa* (three

1. This refers to Sāmkhya-puruṣa as the Sāmkhya-*tattva* (principle, truth) which forms the central concept of the Sāmkhya system of philosophy. Sāmkhya-*tattva* is the goal of practice (*adhyāsa*) which provides the moment for the testimony of deliverance and results in the final emancipation of *puruṣa*. (Kārikā, 64). Therefore, the explanation of Sāmkhya-puruṣa cannot be accomplished by merely studying the critical views developed on the subject by the non-Sāmkhya philosophical schools.

2. *samghāta* - *parārthatvāt* *triguṇādi-viparyayād* *adhiṣṭhānat* /
puruṣo 'sti *bhoktr-bhāvāt* *kaivalyārtha-paravṛttes*' ca //

attributes) composition. According to Kārikā 11,³ *puruṣa* is a composite of *atriguṇa* in contrast to *vyakta* and *avyakta*. The fact that *puruṣa* is an *atriguṇa* presupposes a *triguṇa* composition. That is, the necessary conclusion to the assumption of *triguṇa* composition is *puruṣa*. In order to fully understand this we must first understand the contents of *triguṇa*. In the Kārikā the three *guṇas* are defined and their triune nature is explained. The three are *sattva* (joy, pleasure), *rajas* (sorrow, pain), and *tamas* (darkness, ignorance). The three *guṇas* possess their respective characteristics, they are mutually inter-related, and they function as a single unit for a specific purpose.⁴ Such an unified *triguṇa* is universally prevalent in *vyakta* and *avyakta*. *Vyakta* is the plural effect which has for its cause the single fundamental cause, *avyakta*, and which must be clearly distinguished from the latter.

Vyakta has a cause, is non-eternal, non-pervading, and active. It is multiform, dependent, and mergent; it is conjunctive and subordinate. *Avyakta* is opposed to this and is causeless, permanent, pervading, inactive, single, non-dependent, non-submerged, disjunctive, and independent⁵.

Vyakta and *avyakta* are thus differentiated, but they are equally composed of *triguṇa* and are non-existent apart from *triguṇa*. The reason is that the *triguṇa* of *vyakta* which is grasped directly by sense perception *anumāna* is always derived from the fundamental cause, the *triguṇa* of *avyakta*⁶. Thus, *vyakta* and *avyakta* are identical as *triguṇa* composition. This can be clarified by the triune nature of *triguṇa*.

Indiscriminate and the rest depend upon the existence of *triguṇa*.....Since the properties of the effect is dependent on those of cause, it is clarified that *avyakta* is likewise.⁷

Since *vyakta* and *avyakta* have both been shown to be composed of *triguṇa*, it is clear that *puruṣa* must be demonstrated on the

3. *triguṇam aviveki viśayaḥ sāmānyam acetanaṁ parasavadharmi /
vyaktaṁ tathā pradhānaṁ tadviparitas tathā ca pumān /*

4. Kārikās, 12 and 13. See my article in Japanese, "On the systematic theory of *guṇa*," in my book, "The Sāṃkhya System of Philosophy", Kyoto, 1964.

5. Kārikās, 10 and 15.

6. Kārikās, 6 and 8-9.

7. Kārikās, 14.

basis of triguṇa composition. It would be difficult to understand the statements that composite objects are for another's use (saṅghāta-parārthatva) and that it is the reverse of triguṇa and other composite objects (triguṇādi-viparyaya). Although the fundamental cause, avyakta, has been explained by triguṇa, puruṣa cannot be demonstrated in the same way, since it is completely different in constitution. Even though we speak of its being demonstrated by means of triguṇa, the demonstration of puruṣa (atriguṇa) which is completely different, from avyakta must have a different demonstration. This point however, can be seen in the view that composite objects are for another's use.

As noted in the commentary, *saṅghāta* refers to the triguṇa compositions, vyakta and avyakta. As a triguṇa composition, saṅghāta acts in a triune manner, and the activity of saṅghāta is invariably for the sake of others.⁸ It never acts for itself or for each other. Sense perception is a good example. For example, just as the composites we call bed or house do not exist for their own sake or for the sake of each other, but for the sake of man, so likewise all composites do not act for themselves nor for each other but for the sake of others. The triguṇa composite by its very nature is indiscriminate, and it is also common (*sāmānya*) to many people and non-intelligent (*acetana*). That which is indiscriminate, common and non-intelligent cannot function for its own sake or for the sake of each other. The reason is that it is not a subject in itself and is not self-directed. The activity of such a composition cannot but be for the sake of another. Of course, even when we speak of the triguṇa composition as being for the sake of another, it is not consciously understood in such a way by triguṇa itself. Consequently, it may be difficult to understand why a thing which is not for itself or for each other is immediately for the sake of another.

Such unconscious activity of triguṇa, however, reveals explicitly the existence of a conscious self. The reason is that there must exist a conscious self which understands and recognizes the unconscious activity of triguṇa as unconscious activity. Regardless of how the unconscious activity of triguṇa is recognized, there must be a conscious self. that is, an intelligence (*cetana*), which does the recognizing. Together with the actor (*kartṛ*) of triguṇa, there must be the intelligence (*cetana*) of atriguṇa. The unconscious activity of triguṇa is never for itself or for each other but always for the sake of another which is the intelligence of atriguṇa. Then, how

can the activity of *kartr* (actor) which is *triguṇa* composition be considered to be for itself as well as for mutual purposes? The reason is that it is a union of the two principles⁹ *avyakta* (*pradhāna*) which is a *triguṇa* composition and *cetana* (*jñā*) which is an *atriguṇa* composition. Because of the union of these two principles, *kartr* (*triguṇa*) acts like *cetana* and *cetana* (*atriguṇa*) acts like *kartr*. Thus, the activities of *kartr* appear to be willed and conscious; that is, it seems to be for itself and for mutual purposes. However, it is only in *appearance* that *kartr* seems to be like *cetana*; in actuality *kartr* is truly an actor and not a knower, therefore, its activities are forever unconscious. It never acts for itself or for mutual purposes; it is exclusively for *cetana* (*puruṣa*) which is an *atriguṇa* composition.¹⁰

Thus the existence of *puruṣa* has been clarified by *saṅghāta-parārthatvāt*; the fact of *parārthatvāt* (for the sake of other) is the essence of *saṅghāta*. By its very nature *saṅghāta* as a *triguṇa* composition (*kartr*) is indiscriminating, object, common, non-intelligent, productive, and because of this it exists for the sake of *cetana* (*puruṣa*) which is an *atriguṇa* composition in contrast to *triguṇa* composition (*triguṇādi-viparyaya*) and therefore - discriminate, non-object, uncommon, intelligent, and non-productive. From this viewpoint the existence of *cetana* (*puruṣa*), which is the "other" (*para*) of *triguṇa* composition, should be recognized. As it is stated in *Kārikā* 17, "*triguṇādi-viparyayāt...puruṣo'sti*", *cetana* (*puruṣa*) which is the "other" opposed to *kartr* (*triguṇa*) is the intelligence which recognizes the non-intelligent activity of *Kartr* as non-intelligent activity. Neglecting this point, there can be no cognition of the unconscious activity of *kartr*; in fact, the unconscious activity of *kartr* is (governed) by the intelligence of *cetana* (*puruṣa*). This is suggested by the expression, *adhiṣṭhānāt*. For example, the wagon moves because it is driven by the driver. Just as there can be no progression without the guidance of the driver, so there can be no unconscious activity of *Kartr* without the guidance and the positive governing of the intelligence of *cetana* (*puruṣa*). Thus, from the standpoint of *adhiṣṭhāna* also the existence of *cetana* (*puruṣa*) is evident.

Those of *triguṇa* composition are by their very nature indiscriminate, object, and common; and the fact that they are indiscriminate, object, and common means that they are *bhogyā*. Thus, the *vyakta*, such as *buddhi*, should be enjoyed equally as indiscriminate

9. *Kārikā* 20.

10. *Kārikās*, 37 42 and 56ff.

because of *triguṇa* (this is the reason that the experience of pleasure, pain, etc., grows from within us). The *vyakta*, such as *buddhi*, is not the subject which experiences pleasure, pain, etc., for the very reason that *buddhi* has pleasure, pain, etc., as its essence, and it would be self-contradictory for pleasure to act on pleasure and so forth. There must be subject or an agent which experiences pleasure, pain, etc., without having them as its essence. Thus from the standpoint of *bhoktṛ-bhāva* the existence of *puruṣa* which is *cetana* and *atriguṇa* is clear.

As it has just now been clarified, the *vyakta*, such as *buddhi*, should be experienced equally as indiscriminate, but in this case equal experience (*sāmānya-bhoga*) is for the sake (*artha*) of *atriguṇa*, the "other" of *triguṇa*. And the realization of equal experience means the realization of the purpose of *atriguṇa*. The realization of this purpose which depends on *triguṇa* is dependent upon the realization of this equal experience. Thus the problem now becomes the completion of the realization of equal experience. However, the completion of equal experience, the purpose of *atriguṇa*, is the natural consequence of its realization. And it is also for the sake of *atriguṇa*, the "opposite" of *triguṇa*. In the completion of equal experience the *atriguṇa* composition manifests its true nature; it becomes discriminate, non-object, uncommon, intelligent, and non-productive, because of *atriguṇa*.¹¹ This means the final emancipation (*Kaivalya*) of the intelligence, the non-actor, which is *atriguṇa*. Therefore, it can be said that by its very nature *triguṇa* has as its purpose the experience and final emancipation of *atriguṇa*; that is, the activity of *triguṇa* is for the sake of *atriguṇa*, its experience and its final beatitude.¹² Thus from the point of view of *kaivalyārthapravṛtteḥ*, the existence of *puruṣa* which is *cetana* (*triguṇa*) can be seen.

II. The Plurality of *Puruṣa*.

The existence of *puruṣa* has been demonstrated by analyzing the meaning of *triguṇa* composition. *Triguṇa* is the basis for the cognition of *puruṣa* which is an *atriguṇa* composition. As long as we recognize *triguṇa* (*vyakta* and *avyakta*), *puruṣa* must exist.

11. *Kārikās* 65ff.

12. *Kārikās* 21 and 56ff.

Puruṣa (cetana, atriguṇa) is the basis for triguṇa compositions. If we reject puruṣa, what is the basis for the existence of triguṇa?¹³

There is another problem concerning puruṣa. Is puruṣa single (*eka*) for all bodies, or is it a plural existence corresponding to individual bodies? Kārikā 18 teaches that puruṣa is plural. It states :

Since there is separate allotment for birth, death, and organ,
And since there is non-simultaneity of action,
And since there is different modification of triguṇa,
It is clear that puruṣa exists in plurality.¹⁴

The existence of puruṣa has already been demonstrated in Kārikā 17 in relationship to triguṇa, but what is the puruṣa here referred to? Suggestions have been made concerning the general characteristics of puruṣa. That is, puruṣa, the atriguṇa composition in contrast to triguṇa composition, is the "other", the guide (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*), and enjoyer (*bhokṛ*) of triguṇa (vyakta-avyakta), and is independent of triguṇa. Such characteristics of puruṣa, express the general characteristics of puruṣa, such as discriminate, non-object, uncommon, intelligence, and non-productive. It means ultimately that in contrast to the general characteristics of vyakta-avyakta, the non-intelligent actor of triguṇa, they reveal the general characteristics of puruṣa, the non-acting intelligence of atriguṇa composition. Then how does puruṣa bear upon the problem of *samsāra* of sentient beings? In considering an answer it must be especially noted that the *samsāra* of sentient beings differ with each individual. There are countless differences in the *samsāra* of sentient beings, but does this result from triguṇa (vyakta-avyakta)? In a sense it appears to be so, because the vyakta of triguṇa has the avyakta of triguṇa as its basis and has cause, impermanence, and plurality. But, since the fundamental cause of vyakta, which is avyakta, is causeless, permanent, and single, it is inconceivable that a causal, impermanent,

13. The point to be especially noted is that puruṣa is the existential basis for vyakta and avyakta of triguṇa composition. This is clear from the fact that both exist for the sake of the "other" which is puruṣa. That puruṣa is the existential basis for vyakta and avyakta means that it also transcends the categories of cause and effect which are embraced in vyakta and avyakta in the Sāṃkhya. This is the reason that puruṣa is limited to the intelligent agent (lordship, enjoyer) which is neither cause nor effect. (Kārikā, 3).

14. janana-maraṇa-karaṇānām pratiniyamād ayugapat pravṛttes ca /
puruṣabahutvaṃ siddham traiguṇyaviparyayāc caiva //

and plural vyakta could directly be born from the causeless, permanent, and single avyakta. And although it may be ascribed to the transformation of the triguṇa nature of avyakta it cannot escape the facts of indiscriminate, object, common, and non-intelligence because of triguṇa composition, and thus it cannot fully explain the reason for the individual differences in the saṃsāra of sentient beings. It is for this reason that the puruṣa of atriguṇa composition appears in contrast to triguṇa. This puruṣa must be plural, because it is the basis of triguṇa (vyakta-avyakta) which clarifies the true picture of the saṃsāra or sentient beings. As long as individual differences in the saṃsāra of sentient beings are an indisputable fact, and as long as triguṇa cannot fully clarify the reason for the differences, then the puruṣa of atriguṇa composition which is the reason for the existence of triguṇa must be plural. If puruṣa is not plural, then what can explain the individual differences in the saṃsāra of sentient beings?

In this way we can see the reason for the plurality of puruṣa. The individual differences of sentient beings in saṃsāra can be explained by the plurality of puruṣa. Can we interpret this to mean the eternal aloneness of sentient beings in saṃsāra, that from the timeless beginning all beings are "born alone, die alone, go alone, come alone"? Whatever the answer may be, the important point is that the plurality of puruṣa is postulated as the basis for the individual differences in saṃsāra. In the sense that the plurality of puruṣa is thus postulated it becomes a matter of ultimate concern as clarifying an eternal aspect of sentient beings. This means that puruṣa is none other than the puruṣa of sentient beings and that it is found in all beings, a parallel to the Buddhist idea that Buddha-nature is universally prevalent in all beings.

When the plurality of puruṣa is advocated, it is clear that the singleness of puruṣa is assumed. Puruṣa does not exist in plurality corresponding to the individual beings, but it is one and same for all sentient beings. A single puruṣa exists in all beings as the thread (*sūtra*) which holds together the diamond necklace. On the other hand, it is conceivable that there is a plural manifestation of the single puruṣa, just as the moon is reflected simultaneously in many lakes and rivers. Such arguments, however, present problems when we remember the manifold individuality of sentient beings. If the individuality of sentient beings is clarified only by means of triguṇa (vyakta-avyakta), then it merely becomes a body which is indiscriminate, object, common, and non-intelligent. Although this may explain the total saṃsāra of sentient beings, it fails to account for the individual differences in saṃsāra. The facts of the separate determination of the birth, death, and organ of sentient beings, the non-simultaneity

of activity, the differences in *triguṇa*, and so forth, would forever remain an insoluble problem. Thus, the plurality of *puruṣa* is required, and the necessity for *puruṣa* which is an *atriguṇa* composition becomes valid. The reason is that *puruṣa* is discriminate, non-object, uncommon, intelligent, and non-productive, because it opposes *triguṇa*; and this implies the plurality of *puruṣa* which is neither cause nor effect and corresponds to the individual differences of sentient beings in *samsāra*.

III. The Witness, Final Emancipation, Neutrality, Perception, and Inactivity of *Puruṣa*

The Proof of the plural existence of *puruṣa* has been established. The plurality of *puruṣa* is the basis for the formation of the individual differences in the *samsāra* of sentient beings. The individual differences are due to a number of reasons—the separate determination of birth, death, and organ; the non-simultaneity of activity; the differences in *triguṇa*; and so forth—but they are all based on the plurality of *puruṣa*. And because they are based on the plurality of *puruṣa*, the *samsāra* of sentient beings has individual differences transcending distinctions in cause and effect (*triguṇa*, oneness and manyness).¹⁵

Then, what is the characteristic of *puruṣa* from the practical viewpoint? *Kārikā* 19 provides an answer to this problem which must be next considered. It states :

And because of its opposite, the witness, final emancipation, neutrality, perception, and inactivity of *puruṣa* are established.¹⁶

This *Kārikā* states that *puruṣa* possesses the five characteristics of witness and so forth. As it was pointed out earlier, the five characteristics are the necessary conclusions of *puruṣa* in opposition

15. The theory of *pariṇāma* which makes the *Sāṃkhya* system unique has been generally understood in the past as only a formal outline, emphasizing a metaphysical theory which remains satisfied with merely explaining the structure of the phenomenal world. When judged from the foregoing discussion, this interpretation is questionable. In actuality the *Sāṃkhya* theory of *pariṇāma* which is the necessary assumption of its concept of deliverance is not just a formal, metaphysical outline.

16. *tasmāc ca viparyāsāt siddham sākṣitvam asya puruṣasya /
kaivalyam mādhyasthyam draṣṭṛtvam akartṛbhāvaśca //*

to triguṇa. This should be especially noted. According to Kārikā 14, if it were triguṇa, it would be indiscriminate, object, common, non-intelligent, productive; and in opposition to this, if it were atriguṇa, it would be discriminate, non-object, uncommon, intelligent, non-productive. And since puruṣa is the opposite of triguṇa, it has the latter five characteristics, beginning with discriminate. Thus, the characteristics of witness, final emancipation, neutrality, perception, and inactivity of Kārikā 19 correspond to the characteristics of discriminate, non-object, uncommon, intelligent, and non-productive. But what is the precise nature of the correspondence? According to P. Deussen, non-object corresponds to witness, discriminate to final emancipation, uncommon to neutrality, intelligence to perception, and non-productive to inactivity.¹⁷ This point differs with the interpretation in the older commentary which does not appear to be as logically ordered as Deussen's. As noted in the above, since the five characteristics, beginning with discriminate, are the necessary conclusion of atriguṇa, according to Kārikā 14, these five characteristics have atriguṇa as the basis. Therefore, it is clear that the five characteristics of witness, final emancipation, neutrality, perception, and inactivity of atriguṇa correspond directly to the five characteristics, beginning with discriminate. When considered in this way, it may be said that Deussen's view is more valid than the interpretation in the older commentary. However, there is room for various views concerning the exact correspondence of each of the five characteristics in the two sets. In the first set the positive characteristics are discriminate and intelligence, and the negative characteristics are non-object, uncommon, and non-productive. In contrast to this in the second set the positive characteristics are witness, final emancipation, neutrality, perception, and the negative characteristic is inactivity. When we attempt to find a corresponding relationship between the positive and negative characteristics of the two sets, there is room for various interpretations and no final, definitive conclusion can be reached. But if we should propose an interpretation, the following statement can be made: among the five characteristics of the first set, the positive characteristics of discriminate and intelligence may be seen as corresponding to final emancipation-neutrality and witness-perception, respectively; and the negative characteristics of non-object, uncommon, and non-productive may be summarized into inactivity.

At any rate, as long as the five characteristics, beginning with witness, are the necessary conclusion of atriguṇa composition, they would as a whole correspond not only to the five characteristics of

17. P. Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, I. 3, (1922), S. 433.

discriminate and so forth, based upon *atriguṇa*, but also to the characteristics of subject, enjoyment, and final emancipation, taught in *Kārikā* 17. In short since these five characteristics, beginning with witness, are *atriguṇa* composition, they may be seen as concretely manifesting the characteristics of *puruṣa* which is non-acting intelligence. But since all sentient beings possess *puruṣa*, these five characteristics are necessarily possessed by them. Therefore, it may be said that the method of emancipation, of absolute freedom, of sentient beings from timeless *samsāra* is here revealed and suggested.

ADDITIONAL NOTE

The present essay has attempted to clarify the concept of *puruṣa* through establishing the proof of *puruṣa* in the *Sāṃkhya* system of philosophy. The concept of *Sāṃkhya* *puruṣa*, which cannot be simply identified with *ātman*, is succinctly and systematically explicated in *Kārikās* 17, 18, and 19. In order to clarify the concept of *puruṣa* the three *Kārikās* are of central importance, but they have been relatively neglected. The demonstration of *puruṣa* is not only well-organized in the three *Kārikās* themselves but is important in the development of various aspects of the *Sāṃkhya* system, such as the concepts of *pariṇāma* and of deliverance. Without this demonstration of *puruṣa*, we would probably not have the *Sāṃkhya* system as it exists today, for the very reason that the demonstration means the basis of *Sāṃkhya* system. But this is not easy to comprehend, because the proof for *puruṣa* is so simple and brief and because the development of the *Sāṃkhya* system which follows is very subtle and intricate.

The establishment of the proof for *puruṣa*, may be understood in three stages: the proof for the existence of *puruṣa*, the plurality of *puruṣa*, and the facts of witness, final emancipation, neutrality, perception, and inactivity of *puruṣa*.

The proof for the existence of *puruṣa* can be demonstrated by recourse to *vyakta* and *avyakta* which have *puruṣa* as their existential basis. As long as we recognize the existence of *vyakta* and *avyakta*, *puruṣa* must be assumed as their basis. This is the essential point about the demonstration of *puruṣa*, and the key factor is that *puruṣa*, as the existential basis of *vyakta* (effect) and *avyakta* (cause) which are *triguṇa* compositions, is an intelligence which is neither cause nor effect. *Puruṣa* as an intelligence which is neither cause nor effect in character, is the opposite "other" of

vyakta and avyakta, an atriguṇa composition. It is the "other" for which vyakta and avyakta exclusively exist. In this sense puruṣa may be described as the teleological, absolute 'other' as far as vyakta and avyakta are concerned. Since puruṣa is an absolute 'other', it transcends vyakta and avyakta (that is, it transcends cause and effect). It is forever separated and distinguished from vyakta and avyakta (discriminate). But at the same time, since vyakta and avyakta exist for the sake of another, this absolute 'other' cannot simply be cut off from vyakta and avyakta. The subtle point concerning the demonstration of puruṣa lies in the fact that while it is separated from vyakta and avyakta, it is not completely severed from them.

This subtle point is related to the plurality of puruṣa. Puruṣa, which is a teleological, absolute 'other' for vyakta and avyakta, appears to be a single entity underlying the manifold, individual sentient beings, but it is not single in the sense that avyakta is single. And neither is it plural in the sense that vyakta is plural. Since puruṣa as the existential basis for vyakta and avyakta is an intelligence which is neither cause nor effect, it must be enumerated (*samkhyā*) as separate and distinct from vyakta and avyakta (cause and effect). But how are the countless individual differences in the saṃsāra of sentient beings to be accounted for? If we recognize the countless individual differences in saṃsāra, then puruṣa must be plural, because they cannot be fully explained by vyakta and avyakta alone. The countless individual differences can be explicated only through puruṣa which is their existential basis. Based upon the plurality of puruṣa, the saṃsāra of sentient beings takes on individual differences which transcend distinctions in cause and effect (that is, triguṇa composition, one and many).

Thus, puruṣa, together with vyakta and avyakta, is postulated to explicate the problem of saṃsāra of sentient beings. The key to understanding the saṃsāra of sentient beings lies in puruṣa, as well as in vyakta and avyakta. Does puruṣa clarify the aloneness of sentient beings in saṃsāra from the timeless beginning, and does it reveal that self-same aloneness to be extended into the timeless future? Whatever the answer may be, each sentient being in saṃsāra undergoes separate forms of suffering because of puruṣa (*Kārikā* 55). The reason is that puruṣa is the subject and enjoyer of vyakta and avyakta which are triguṇa compositions. And at the same time it is because of puruṣa that we sentient beings achieve deliverance from the saṃsāra in the triple worlds. This is clear from the statement that the reason for individual suffering in the triple world is due to the lack of intelligence of puruṣa (*Kārikā* 55). When

the intelligence of puruṣa is born, it follows naturally that the final emancipation of puruṣa is attained (Kārikā 64 ff). Thus it may be said that puruṣa is the pivot on which both saṃsāra and deliverance hinge. The fact that puruṣa is crucial for both saṃsāra and deliverance contains the secret of its relationship to the concepts of pariṇāma and deliverance in the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy. This point is succinctly pointed out in Kārikā 19 which clarifies the aspects of witness, final emancipation, neutrality, perception, and inactivity of puruṣa.

In past studies the Sāṃkhya puruṣa has been critically observed from the standpoints of non-Sāṃkhya schools, such as Vedānta, Buddhist, and so forth. It is clear, however, that it must be understood within the total perspective of the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy itself. Such an approach is the premise not only for a full explanation and valid criticism of Sāṃkhya puruṣa but also for the understanding of the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy as a whole and the development of its concepts of pariṇāma and deliverance.

“Avyakto'yam acintyo'yam
 avikāryo'yam ucyate /
 tasmād evaṃ viditvai'nam
 nānuśocitum arhasi //

He is said to be unmanifest, unthinkable,
 and unchanging. Therefore knowing
 him as such,
 thou shouldst not grieve.”

“When Crite asks, “In what way shall
 we bury you, Socrates?” Socrates
 answers, “In any way you like, but
 first, you must catch me, the real *me*.
 Be of good cheer, my dear Crite, and
 say that you are burying my body
 only, and do with *that* whatever is
 usual and what you think best.”

—*The Bhagavadgītā*,

Ed. S. Radhakrishnan. London, 1948, p. 109

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
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